Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine's surprise incursion into Kursk: objectives, tactical & strategic gains and major risks.
Ukraine conducts the largest ever assault into Russia.
Ukraine has once again surprised the world with a daring and clearly unforeseen raid into the Kursk region of Russia.
Before delving into strategic/operational objective and gains for Ukraine, we should mention a few early observations:
1) Unlike the previous incursions into Russia, these were not some covert sabotage groups or a group of Russian ''patriots'' (based in Ukraine) turning against the Putin regime.
This operation was not exclusively limited to the participation of Ukraine's military intelligence "HUR" either.
No, this was a proper military force - Ukraine conducted a multi-brigade operation.
With (according to various reliable sources and open-source intel/OSINT) Ukraine's 22nd Mechanized and 82nd Air Brigades leading the charge - both are highly experienced and high-quality units.
2) In contrast to Russia's dismounted attacks in Kharkiv (which culminated pretty quickly given the light nature of the assault units), Ukraine's offensive into Kursk is led by mechanized and highly mobile forces - essential prerequisites for successful exploitation of gaps within Russian defenses.
3) Notions of a fully transparent battlefield have been debunked: no amount of live satellite imagery and drone coverage prevented Russia being caught off-guard.
Eastern Ukraine is probably the most closely watched space in the world right now, and yet Russia was still unable to 1) see Ukraine's mechanized forces organize, and 2) Move in the direction of the border in time to prevent an incursion into Kursk.
This highlights the continued importance of surprise, initiative, and ultimately, maneuver warfare in this war.
The fact that Ukrainian forces were able to conceal their mechanized force (unlike Russians concealing only dismounted troops in Kharkiv in May) for long enough to launch this offensive is a further testament to the skill of experienced officers in Ukraine’s military leadership.
(side note: it is also notable that Ukraine had significantly improved its short-range air defenses that protect its assault units. Unlike the counteroffensive of last summer, the Kursk offensive has demonstrated more successful deployment of air defense assets: shooting down at least one Russian aircraft and two helicopters.)
Tactical and operational goals.
1) Wiping out Khalino air base.
This air base is located in the Kursk region (mere 65 miles from the border with Ukraine) and typically hosts more than 24 Sukhoi Su-30SM fighter-bombers that can carry KAB glide bombs (which have terrorized the 700-mile long frontlines between Ukraine and Russia).
And even days and weeks prior to the invasion, Ukraine was consistently targeting the air base with missiles (most recently, with an adapted version of the Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles).
It is thus far unclear if Ukraine has reached close enough to that base but if they manage to take over and render it inoperable for the foreseeable future, then this will clearly amount to a major success.
(side note: in addition to operations in Kursk, Ukraine has also apparently successfully destroyed the Lipetsk air base ammo depot - facility which was apparently storing hundreds of glide bombs. This is a smart move. Destroying an ammo storage will prevent far more air sorties against Ukraine than damaging specific aircraft.)
2) Dividing & redirecting Russian resources.
It is too soon to judge the value of this campaign, but one thing is clear: this will surely redirect resources within the Russian military.
Clearly, repelling and pushing out Ukrainian forces will be the primary goal for the Russian military leadership.
This will surely take away from forces deployed in defense of front lines in Donbas.
More experienced troops tasked with further assaults may also end up being redirected towards the Kursk region.
In addition, reserves and new recruits being trained and allocated for the new offensive operations in Donbas will now likely be redirected to deal with this far more pressing urgency.
2) Attrition and forcing high value assets into the open.
Ukraine’s special forces have conducted important targeted strikes in support of this incursion.
Several nearby warehouses full of ammo were detonated and destroyed: Ukraine claims up to 700 stored glide bombs were either damaged or destroyed - same with helicopters and several dozen fighter jets like the Su-34, Su35 and MiG-31s - also allegedly damaged or destroyed.
If even a third of the claimed destruction figures pan out to be accurate, then that is already some significant success - the destroyed fighter jets aren’t easy to replace, (unlike tanks which can be retrofitted from long-storage spare parts).
4) Sowing discord and causing low-morale within the Russian military ranks.
The longer this crisis for Russia drags the worse it is for the morale of the ordinary Russian troops.
