Weekly Overview Cables - Zelensky and Putin frame their initial Trump messaging, and Trump's future plans for Ukraine.

Ukraine War Updates.

• 1) Ukraine targets Russia in the Caspian sea - Iran shipments next?

• In yet another spectacular demonstration of its long-range strike capabilities, Ukrainian UAVs hit a Russian Navy base in the Caspian Sea - some 500+ miles away from frontlines in Ukraine.

• Wednesday’s strike adds to a string of devastating hits against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which has been hemorrhaging assets under Ukraine’s relentless campaign.

• Using homegrown missiles and naval drones, Kyiv has managed to inflict severe damage without a conventional navy.

• This asymmetrical approach has, over the last two years, pushed Moscow to retreat, relocating its prized fleet from the Crimean peninsula closer to Russian shores - a strategic shift that underscores Ukraine’s growing prowess in unconventional warfare.

• Ukrainian forces have sunk, destroyed, or damaged at least 32 medium to large Russian naval vessels in the Black Sea, according to the U.S. military intel.

• 2) Zelensky pitched to strength and stroked Trump’s ego.

• In response to Trump’s future return to the White House, President Zelensky had to once again engage in ego-handling - as if the administration of the war itself wasn’t enough of a burden already:

  Congratulations to @realDonaldTrump on his impressive election victory! I recall our great meeting with President Trump back in September, when we discussed in detail the Ukraine-U.S. strategic partnership, the Victory Plan, and ways to put an end to Russian aggression against Ukraine. I appreciate President Trump’s commitment to the “peace through strength” approach in global affairs. This is exactly the principle that can practically bring just peace in Ukraine closer. I am hopeful that we will put it into action together. [emphasis added]

• This is a pretty transparent attempt to massage Trump’s ego and shower him with flattery - there is nothing that Trump likes more than being called strong.

• But this transparency in flattery is fine - absolutely everyone was fully aware that Zelensky would need to flatter Trump

• And as far as messaging goes, this is really good - Zelensky is right to appeal to Trump’s desire to win and demonstrate strength.

• In fact, this is an under-appreciated aspect of Trump’s personality that those eager to jump on the “Trump is back, Ukraine is gone” doomer train refuse to acknowledge.

• Trump has spent months attacking Biden for the shameful scenes of U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and has frequently blamed the outbreak of the war in Ukraine on Biden’s failure of deterrence - emphasizing that Putin would ‘‘never go into Ukraine’’ under his presidency.

• (side note: this side of Trump is not very much appreciated by the Putin appeasing weirdos that form a faction of MAGA right - people like Tucker Carlson et al, who insist that the invasion was caused by the “NATO expansion’’ - never mind that prior to this war, Ukraine joining NATO wasn’t even on a near-term agenda, or the fact that Finland has since joined NATO and Putin is somehow pretty chill about that. What happened to the “They are encircling and threatening Russia” argument? Why did Russia fail to invade Finland prior to their accession?)

• So Zelensky is quite right to frame support for Ukraine as demonstration of strength for Trump - from Ukraine’s perspective, the best way to ensure continuous military support is to make it clear to Trump that Ukraine’s collapse would be a stain on Trump’s presidency, and that he will be forever associated with “weakness” and ‘‘losing’’ - the very two things that he hates the most.

• Volodymyr Zelenskyy told journalists this week that the Ukrainian forces have received only 10% of a $61 billion U.S. aid package pledged in April, blaming delays on bureaucracy and logistics.

• it’s the White House’s only chance to send new equipment to Ukraine ahead of inauguration day, as Kyiv faces a renewed Russian assault in the east. The administration can give Ukraine $4.3 billion to pull existing Pentagon stocks and has $2.1 billion on hand to put in more orders for weapons with U.S. defense contractors. Unlike other steps the Biden administration can take during the “lame duck” period, it’s not remotely Trump-proof

• 3) Putin is quick to adapt to Trump’s return.

