Weekly Overview
Ukraine gains an opening for a counteroffensive: empowering and equipping Kyiv for effective counterattacks & mitigating the most consequential risks.
Amidst the generally stalled offensive, Russia started the week with shows of strengths - by doubling down on the use of hypersonic Kinzhal (as well as Kalibr) cruise missiles to strike high-value Ukrainian defense industry targets, and important military installations/bases.
The week ended however, with credible intelligence prognosis that Ukraine can actually now push back against Russia and start the campaign to free its territories from the invading army.
Indeed, after a string of successful counter-attacks, the Ukrainian forces have recaptured towns and suburbs east of the capital Kyiv on Friday (and 20,000 civilians have abandoned the area - allowing Ukraine to continue its push forward).
And according to the British intel, Russian forces near the capital are falling back.
And that’s not all - according to the Pentagon, for the first time since its occupation of Kherson in the Southern front, Russia has now lost partial control over the city.
All of this has led to Russian leadership finally coming to terms with the new status quo on the battlefield - forcing them to publicly change the objectives of this military campaign: no longer seeking to topple Zelensky (regime change), or encircling/laying siege on Kyiv to force concessions (compellence strategy).
No, instead, and in a public press briefing, Russian generals announced a new stage of the war - focused on complete “liberation of Donbas’’.
(side note: naturally, we shouldn’t take these statements solely on their face value - besides, the military objectives could once again change if Russia sees renewed success on the battlefield)
The generals then went on to make completely implausible claims that this was in fact the plan from the very outset, and that the attacks along other axes and on Kyiv in particular, were conducted as a sideshow - to serve as a ‘‘distraction’’ from this ultimate goal of fully ‘‘liberating’’ Donbas.
This is of course a pathetic attempt to save face, and utter nonsense.
Russia sent some of its most valuable ‘‘elite’’ VDV forces to take over Kyiv, and distractions are usually not in the form of 40 mile long military convoys - all that hardware could have been used to achieve faster territorial conquest in the Donbas arena.
Besides, Putin himself publicly called on the Ukrainian military to overthrow the government in Kyiv.
He never hid his original plans for a regime change - neither in rhetoric nor in actual commands (many of which were public).
But we shall not spend too much time rebutting these rather obvious pretenses and lies.
Instead, we shall take a closer look at: 1) what pushed Russia towards this decision, and what is the best case scenario that Putin can now hope for, 2) what needs to be done to help Ukraine take over the initiative, and launch an effective counterattack, and 3) How to minimize risks of Russia’s disproportionate use of force in the form of biological/chemical weapons.
1) What forced Putin’s hand?
Faced with brutal reality, Putin had to adapt and alter his military objectives.
The fact is that Russia is getting weaker with every day.
With a significant corporate exodus, hundreds of thousands of Russians will lose their jobs and there is already an enormous brain drain - this is especially the case with high-skilled tech employees, promising nothing good for the long-term economic growth.
Having said that, the initial ‘‘shock’’ effect is gradually wearing off, and Russia’s ‘‘potemkin’’ stock market has been partially reopened (with, so far severe restrictions), and ruble has rebounded after Central Bank head Nabiullina’s rapid response competent management, and Putin’s suggestion that (in the near future) the payment for gas (from ‘‘unfriendly countries’’ - meaning the EU) will be demanded in rubles.
This is to say that the main reason for Putin’s change of heart was probably the demonstratively terrible military campaign.
Firstly, Russian casualties have been rising at an unsustainable rate.
Relying on (probably inflated) Ukrainian numbers is certainly a bit risky, but the latest number presented by the Russian Ministry of Defense (1,351 service members killed and another 3,825 wounded), is also highly implausible.
NATO’s estimation is probably more likely, and still devastating: 40,000 total casualties (killed, wounded and/or captured/missing), with KIA number in the 7,000-15,000 range.
This is a significant number - more than 25% of the original 190,000 strong army assembled before the invasion.
And the situation is equally dire when it comes to deaths of senior leadership: nearly 35% of Russian generals involved in Ukraine, have now been killed.
