Weekly Overview - Ukraine war, Putin's annual Q&A: a trove of political manipulation.

Ukraine war updates.

• 1) Ukraine presses on with shaping operations.

• Ukraine is continuing operations on the east bank of Dnipro river - to expand the beachhead, push Russia’s 152mm tube artillery systems (with a range of approximately 25km) further away from the shores, and thus, shape favorable conditions for a larger crossing in the medium to long-term.

• In the meantime, Russia’s assault on Avdiivka - a town of 30k - enters its third month.

• After months of fighting, thousands of casualties (some of the highest per day over the entire war), and hundreds of destroyed tanks and armored vehicles, Russia was still unable to capture this little town.

• There could not have been a better demonstration of a gap between Putin’s self-assured rhetoric (more on that later below) and the Russian army’s performance on the ground.

• What keeps Russia going (and saves it from defeat) is primarily Western hesitation, disunity, and a lack of political will in providing a decisive and powerful military and financial aid to Ukraine.

• 2) Putin appeasers are finally fully transparent in their ultimate desires.

• For months now, these cables have argued that Putin appeasers in the west actually want Russia to succeed and be rewarded for its invasion.

• For a long time, the code word was ‘‘it is time to negotiate’’ - to which, these cables have always responded with a request to forego such pretenses and (considering that negotiations right now mean nothing but Russia’s freeze in territorial gains) state openly their desire for Ukraine to give up its land to the imperialist invader.

• Well, we finally have some transparency.

• Here is US Senator JD Vance:

  
  “What’s in America’s best interest is to accept Ukraine is going to have to cede some territory to the Russians and we need to bring this war to a close”.

• Leaving aside the horrible ethical implications of this suggestion, and leaving aside the fact that Ukraine wants to continue fighting off the invading army of Russia, strategically too, this is of course absolute nonsense.

• Actually, this is the very opposite of America’s best interests.

• With: 1) no troops on the ground, 2) most of the contracts and military-industrial benefits going to US states and manufacturing plants (that create more jobs, and get their assembly lines in shape - in preparation for a larger conflict with China), and 3) at a mere 0.18% of its GDP and an annual amount 4x less than what is lost by the Federal government to general transaction errors, what the US gets in return is astonishing: a 315k casualty inflicted on Russia’s armed forces (with 90% of pre-invasion army accumulated at the Ukrainian border, now destroyed).

• With no troops on the ground and at a tiny monetary cost, the US gets to decimate the military of China’s main partner on the global stage.

• This is of course in addition to a major boost in America’s credibility (much damaged after Afghanistan withdrawal in 2021), strengthening and expanding NATO, and many other strategic benefits that flow directly from Washington’s decision to help Ukraine defeat the invading force.

• In terms of cost/return to investment, this must be one of the most fruitful and strategically beneficial foreign policy decisions ever made by any country in history.

• And Senator Vance would surely be aware of this if he took his job a bit more seriously, and actually looked at the facts on the ground before spewing useless Kremlin talking points.

• 3) Some bad and some good news on the political front.

• Zelenskyy’s last minute DC trip did not unfortunately yield any results in the Congress so far - truly shameful.

• On the other hand, there was some good news from the other side of the Atlantic.

• Poland’s new PM Donald Tusk re-entered the global political stage with some much-needed pro-Ukraine energy and force:

  
  "We will demand full mobilization of the west to help Ukraine. I can no longer listen to politicians who talk about being tired of the situation in Ukraine”
  

• In the meantime, the EU had finally formalized accession with Ukraine - Viktor Orban removed his block (by leaving the room during voting) in return for the release of more than €10 billion (hitherto frozen due to Hungary’s rule of law violations)

• Unless the EU amends its founding treaties to allow for a majority vote (and/or dispenses with the need for unanimity), its foreign policy decisions will be increasingly vulnerable to an outright blackmail by the likes of Viktor Orban.

• Indeed, €10 billion was not enough for Orban to lift his block on a €50bn EU aid to Ukraine - he wants more of his €22bn unfrozen..

• 4) The US and G7 revisit sanctions and asset seizures.

• Washington has imposed new sanctions on hundreds of companies and individuals (more than 250 in total) that have helped Russia evade sanctions on shipment of technology and equipment & inputs - including aircraft parts and X-ray systems.

• In the meantime, G7 is working to find a legal justification to seize Russia’s $300bn frozen assets.

• (side note: most of the funds are currently sitting in the Belgium-based Euroclear - which already made €3bn from interest earned on these assets. The legal justification for the seizure of the interest earned should be easier to create - redirecting the funds to Ukraine. And in any case, the EU must not allow Euroclear to retain the proceeds as proper earnings..)