• In comments made at the Valdai Discussion Club (Russia’s version of Davos) Putin commented on Trump’s win and on the possibility of a reset in the US-Russia relations.

• Implying (rather baselessly) that Trump’s win was to do with the desire to ‘‘restore relations with Russia” and ‘‘help end the Ukrainian crisis”, Putin then noted that Russia was open to the "possibility of restoring relations with the United States."

• Note how he still insists on describing the situation as a ‘‘crisis’’. As if he didn’t launch and unprovoked invasion and is instead an impartial third-party observer.

• And of course, Trump’s election probably has very little to do with Ukraine.

• Most Americans (including most of the Republican voters) express support for Ukraine, but this is simply not a salient issue for most of the Trump voters.

• Trump’s win had 10x more to do with a combination of Biden admin’s inexcusable failure to protect the southern border - leading to mass immigration of undocumented migrants, democrats’ weird obsession with woke politics and gender pronouns, and to some extent, voter resentment around inflation.

• (side note: the economy is probably not as salient as immigration and cultural fights. Most Trump voters will magically feel way better about the economy a few days after Trump’s return. There is a precedent to this radical perception switch.)

• But Putin is already seeding the talk of normalization - of course, he will insert more into that talking point - how for example, Ukraine conceding 20% of its territory will be necessary to ‘‘normalize’’ these relations.

• Will this work? Hopefully not.

• And there is some tentative good news on that front.

• In his first phone call with Putin, Trump allegedly warned the latter to not ‘‘escalate’’ the war in Ukraine - reminding Putin that the U.S. had substantial military assets in Europe.

• This is a good start - Trump is starting from a position of strength and implied threats.

• Let us hope that this will continue.

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Possible Trump Plans For Ukraine.

• In an under-the-radar preference that may surprise outsiders, many within Ukraine's government institutions had a clear preference for Trump over Harris.

• Much like the American electorate's demand for change on various fronts, these Ukrainian officials felt frustration with the current trajectory and viewed a Trump administration as a potential agent for the shake-up they believe necessary to reverse what they see as a losing drip-drip strategy: leading to a slow death of Ukraine.

• Indeed, just last week, President Zelensky disclosed to journalists that Ukrainian forces have so far received just 10% of the $61 billion U.S. aid package promised back in April.

• Zelensky attributed the lag to bureaucratic and logistical hurdles.

• We have discussed this issue throughout the past two years - the slow, indecisive drip-drip aid has always been just enough to ensure Ukraine’s survival in this war of attrition (although, even for this narrower goal, the aid is becoming increasingly inadequate - given Russia’s compounding advantages) but nowhere near enough to enable an actual victory for Ukraine.

• So then, from Kyiv’s perspective, risking an all-out bet for a radical shake-up may be preferable to the slow death that is being currently inflicted on it.

• So what would a new Trump presidency mean for Ukraine?

• It is clear that Trump was never going to end the war within the ‘‘24 hours” of his election

• (side note: one could make a petty argument that this is the first promise broken already)

• Or even the first 24 hours of coming to power in January.

• But even though a lot of day-to-day dynamics can in fact change, the six major variables in this equation will remain relatively static and are going to be as follows:

• 1) To what extent will Trump be willing to inflict costs on Russia as a no deal punishment? To what extent will Trump be willing to do the same to Ukraine? (if Zelensky refuses to take a bad deal)? Will he really abandon Ukraine and let it crumble under Russian onslaught? Will Trump be willing to stain his presidency with the Russian takeover of Ukraine?

• 2) To what extent will the GOP establishment in Congress and his State Dept/Defense Dept/Intel agencies push back on Trump?

• We know that prominent republicans in the Senate (like Lindsay Graham) and in Congress, like the House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Mike McCaul (R-Texas) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Lead Republican Mike Turner are strongly pro-Ukraine.

• And Mike McCaul (who has an outsized impact on Speaker Mike Johnson in getting the $60bn Ukraine aid bill passed in April) has been extremely critical of the Biden admin for restrictions on the use of US-supplied ATACMS against targets within Russia.