Secondly, there is an issue of basic operational competence and logistical prowess.
The failure rate on Russia’s precision-guided missiles reaches an embarrassing 60%.
In addition, almost half of Russia’s cruise missiles are gone - all used up, and the stock of the PGM (precision-guided munitions) is also emptying quickly: meaning that Russia would have to rely on ‘‘dumb’’ unguided bombs going forward - with further corresponding reduction in the operational success.
Russia simply cannot afford to continue in this way - wasting the remaining high-value missiles, without making contingency plans for a potential confrontation with NATO.
Finally, there are credible indicators of significant losses in morale.
There is the case of a suddenly emotional Russian general dissatisfied with the campaign in Ukraine.
And then there is this potential incidence of fragging: a shocking suggestion (revealed by a reputable “The Guardian” reporter) that a Russian general may have been killed by his own troops - due to sheer anger directed at senior leadership’s performance:
The best that Putin can aim for.
Given all this context, what is the best case realistic outcome for Putin?
Ideally, all of the following:
1) Russia expands territorial gains in Donbas, inflicting further damage on Ukrainian forces and solidifying a land corridor with Crimea.
2) ‘‘Denazification’’ - if Russia crushed Azov Battalion/took over Mariupol, Putin could then declare that the goal of ‘‘denazification’’ (however absurd) has been attained.
3) ‘‘Demilitarization’’ - either Ukraine agrees to Russian demands to reduce its army to that of 50,000/5x smaller than now, (we can rule this one out as an impossible demand), or Putin inflicts further damage to Ukraine’s military-industrial complex via further cruise/ballistic missile strikes.
4) Ukraine accepting neutrality.
So far, only the first scenario is likely to occur, ‘‘Denazification’’ and ‘‘Demilitarization’’ are concepts vague enough to claim their achievement without much evidence, and neutrality is partially agreed to by Ukraine (with Kyiv’s acknowledgement that it will not be getting into NATO anytime soon).
Here are the main sticking points:
1) As Turkish President Erdogan suggested, the question of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty over Crimea and Donbas.
Here, Zelensky will already forgo some personal responsibility for a bad deal - by involving ordinary Ukrainians in having a say via a referendum vote on a potential settlement.
Perhaps a creative diplomatic draft could also maintain Ukraine’s formal sovereignty over the territories in the eastern Ukraine, whilst granting them further autonomy/de facto self-rule.
One thing is however, crystal clear: Ukraine (and the rest of the world) will not recognize Crimea or Donbas ‘‘republics’’ as Russian or independent state territories.
This is especially the case now: when Ukraine is regaining the momentum on the battlefield - and thus the pressure to succumb to a bad deal has been further reduced.
2) The question of neutrality and security guarantees: Ukraine seeking western security guarantees is a good policy (for Kyiv) but not something that Putin would ever agree to.
Any security guarantee would either be ironclad (and thus look awfully like a NATO backstop of Ukrainian security), or amount to something meaningless and unenforceable like the Locarno pact of a century ago.
Or even theBudapest memorandum of 1994: with its supposed security assurances towards Ukraine - in return for Kyiv’s forfeit of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine (although, to what extent Ukraine had a technical access to them / the extent to which it was a serious and practical concession, is highly debatable).
Therefore, the West (US and UK as a minimum - potentially also France, Germany and Turkey) would either have to agree to a meaningless security guarantee (damaging their own credibility and the weight of given assurances), or to something extremely impactful - and thus unacceptable to the Kremlin.
And then there is the EU membership - something Putin would have to accept (since Kyiv’s concession on the matter is almost inconceivable).
Consequently, there still are a couple of sticking points for a sustainable political settlement to take place.