Every time there is a setback within the Russian military, we see a number of telegram channels start to leak videos/recordings of disillusioned commanders (like the well-liked Popov) who berate the top brass for corruption and incompetence.
Naturally, it is obvious that for Russia’s military, this is an acceptable security failure: a country that they have been in war with for more than two years crosses the border in one of the most obvious locations ever - this is not some sabotage campaign in some remote Siberian village - several brigades have literally invaded Russia from the most obvious direction.
So some leaders will have to be fired and internal investigations would need to be conducted: all of this is extremely good for the morale of Ukraine’s army and very bad for Russia’s.
Indeed, there are already unconfirmed rumors that the Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov is in trouble (apparently, he has skipped a few televised security briefings organized by the Kremlin since the onset of the Kursk incursion).
Strategic goals sought by Ukraine.
1) Display flexibility of Putin’s ‘‘red lines’’.
For more than two years now, Putin has dissuaded countless weapon transfers and slowed down help to Ukraine with his frequent threats that certain Western moves would ‘‘cross red lines’’ and be deemed as ‘‘escalatory’’.
We have frequently discussed that in practice, Putin’s red lines are extremely malleable and can withstand a lot of stress from Ukraine.
Western statesmen and analysts don’t put enough weight into considering the dilemmas faced by Putin: admitting that red lines have indeed been crossed would necessitate a corresponding adequate response - which in practice means 1) mobilization, and 2) resorting to more drastic measures.
Both options are not great for Putin - they both add political risks to his regime.
And in this case too, although Russia has declared a general state of emergency in the Kursk region, Putin is yet to take more drastic measures - like ordering a general mobilization or even a declaration of war.
(side note: in any other context, any other normal country with normal political governance would have declared war on another country invading its territories. But Putin is primarily driven by the need to ensure survivability of his regime, and so he is still reluctant to abandon the language of the ‘‘special military operation”. Formally therefore, Russia is conducting anti-sabotage and anti-terrorism operations in Kursk.)
2) Reverse national morale trends.
For months, Ukraine has been losing ground in Donetsk and the incursion from the Kharkiv axis in May was a particularly demoralizing event.
And even though the western arms are pouring back in, and new advanced weapons and platforms (like the F-16s) are being delivered and the NATO’s July summit was certainly a politically monumental event for the country, there was still a lot of gloom and lack of progress on the frontlines.
On the flip side, Russians were getting quite comfortable with the day to day of the war - war economy is producing plenty of new jobs, economy (in spite of major sanctions) is doing relatively well and instead of mobilizing troops, Putin has decided to increase the monetary incentives for the volunteers to astonishing (by Russian standards) levels: reaching some $59k in monetary incentives for Russians in Moscow (in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, for American citizens this would be something like an offer of around $230k (or around 4x) to join and serve 1 year fighting in the war.)
Clearly, the momentum is reversed - Putin is now on the defensive, and there is a global social media buzz behind Ukraine.
3) Create threats to Putin’s regime.
Contrary to popular belief, Putin’s regime isn’t bulletproof to external crises.
Although it is true that Putin has gotten rid of all of the genuine political opposition (with mainstream/popular opposition leader Navalny dead and nationalist leader Igor Girkin in prison) there can still be significant challenges to his regime.
There was a Prigozhin uprising/coup attempt that shook Putin and created the biggest challenge to his regime.
(side note: one wonders what would be the outcome if the attempt was better timed. Imagine if this attempt was done a year later - today: when Putin is already stretched thin with the crisis in Kursk..)
But there were also other Generals and commanders that spoke against the corruption and incompetence in the Russian military (like General Popov - who was later fired for speaking out.)
If the situation in Kursk was to worsen and/or other embarrassments on the battlefield with Ukraine were to take place, then one can imagine how Putin could face another challenge from within the military (with or without public support - both Russian revolutions in 1917 were fueled by the public discontent and disillusionment caused by military defeats in the Eastern front..)
Major Risks.
1) Wipeout in exchange for little gain.
A lot of analysts have completely ignored this point, but it is important to remember that Ukrainian units in Kursk can in fact get decimated by an overwhelming Russian response.
