Weekly Overview Cables - Updates on the counteroffensive and Ukraine's short-range air defense problem.
*note: on Thursday’s cables, we shall take a deeper dive and explore Putin’s playbook and next moves after last week’s attempted coup. Happy 4th!
Ukraine War Updates.
1) With three layers of entrenched defensive lines and minefields to overcome, Ukrainian counteroffensive is continuing at a gradual (yet understandably slow) pace.
There have been reports of marginal gains and forward progress in Bakhmut Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts (districts).
2) President Zelensky warned that Russia may deliberately cause a nuclear incident at Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, in order to use the excuse of the radioactive fallout to then freeze the conflict.
Such a scenario although not wholly implausible (especially after the Kakhovka dam explosion - with an overwhelming evidence pointing towards a Russian sabotage) is still very unlikely.
This is because any nuclear fallout will by definition become uncontrollable - placing Russia itself (as well as the Russia-occupied territories in Ukraine) under a significant risk.
This is essentially a gamble around the direction of wind - Putin can be reckless, but such a move would simply be idiotic.
And given that a lot of EU member states are likely to be exposed to such a potential fallout, it is not at all clear that there will be any remaining appetite to deal with (negotiate with) Putin under the pretense that he is still a rational actor.
In other words, there are simply way too many ways for this to backfire massively on Russia-any possible benefits would not justify taking on such drastic risks.
A more likely scenario therefore, is one where Russia would continue to use the general concern around the said nuclear plant’s state, to induce a general atmosphere in the western backers of Ukraine - to persuade them into negotiations indirectly.
3) Ukraine fatigue reversal.
Could it be the impact of Wagner’s attempted coup?
Whatever is the ultimate root cause however, the news around a very sharp increase in the US public sentiment for continuous support of Ukraine is great.
A two-day and a highly reputable Reuters/Ipsos poll that was concluded last Tuesday, demonstrated a sharp increase in support for armament of Ukraine: 65% in favor vs 46% in May.
Moreover, and after a very long time, a majority of Republican voters (56%) are now also in favor of arming Ukraine.
In addition, fully 76% of surveyed Americans agreed that by arming Ukraine the US demonstrated to China and other adversaries that America had “the will and capability to protect our interests, our allies and ourselves.” (Hear that DeSantis?!)
4) The new $500 million security assistance package from the Biden admin will now include provision of fire torpedoes: most likely to be used to clear minefields and attack trench fortifications.
(side note: remember the opening scenes of the D-day landing in Saving Private Ryan? What was used against beach fortifications and bunkers? The modern version of similar weapons will now be used in the battlefields of Donbas: yet another reminder of how well-entrenched Russia’s layered defenses are. Real patience is required in expectations placed on Ukraine.)
5) The US gathered extreme details on Prigozhin uprising but refused to share with wider NATO alliance, limiting it to select partners like the UK:
“Once Prigozhin launched his rebellion, senior US officials began scrambling to connect with allies and partners and reiterate a key message: that the West should remain silent and not give Putin any opening to lay the blame on the US or NATO for the insurrection.
Privately, US officials were reinforcing to the Russian government that the US had nothing to do with the uprising – and urging them to maintain the safety and security of their nuclear arsenal, officials said.
On Saturday, before Prigozhin stood down, there was outreach to Ukrainian officials from allies on a number of different levels, cautioning them to resist taking advantage of the chaos to strike inside Russia, according to a Western official.
The concern was that Ukraine and the West would be seen as helping Prigozhin and threatening Russian sovereignty.”
This will lead to some awkward chat in the upcoming NATO meeting (though it should not - of course the US had to keep it closely secret. But one is curious whether France was informed..).
6) Moscow is suspected in conducting an act of sabotage/explosion against an arms factory in the town of Karnobat - just as Bulgaria is ramping up military exports to Ukraine
Russia is displaying an increasing willingness to target NATO assets that play a role in supplying/arming Ukraine.
This adds to their often-repeated threat against NATO assets if/when they deliver the type of weapons to Ukraine that ostensibly violate the Kremlin’s (ever so easily crossable) red lines.
Naturally, this is unlikely to deter or cause hesitation in NATO states this late in the game.