So either: 1) There must be a successful strategy to affect Putin’s calculus even further, and force him to accept less for a settlement (for example, Putin should not be even be in a position to seriously demand the reduction of Ukraine’s army to 50,000 troops - leaving Ukraine vulnerable with a perpetual threat of a renewed invasion, and/or campaign of compellence, at Putin’s chosen time), or 2) There is a risk of a prolonged war of attrition with frequent stops/stalemates - a nightmare scenario of a semi-frozen conflict with frequent clashes: in essence, a post 2015 status quo with more frequent/bloody battles.
To avoid the latter option, and to strengthen Ukraine’s hand (and affect Putin’s calculus) the US/NATO must help Ukraine to further change facts on the ground in Kyiv’s favor.
And the French President is utterly wrong when pushing for the achievement of “first a ceasefire and then the total withdrawal of troops by diplomatic means. If we want to do that, we can't escalate either in words or actions."
On the contrary - to achieve a lasting ceasefire and a total withdrawal, the cost of continuing this war must be so high, that the Kremlin’s BATNA (Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement) becomes extremely unattractive - and a compromise deal ends up being their best option.
Consequently, the US/NATO must help Ukraine to launch an effective counter-offensive, and reclaim as much territory as it can, and in the shortest period of time.
2) Helping Ukraine to take over the initiative.
Firstly, what not to do: In his speech delivered in Poland, Biden’s remarks on Putin weren’t exactly helpful: ”For god’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.”
It is unclear what was the ultimate objective of this statement.
It is one thing to warn the West against business as usual/Putin’s normalization after this war (precisely what the British PM did - rightly too).
Quite another to openly call for a regime change in Russia.
The only possible time for such remarks: if credible preparations have been made/plans put in motion for Putin’s imminent fall - where the public statement acts as a backup for those on the fence about implementing this operation.
(side note: although, even then the risk of appearing as Western-backed traitors would surely outweigh any practical benefit of the statement)
There is little indication that this is indeed the case here - and as discussed in previous cables, Putin is relatively coup-proof.
So then, what was the point of it all?
Aside from playing right into Putin’s hands?
Enabling him and his propaganda officers to justify further military operations to ‘‘demilitarize’’ Ukraine - tying Kiev to ‘‘Western plots against Russia’’, and justifying prolonged military operations as acts of necessary self-defense.
Indeed, this echoes Obama’s comment on Syria in 2013: ‘‘Assad must go’’ - which was then followed with zero actions to make that happen (not to mention failure to act on the chemical weapons ‘‘red line’’/warning).
The President of the United States should not act like an op-ed columnist -expressing his aspirations without acting on them: such conduct only harms America’s credibility and prestige.
And the White House cleanup was even more pathetic: “The President’s point was that Putin cannot be allowed to exercise power over his neighbors or the region. He was not discussing Putin’s power in Russia, or regime change.”
Yes yes - and when President Reagan said ‘‘tear down this wall’’, he was actually referring to that out of place wall behind the shed in Gorbachev’s private residence/dacha.
Naturally, this is just laughable and frankly pathetic - everyone knew and understood exactly what Biden was talking about.
The White House must stop this terrible habit of trying to cover mistakes with even bigger embarrassments.
But back to what the US and NATO should be doing instead: keep raising costs of further operations and equip Ukraine with military hardware fit for an offensive warfare.
Specifically, the US must lead on delivering the following:
a) Military hardware conducive for counter-attacks and offensive warfare.
It is good that the UK is sending additional 6k missiles, and that the US is in the process of delivering more anti-ship missiles as well.
And this may help Ukraine to withstand further attacks - but Kyiv now needs additional offensive weaponry as well.
An effective army cannot just rely on anti-tank missiles and drones.
NATO must urgently supply Ukraine with MIG-29 fighter jets - these will be crucial in combined arms counterattack operations.
Ukraine will also need all the T-72 and T-80s under NATO possession.
Howitzers and artillery units must also be delivered.
Ukraine has seen success with its (domestically developed and manufactured) Vilkha M guided MLRS systems - but there are simply not enough of them to sustain effective offensive operations.
NATO should offer similar MLRS systems under its possession - all NATO states that have BM-30 Smerch, must urgently deliver them to Ukraine (to be backfilled with more modern MLRS systems - like the US/Lockheed Martin HIMARS).