Putin’s annual Q&A was a display of competence in strategic manipulation and information warware.

• Credit where it is due: when it comes to manipulation and deception, Putin stands out as a class of his own.

• To be clear, he is not necessarily extraordinary in his skill (although he very well may be), but his willingness to be so brazen in applying his skills certainly makes him extraordinary.

• His counterparts (and adversaries) in the west are limited by media scrutiny and divided legislatures willing to impeach them for slights and offenses both minor and major.

• Putin faces no such impediments - his accountability is one of a long-term nature: as long as he delivers prosperity, stability, and identity worthy of pride (through propaganda and imperialism/military conquest) over a period of time, he need not concern himself with lesser restrictions of civilized democracies: things like ruling lawfully, not lying, not usurping state resources to build yourself a palace, or killing/imprisoning your political opponents.

• And as a general rule, his authoritarian partners are of a much lower caliber of skill and finesse: dictators big and small - whether it is Xi Jinping or Nicolas Maduro, are usually over the top, way too crude and therefore, unconvincing.

• What makes Putin so dangerous is his ability to generate a following amongst the citizens of the western liberal-democratic states.

• For example: there aren’t many fans of Xi, or Syria’s Bashar Assad - Putin is in a category of his own.

• He has managed to convince a not so insignificant portion of the electorate in the US and the EU that he is a bastion of traditional christian values - fighting against the woke and decadent west.

• And his annual live q&a (which was skipped in 2022 - when Russia only recently suffered embarrassment of Ukraine recapturing Kherson, and pushing further in Kharkiv) was yet another demonstration of his manipulative prowess.

• Putin is very sensitive to narratives and perceptions taking hold in the west, and his answers were finely tuned to appeal to every major western electorate - signaling to all the relevant stakeholders.

• Following the Magruder’s principle (named after a Confederate general John Magruder), which states that it is often easier to deceive a target of deception into holding and strengthening a pre-existing belief than it is to convince him of something new (or in contradiction to his current beliefs), Putin doubled down on widely held perceptions and pre-existing narratives in the west.

• The q&a was long, and there were way too many great examples to discuss them all (I suggest you watch it in full if you can afford the time), so we shall focus on the main signals and messages deployed by Putin.

• Mixed signals on grand strategy in Ukraine.

• Putin grabbed most attention for his remarks on the overall war aims in Ukraine:

• “There will be peace when we achieve our goals..They haven’t changed. Denazification of Ukraine, the demilitarization of Ukraine.”

• The message is aimed at all of the relevant stakeholders involved - from the Russian public to Ukraine and its western backers.

• At a first look, this appears to be a signal of staying power: you did your best for almost two years, you supplied Ukraine with weapons and money, but our goals are unchanged and we will continue for as long as needed to achieve them.

• And to be sure, this is in the main, correct.

• But the goals of denazification and demilitarization are deliberately strategically vague, and can always be tweaked to adjust them towards an appearance of consistency with an already chosen near-term strategy.

• Indeed, if previously, “denazification” meant removal of Zelenskyy via force (both as displayed in the initial attempt in the first few days of the invasion and by Putin’s own remarks demanding the‘‘regime’s’’ removal) today, the standard may be lowered.

• And this is indeed demonstrated in Putin’s own remarks: “The national hero in Ukraine is Stepan Bandera, a Nazi” and for this reason ‘‘the question of the denazification of Ukraine remains current”.

• In other words, if previously, Zelenskyy was a target of an attempted forceful coup, nowadays, Putin may be appeased with lesser symbolic concessions.

• (side note: of course what would be considered as symbolic to the west, may not necessarily be so for Ukrainians - most would dispute Bandera’s categorization as a Nazi (who was at one point detained by Nazis and sent to a concentration camp. Thereafter, Bandera fought both Soviets and Nazis alike. His main goal was an independent Ukraine.) and in any case, changing a status of a national hero to appease a foreign dictator’s whim is a grave violation of national sovereignty and dignity - issues at the core of this war)

• Putin’s comment on demilitarization was also vague: “Since Ukraine does not want to reach an agreement on the demilitarization of the country, Russia is applying alternative measures”.

• This phrasing is also constructed deliberately vague to appeal to the isolationist Putin appeasers/apologists: see, if only we stop fueling weapons to Ukraine and push Kyiv towards ‘‘demilitarization’’, Putin will be happy and the war will be over.

• Nothing can be uglier (or contrary to US national security interests and international credibility/prestige) than removing self-defense aid from the invaded/attacked country fighting for its survival - but unfortunately, Putin’s message will appeal to many clueless sycophants in the West.