• It is hard to see how there wouldn’t be major pushback against Trump’s potentially extreme concessions on Ukraine.

• 3) How will the EU react to all of this? Will they step up and rise to the challenge? Will European allies increase their contribution in hardware supplies, military-industrial production and weapons transfer to Ukraine? Or will they act weak and let Ukraine crumble if the US was to somehow completely withdraw its support?

• There is a hopeful indication that Europe may step up to the challenge.

• A trigger to the collapse of the German governing coalition for example, was Chancellor Scholz’s insistence that more money be spent on defense after Trump’s win.

• This led to a disagreement with the Finance minister Christian Lindner (representing the FDP) and to his eventual dismissal.

• But major EU powers like Germany and France still spend 3-4 lesser share of their GDP on helping Ukraine when compared to the Baltics states and countries like Denmark.

• For any chance at a credible cost display to Putin, major powers like France and Germany would need to step up their involvement and the scale of their spend on all things defense.

• 4) Russia’s internal dynamics and Putin’s calculus: how willing is he going to be to prolong the war?

• Will he call Trump’s bluff (in case of a no deal) ? Will he overestimate his capacity to prolong the war of attrition? How would the mood in Russia change going forward in 2025? Would the rising casualties in tandem with inflation and the offer of a Russia-friendly ceasefire/frozen frontlines persuade the Russian public that they had enough of this war? What if Putin insists on continuation of the war? Will there be a pushback?

• 5) Russia’s allies: their willingness and capacity for sustained support.

• To what extent will Trump impose costs on countries like India and the UAE (soft enabler) ? What about China, Iran and North Korea (hard enablers) ?

• Beijing is already bracing for a tariff war with Trump - if he then imposes additional costs on Chinese economy in order to dissuade aid to Russia, well then Xi Jinping may conclude that the cost of supporting Putin in a prolonged war with Putin’s maximalist war aims, outweighs the cost of continuously backing.

• 6) Ukraine’s internal dynamics and Zelensky’s calculus.

• Although Ukrainians are broadly in support of continuing the war - which they largely consider as one of independence - the support for negotiated outcomes has in fact been rising as of late.

• This is understandable - the Ukrainian public is not presented with a clear path to victory.

• And whatever Zelensky presented as a victory plan is simply not realistic to attain as of right now - the U.S. is unfortunately not willing to support Ukraine to that extent (at least, thus far).

• In addition, there is an issue with recruitment and manpower - lowering the conscription age below 25 is probably necessary at this point, but also politically more costly as well.

• Moreover, the rate of desertions has gone up, and brazen/aggressive behavior from recruitment officers (caught on video) has caused further public backlash.

• In other words, the situation is very tense, and a lot of future sentiment and desire (and the public’s corresponding instruction to the government) to either continue fighting or negotiate/settle will depend on the near-term prognosis: if Russia continues to capture more and more territory and there is not some drastic shift in policy from the West, well, then the likelihood that the Ukrainian people will maintain their appetite for the continuation of this war goes down significantly.

• So then, Zelensky’s calculus and the hand that he is able to play is contingent on the near-term developments at the front.

• And these developments will lead to a stronger public support to continue the fight - consequently, Zelensky will then get a stronger hand to push back against any external pressure to make unpalatable concessions.

• Unfortunately, the opposite is also true.

• Now, what about Trump’s actual plans?

• Not much has been spelled out yet, but broadly speaking, there are two possibilities here.

• 1) The most serious proposal from Trump’s team is one coming from the former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (also published in WSJ back in June).

• We will review that proposal in the next cable.

• But there is also a WSJ report on Trump’s inner circle/transition team’s proposals.

• We shall review them after evaluating Pompeo’s proposals.

• (side note: Trump confirmed that Mike Pompeo will not be returning to his administration. But Pompeo’s proposals are still substantive and we shall review them regardless - since it is likely that at least some of his policy proposals will be co-opted and reapplied by the incoming administration.)