*a lot of readers have emailed and asked questions re Israel vs Iran (and the JCPOA), South Korea’s nuclear rhetoric, and few other issues. Time for another reader Q&A - coming up on Thursday’s cables.
Ukraine War Updates.
Ukraine’s counteroffensive & outlook.
Battles in the southern and eastern Ukraine intensify - both sides are engaged in shaping operations to secure advantageous positions ahead of the expected renewal of serious offensives in the spring.
In Zaporizhia, Russians have started sending tank formations to probe for weaknesses, and the number of incoming shells faced by Ukrainians have doubled to 4,000 a day.
And as the battles intensify, there is a renewed debate around catching up with Kyiv’s basic artillery shell needs.
At 90,000 a day (a figure that is expected to rise by spring) it already forced the Pentagon to 6x its artillery production capacity - to have any chance of catching up with Ukraine’s needs.
Some military analysts have suggested that Ukraine should deploy the DPICM (Dual-purpose improved conventional munition).
To be clear, these are cluster munitions, and supplying Ukraine with these has its advantages: 1) They cover a larger area, and have stronger impact on trench-style warfare, 2) Given their effectiveness, Ukraine would need to use less of these - reducing the wear and tear and maintenance needs for the artillery barrels, 3) They would reduce logistical needs - since the expenditure rate (and thus the replacement needs) would go down considerably, and 4) There would be reduced pressure on the Western production of 155mm artillery shells - NATO allies would have time to catch up.
(side note: cluster munitions are not banned by international law, and Ukraine is not a signatory to the (voluntary) Convention on Cluster Munitions)
On the other hand, there are considerable risks to this strategy.
This extensive report looks at how American troops were effectively killed by friendly fire due to the use of cluster munitions in Iraq & Kuwait:
“By scattering this new weapon in Iraq & Kuwait, American pilots had essentially placed unmarked, indiscriminate and long-lasting minefields in their own ground forces’ path — in this case on a runway other American soldiers planned to reopen quickly”.
For context, Russians are heavy users of cluster munitions (with predictably devastating toll on civilians) - but then again, they are not known for demonstration of due care to their own soldiers.
Perhaps there are specific contexts where the use of these munitions would provide asymmetric benefits (given risks) to Kyiv - but that would require some careful deliberation, and definitely not a quick switch of tactics just to save pressure on the Western (155mm shells) production capabilities.
Kyiv needs tougher punishment against corrupt officials and spies.
News of senior state officials caught in corruption or spying for an enemy is always bad - doubly so when you want to secure long-term continuous support of your Western backers.
Ukraine did not get good international headlines this week: uncovering instances of corruption (with a direct impact on the effective provisioning of Ukrainian army), and Russian spies operating at the highest level of Ukraine’s own SBU (Security Service of Ukraine), certainly makes it harder to reassure NATO allies and the Western publics that their aid is not going to waste.
(side note: although this is not a direct evidence at all, the presence of spies at the highest level of Ukraine’s own intel leadership makes it more likely that our previous hypothesis that the success of suspiciously on target and well-timed Russian missile strikes targeting core infrastructure is due to intel aid from within Ukraine.)
Now, granted President Zelensky did fire a number of officials allegedly involved in this scandal, this is arguably still not enough.
Once their guilt and complicity is proven, they should face toughest penalties and lengthiest prison sentences possible under Ukrainian law.
Not only to deter future corruption, but to send a signal to the worried Western allies that the leadership of the country is in good hands, and that such incidents will not be tolerated.
Zelensky simply cannot afford for this narrative to take hold - otherwise, the GOP-style calls that the US is sending ‘‘blank checks’’ to Ukraine will grow louder - and over time, they may end up causing significant reduction in American aid.
So Zelensky must err on the side of being too harsh to nip this in the bud.
The great tank u-turn: good news and some undesirable implications.
Just last week, we discussed how in spite of all the resistance, Berlin could at the end, succumb to pressure and agree to supply Ukraine with Leopards.
Well, a few days later this is precisely what happened.
Now, let’s start with some good news: not only Germany, but the US will also send its own M1 Abrams Tanks.
(side note: turns out, we were right to not take Washington’s arguments around ‘‘logistical difficulties/steep learning curve’’ at face value).
All in all, Ukraine is to receive 31 Abrams, and 62 Leopards (with Berlin sending 14 of their own - a very low number given that Germany is in possession of around 600.. but still a start).
Canada is to send 4 more Leopards, and the UK will send 14 Challenger IIs.
Delivery times will probably vary, but it shouldn’t be too risky to assume that in the near future, Ukraine will come into possession of around 100, far more advanced Western tanks.