NATO analysts must also determine which artillery/MLRS systems will require the least amount of training - and urgently supply them (ideally, these would be Turkish Roketsan MBRL and TRG-300 Tiger - both have powerful firepower.
Armored special ops vehicles and NATO-possessed BTR-4s (and their lookalikes) must also be supplied - these require minimal training.
France should finally do something consequential, and provide Panhard VBLs armored vehicles - these are especially useful in fast urban blitz warfare.
To further assess all possible offensive weaponry needs, a NATO-Ukraine working group must be urgently established with this specific task in mind.
b) Sanctions and contingency planning.
Further transatlantic sanctions were of course welcome: the Treasury department imposed additional sanctions on Russian companies (especially those with roles in military procurement), 328 members of the Russian parliament/Duma and Sberbank’s CEO.
In addition, and partly thanks to the UK’s insistence, gold transactions are now also covered under the imposed sanctions - limiting Russian ability to maneuver itself out of this pickle.
But the biggest levers are still left underutilized - why is there still no full blocking sanction imposed on Sberbank?
We have previously analyzed the full menu of practical & impactful sanctions options available to the West - without returning to the entire list yet again, suffice it to say that they have been heavily underused.
And there is still no movement on imposing transatlantic (and phased/gradual) sanctions on Russian oil.
Having said that, Biden admin’s contingency planning for Europe’s gas needs was a welcome development.
With a new US/EU LNG deal, the US would deliver at least 15 billion cubic metres(bcm) additional LNG to Europe this year - substantially exceeding previous plans.
Beyond the obvious/practical value of preparing for contingencies, there is also a signaling effect in this: that the US and the EU are both willing and able to take steps necessary for a sustained, long-term confrontation.
In other words, such signals of staying power, aim to convince Putin that time is really not on his side - that the longer this war drags on, the more leverage he will lose.
But more sanctions are still available, and Moscow should be warned that these would be promptly imposed without a sustainable peace settlement in place - incentivizing withdrawal of Russian troops.
(side note: and UK Foreign Minister’s announcement that sanctions could be lifted if/when Russian troops fully withdraw, was a wrong-headed policy - such statements must only be suggested in private. Why provide ‘‘light in the tunnel’’ for ordinary Russians, and thus reduce the political pressure on Putin? If sanctions are only temporary, and will be withdrawn, then the impetus to “rally ‘round the flag” and prosecute the war with more aggression and urgency, only increases. And besides, there is also a need for wider discussions around which sanctions in particular will stay as a longer-term punishment for such atrocities. A half-baked policy, announced prematurely).
c) Preventing Belarusian involvement.
Lukashenko has hitherto resisted the Kremlin ploys to secure his active involvement on the battlefield - and it is therefore unlikely that he would succumb this late in the game - when Russia is quickly losing its leverage and (at least perceptually) the tide is turning in Ukraine’s favor.
But this doesn’t mean that his involvement can be definitely ruled out - for one thing, we still do not know what Putin is planning for the troops outside of Kyiv.
Are they to withdraw?
Or are they to remain entrenched in defensive positions? Acting as a sword over Kyiv’s head, and preventing the Ukrainian army from fully focusing on southern and eastern fronts?
Putin could therefore push Lukashenko to send in troops as fresh reinforcements to the northern front.
He could also demand/expect help in solidifying supply lines/logistical operations that feed the army encircling Kyiv.
This would allow him to resume attacks on Kyiv if/when sufficient progress is achieved in Donbas.
After all, there is no guarantee that Putin will not once again change his mind and push for further compellence strategy/siege of Kyiv, once operational goals in the eastern front have been accomplished ( precisely why NATO must urgently help Ukraine with provision of fighter jets/MLRS to strike the army north/northeast of Kyiv)
But back to Belarus: whether the Kremlin intent is to add another distraction or replenish its army, the US/NATO must prevent Belarus’s late-stage entry into this war.