• Putin then paired these remarks with the (unfortunately, correct) observation that Ukraine was in need of Western help to survive Russia’s onslaught:

  “Ukraine produces nearly nothing, everything is coming from the west, but the free things will run out some day, and it seems it is already happening.”

• This is essentially a repeat of the Valdai club statement that Ukraine had only a ‘‘week to live’’ without the West.

• (side note: although the comment that Ukraine needs the West is true, the claim that Ukraine produces nothing could not be further from the truth - it already dwarfs most NATO member EU states for the capacity of its military-industrial complex. Ukraine produces everything from long-range missiles, to Neptune anti-ship missiles (that already sank Russian ships) to thousands of modern drones. It is also forming production agreements with Western firms (like with Germany’s Rheinmetall) to produce tanks and armored vehicles in Ukraine. In a few more years, Ukraine will be in a league of its own. By the time it joins NATO, it would have had years of combat experience against Russia, a solid domestic military-industrial base, and generations that would be grateful for the US support - making it one of America’s most valuable NATO allies.)

• It is only a matter of days before Tucker Carlson pushes the narrative ‘‘we are the only reason this war is still going on” into the isolationist mainstream.

• But, and as mentioned above, the phrasing offered by Putin was deliberately vague: so even though there will be favorable messaging impact for the Kremlin, Putin is also keeping his options open on what exactly ‘‘demilitarization’’ would look like.

• Here is an example: US/NATO promise not to host a military base/certain missiles on Ukraine’s territory (even if/when Ukraine joins NATO).

• This has been offered before, and provided that Ukraine joins NATO, there wouldn’t be major issues in offering such a concession again.

• (side note: naturally, the actual strategic/military value of this potential political concession would be moot with Finland joining the bloc, having the biggest border with Russia, and already granting the US an unimpeded access to 15 of its bases. But symbolically, such concessions could be something for Putin to wave at home as evidence of ‘‘strategic success”)

• Naturally, any deal of this nature would/must include total withdrawal of all Russian troops from the occupied territories (at least from those after Feb 2022, if not also from Crimea) of Ukraine - so this is not the time to discuss such measures in earnest: only to show that Putin’s messaging here (in spite of hard/aggressive exterior) signals potential willingness to be flexible on next steps.

• But with all that said, there was one conspicuous omission: justifying the “special military operation” primarily as a means to ‘‘protect ethnic Russian-speakers” from “genocide” - the bogus claims that were originally advances as the proximate casus belli just a week before the invasion in Feb 2022.

• This omission most certainly was not by mistake - and the lack of desire to focus on this particular justification is pretty obvious from signals and messages coming from the rest of the Kremlin propaganda machines.

• Providing an alibi for Putin appeasers in the West.

• Putin spoke approvingly about Hungary’s Viktor Orban (who blocked €50bn aid to Ukraine, and by leaving the room during a crucial vote, only just let EU’s accession talks with Ukraine to begin) - but he was careful to cloak the praise and provide a cover for Orban.

• Orban is the only EU leader that met and shook hands with Putin since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

• He also blocked €50bn in EU aid, and only just let the membership accession talks with Ukraine to commence (by leaving the room during a crucial vote - in return for which he got €10bn in EU aid unfrozen (funds that were previously frozen due to Hungary’s subpar performance in the matters of rule of law)

• In other words, Orban is already known for his pro-Putin stance - the least he needs right now, is open praise from Putin that confirms the insidious nature of the relationship.

• Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to come up with what more could Orban do for Putin?

• (side note: accession talks are symbolic, but a full membership would require unanimous member state ratification - which Hungary can always withhold)

• Consequently, Putin provided the much-needed cover for Orban - he is not pro-Russia - he is merely a “nationalist”.

• And to be fair, this is 1) formally true, 2) is a very good cover, and 3) one that can be applied anywhere and everywhere.

• One could, for example, be a “nationalist” in France and use that fact to justify a similar stance.

• Same in America and elsewhere (see Ramaswamy for a cheap version of this).

• (side note: of course, the true national interests of all western nations - and that of America especially (which is most interested in attrition caused to the primary partner of China) lay in the need to see Russia’s defeat)

• Overall, and given Russia’s actual predicament in Ukraine, and the nonexistence of any moral and/or legal grounds, this q&a couldn’t have gone better for the Kremlin.

• But these were not all the messages and signals sent by Putin.

• Next up, we will discuss how he was shaping the ground for further divide & conquer campaigns and created rhetorical openings and opportunities for the Western leaders to abandon Ukraine without losing too much face.