Let’s not forget that units partaking in this incursion are not on their home turf - and they will consequently face the same disadvantages that Russian invading forces have faced: relying on external lines for logistics.
Units in Kursk have not yet established a logistics hub and secured a safe transport line for such provisions.
In addition, they will not have enough time to create serious fortifications and defensive fixtures.
That is unless Russia’s response is extremely delayed - but if that doesn’t happen (which, it likely won’t - given the gravity of the situation) then Ukrainian forces will face Russian troops on foreign turf and without secure lines for logistics and appropriate defensive lines.
Now, a total wipeout is unlikely to materialize - Ukraine can always choose to withdraw its forces.
But that would then beg the question: what was this all for? Was it really worthwhile to risk your most experienced troops and modern gear (for example, quite a few of the US-supplied Stryker combat vehicles were spotted in Kursk)?
2) Actual escalation: nuclear & general mobilization.
Technically speaking, Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk can be deemed as sufficient to trigger Russia’s doctrine on nuclear weapons use for defensive purposes.
Let’s recap the essence of this doctrine:
“In response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”
Obviously, the very existence of the state is not in jeopardy.. and to be clear, there would be enormous personal political cost admitting to such a threat: what was Putin doing all this time exposing Russians to this ‘‘existential threat’’?
How could the Russian army not guard its borders from a country that it has been fighting for 2.5 years now?
Indeed, there are many steps before possible use of such weapons - many embarrassing state of affairs for Putin to admit to.
And so to be clear, chances of such an escalation are very low - at least for now.
But if the Kursk assault was to expand and Putin sensed a threat to his regime - if he sensed loss of control, then one can see how he could resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Naturally, using these on Russian soil is out of question, but he could target a relatively little-populated area somewhere in western Ukraine to ‘‘make a point’’ - essentially, a demonstrative strike to shake leaders in Kyiv and compel them into backing off.
But if the risks of a nuclear escalation are still remote, the risk of Putin calling for a general mobilization isn’t as unlikely - especially if Russia fails to contain this incursion in a timely manner.
It would be politically costly for sure (admitting incapacity and impossibility of repelling this attack with a regular army) but at some point, Putin may no longer have any other viable options left.
The problem for Ukraine is that once the mobilization door has been opened, it won’t shut immediately after successful defeat of Ukraine’s incursion.
No, more likely is that the general mobilization will remain in order to ‘‘guard against future provocations”.
Consequently, Ukraine would have a massive Russian army backed by mobilization on its hands.
In addition, although there will be pressure on Putin, there will also likely be a rally ‘round the flag effect in play as well.
Up until now, ordinary Russians have largely been insulated from the daily realities of the war : with the highest casualty rates limited to small towns in remote locations - places (overrepresented with ethnic minorities) far away from large population centers of Russia.
But this would change with a general mobilization - and it would be too risky (and baseless) to assume that these Russians would not be motivated to fight back against Ukrainians (especially given this recent incursion).
3) Cannot repeat the same trick twice.
This is one of the least frequently discussed risks: similar incursions in both size and intensity are now unlikely to happen (at least from the Ukraine - Russia border).
Putin will likely throw the kitchen sink to ensure this.
In itself, this is not a major downside since Ukraine doesn't have an intention to invade Russia in any case.
So the risk here is associated with the timing risk: this trick is unlikely to be replicable.
So the question then becomes whether the timing was right: was this really the best time for Ukraine to pull off this trick?
Given the enormous tactical and strategic gains accruing to Kyiv, the question then becomes if accumulating those at another time would have been better?
Perhaps this assault should have been delayed until such a point in time when it was a far more opportune moment to negotiate in earnest and so, such a trick could then act as another jolt?
Or when there was another inhabitant of the White House that was becoming increasingly disillusioned about Ukraine's chances, and so this little push would have turned the narrative at a far more crucial point in time?
(Side note: there are some pundits that have suggested that this is in fact what Ukraine is trying to achieve - to use the captured territory as a trade in the upcoming peace summit in the fall. But such arguments rest upon heroic assumptions - not least that it presumes Ukraine's ability to keep hold of the territories for 2-3 months!)