And in the meantime, many NATO members are in fact doubling down on forward-presence - with Germany becoming the latest country to offer a forward deployment of troops: up to 4,000 German troops will be available for deployment in Lithuania - to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank.
7) GOP nominees that promote the right message to the base:
Nikki Haley: “This is a time where we should be pushing Putin to get out of Ukraine and to make sure that we're all standing with a strong force. This is an opportunity where … it requires action from all of the alliances….. Putin is distracted, he's caught flat-footed. He's got very few options, and this is a time where we need to be on our game and make sure that we handle this appropriately.”
Candidate and former CIA officer, Will Hurd: “We had intelligence reports that suggest that this was going forward, we should have been planning with our allies, we should have been planning with the Ukrainians on how to take advantage of this opportunity …We should be supporting the Ukrainians more. I think that even goes as far as doing a no-fly zone and helping them enforce that no-fly zone.”
Denmark is also considering the supply of its aging F-16 fleet (precise number and timing is unclear as of this moment) as it is replacing the older fleet with the new 27 F-35s.
Ukraine’s Short-Range Air Defense problem.
It is now becoming clear that Russia has once again found use for its Ka-52 ‘‘alligator’’ attack helicopters.
These performed relatively well in the early days of the war - up until the moment when most of the fighting consolidated in larger cities: where these helicopters came too close within the range of the short-range and man-portable (MANPADS) Stinger air-defense missile systems.
Alligators played a less prominent role in battles for Kherson, Kharkiv, Soledar and Bakhmut.
But they are once again back in the arena - with devastating outcomes for Ukraine.
Most of the early footage of the destroyed western heavy armor (Bradley fighting vehicles and Leopard II tanks) was due to these Ka-52 alligators.
And there is a very specific reason for this: now that Ukraine is on a counteroffensive, and trying to breach layered Russian defenses, the alligators can stay at a safe distance of approximately 5 miles (outside of Stinger’s 3 miles range), and shoot at incoming armored vehicles and tanks (with 9A4172k Vikhr-1 laser-guided ATGM missiles) whilst facing a lesser risk of a counter-fire.
(side note: the upgraded Ka-52s can now fire the more advanced LMUR anti-armor missiles (with a 9 mile range). These have not been seen in Ukraine, but the missiles can be employed by other platforms - and this much was indeed observed)
It is not that Ukraine doesn’t have tools to tackle the Ka-52 problem, it is instead a problem of sufficient quantity.
Ukraine has two primary SHORAD weapons from the Soviet era: the 9K330 Tor (NATO name: SA-15 Gauntlet) and the older 9K33 Osa (NATO name: SA-8 Gecko).
Both have the range to destroy the Ka-52 (even at a hypothetical distance of 9 miles when using LMURs).
But both are in limited supply - many having been already destroyed.
In addition to older/Soviet weapons, Ukraine did also receive NATO-supplied German 52 Gepards, and 20 of the American AN/TWQ-1 Avengers - but both are in limited supply and many have been (rightly) allocated to point defense of key cities and infrastructure deeper inside Ukraine: with a special focus on cheaper Iranian (Shahed) drones and shorter - range missiles that do not warrant the expenditure of more expensive NASAMS/Patriot and IRIS-T missiles (better suited to long-range cruise and ballistic missiles).
Now then, the immediate solution to this problem is provision of an appropriate amount of short-range air defense systems (SHORAD) that will have a longer range and higher survivability than a soldier carrying a MANPAD.
The US and rest of the NATO states must hurry with this - they are urgently needed at the frontlines in Donbas to prop up the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
But that’s not all that Ukraine’s western allies can do here.
A longer-term solution to the attack helicopter problem, is to destroy the air fields where they take off - precluding their ability to travel short distances to the frontlines.
And to do this - to target and destroy targets further away from the frontlines -Ukraine needs ATACMS to be fired by its HIMARS.
These cables have been calling for their supply since the very beginning of this war.
Once again, after dragging its feet for no good reason, and wasting so much valuable time, the Biden admin is finally close to coming around on this.
One hopes that even further delays will now be avoided - Ukraine needs all the tools necessary to capitalize on Putin’s weakened domestic posture - inflicting as much damage on the battlefield as possible.