Lukashenko must be warned that Belarus’s participation on the battlefield would guarantee the end of his regime.
Lukashenko must face the following reality: refusing the Kremlin requests may further annoy Putin. But, so what? What is Putin’s alternative in the middle of the war? Who can he replace Lukashenko with? And more importantly, who is going to remove Lukashenko for Putin, and join the Kremlin’s sinking ship?
Even if there were a few operatives foolish enough to do this, the wider Belarusian KGB apparatus would surely refuse to support such a move - preferring to stay out of the war (and not share the cost of further crippling sanctions and potential war crime tribunals).
On the other hand, Lukashenko must realize that the cost of crossing the EU/NATO will be much higher.
Lukashenko must be warned that his economy would be crippled with devastating sanctions - that there is more room/ability/leverage to cause harm to his regime than to Russia.
He must know that Belarus’s economy would end up much worse than that of North Korea - and all for what? To please Putin? Who’s own political future (and a de facto power/influence, if not formal position) is now increasingly uncertain?
Lukashenko must also be privately warned that the US/NATO would do everything to actually topple him.
And covertly, the US/NATO should in fact fund the anti-Lukashenko volunteer forces/militias that only recently swore an oath to fight for Ukraine.
Even a couple of thousand of such militias could strike the Belarusian KGB and topple Lukashenko whenever there is another wave of pro-democracy mass demonstrations.
3) Mitigating the risk of a worst-case scenario.
In the meantime, the US/NATO must deter Russia from using chemical/biological weapons.
It is admittedly an unlikely scenario: and if anything, the fact that the Russian military command has demonstrated flexibility and adaptability in announcing the new ‘‘military objectives’’, shows that they are not totally delusional and out of touch with reality.
This is indeed good news: it is therefore unlikely that Russia would at this point do something extreme - but unfortunately, it is still not wholly implausible either.
Consider Putin’s options if the offensive in Donbas fails and Ukraine starts making quick gains.
What if the Russian army starts to degrade, defeats become public/high-profile, and casualties unsustainable?
Under such circumstances, Putin resorting to drastic measures becomes plausible (even if still unlikely).
He must therefore be warned that the cost of doing this would be extreme, and would most definitely go beyond the economic pains of tough sanctions.
He must fear a NATO military response.
In this regard, Biden’s warning that the US ‘‘will respond’’ (in case of a chemical/biological attack) wasn’t all that impactful or reassuring.
Of course US would respond - who is unaware of that?
On this matter, NATO Secretary General’s comment was far more useful: ‘‘Any use of chemical weapons would totally change the nature of the conflict, it would be a blatant violation of international law and would have far-reaching consequences”[emphasis added].
If the nature of conflict is ‘‘totally’’ changed, it is implied that the response could ‘‘totally’’ change as well.
Nevertheless, it could still have been extremely useful if Biden warns that such an action would force NATO to ‘‘consider all possible options for retaliation’’, and that nothing would be ‘‘off the table’’.
This is the crucial point: Putin must believe that there would be a credible/realistic risk of NATO’s military involvement in the conflict - that NATO, could for example, impose a no-fly zone after all.
And DC policymakers should be confident in pursuing this policy - there is a strong public support for a tougher stance on Russia (which should always be mentioned in public speeches - since by demonstrating lack of “public opinion shackles” on the US leaders, this basic fact helps to add credibility to America’s warnings and threats).
But to finish on a positive note - the Biden administration decided to stick to the older doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons - refusing to adopt a ‘‘sole purpose’’ rule: the flawed doctrine suggesting that the only acceptable use of a nuclear weapon would be to deter or respond to a nuclear attack.
Such a self-restrictive policy, would have paradoxically reduced the deterrent effect - increasing the likelihood of a nuclear war.
It would also put the US allies at risk (with an implication that these weapons wouldn’t be used to defend an important ally).
These cables have long argued against adoption of this policy - and it is good to see that the reality on the ground, and the increasing threat from both Russia and China, have finally convinced the Biden administration to give up on that wrong-headed policy.