This is still only a 1/3 of the figure requested by the Ukraine’s chief commander - and it is certainly hard to see why many more couldn’t be sent…
(side note: Ukraine’s Ambassador to France did claim that all-in-all, 321 Western tanks were pledged to Kyiv. We shall await confirmation of deliveries of this scale before celebrating the news).
The US is not planning any land-based invasion anytime soon.
Conflict in Iran is likely to be limited to air strikes only (with a much smaller probability of a regional war where Abrams would be needed to prop up allies), and any potential war over Taiwan will be fought by advanced, long-distance and hypersonic cruise/ballistic missiles, as well as stealth aircrafts and warships.
In other words, there is no pressing need to retain M1 Abrams.
This does not mean that there is no legitimate reason for a small batch start: strategists at the DoD may want to wait and see how M1s perform in Ukraine before sending any more: will they prove valuable? Will Ukrainian troops be able to utilize them effectively? After only a brief training? Will Russians counter and destroy these tanks in high numbers?
In other words, it is indeed valid to confirm on the ground effectiveness of these tanks prior to their delivery.
And one certainly hopes that these legitimate military/strategic reasons, and not other political reasons are the cause of hesitation to go all in.
Now then, on to some not so happy implications of this recent u-turn:
1) Abrams M1 wasn’t, after all, that cumbersome to deploy.
A consequence of this indirect admission, is that;
a) Further, similar ‘‘practicality-based” arguments will receive less weight, and will be treated with much skepticism, and;
b) There is no longer a plausible argument against sending even more Abrams. If Washington is ok with 31, then why not more? (except for legitimate and temporary reasons mentioned above).
Surely if it was to do with logistics and practicalities, then sending a smaller number makes less sense? Given that we would be foregoing benefits of the economies of scale, and given that once Ukrainians are trained on the tank, and once the period of steepest learning curve is behind, it simply makes more sense to supply more of the same tanks and benefit from the accumulated local knowledge and skill from operating these tanks - in other words, it will be harder to justify further ‘‘diversification’’ , by for example suggesting than France should also send its Leclercs (which apparently requires a different training/maintenance approach than Abrams).
2) The new reality that Germany can blackmail its allies into joint “skin in the game” action.
One way to narrate the events of the past few weeks, is to declare that Germany succumbed to immense pressure from its NATO allies - forced into line by other Western states.
Overall, that is true, but nonetheless, still an unsatisfactory account: for it ignores the other half of the story.
If Berlin was in fact forced into line without supply of American M1s, then the story would truly be short and simple - and rather humiliating for Germany.
But in this case, the story didn’t end there - Germany did achieve its objective of dragging the US into the very same boat it found itself in.
The precedent is now set: Germany can resist and insist on various conditions from other countries for it to play along.
Such tit-for-tat, one-off, ad-hoc, and transactional deals, are far from ideal within the context of a military alliance that aims to instill faith and appearance of iron-clad robustness into its basic premises and commitments.
Transactional and conditional deals cause much injury to the integrity of these foundational commitments.
Last week we discussed how Germany’s conditionality-based approach and allied pressure (as a short-term fix) were harmful to NATO’s core in the long-term: we can now add a third poison into the mix - one ally successfully blackmailing another into a transactional deal largely on blackmail.
That this is a bad precedent is already bad news - that this precedent is likely to be repeated in the near term is worse still.
Since, why wouldn’t Germany resort to the same playbook in the future?
It got the confirmation it needed: Berlin’s tactics work, and Washington can be pressured into appeasing Germany.
Not only that, but Germany’s position gained legitimacy in the process.
If it was forced to comply without any concessions, the whole world would see this as Germany realizing the untenability of its position, and correcting its mistakes under immense pressure - pretty humiliating.
But now that the US agreed to provide what Germany demanded, Berlin’s position is suddenly more reasonable and legitimate.
And this makes it even more likely that a similar trick will be pulled in the near term - the implications of such a scenario are not abstract or hypothetical either: further vital shipments may be delayed by several months due to existence of a similar situation, and Berlin’s (or even another country’s) deployment of similar tricks.
And in the context of a war where Ukraine needs the advantage of speed to realize maximum gains before Russia mobilizes all of its capacity, this delay of 1-2 months could end up causing a massive difference - leading to catastrophic outcomes that we all want to avoid.
New political realities for Biden: incentives to escalate.
Latest polls suggest political trouble ahead for President Biden: for the first time ever, a majority (52%) of Republican voters are against further funding of Ukraine.
So what? you may ask.. how is it that the GOP voter base preference is relevant to Biden?
Primarily, in two ways:
1) Current shift in GOP preferences is a signal of a future trend - whenever a policy-preference shift happens in one of the two major parties, inevitably, and after some period of time, moderates/independents start adjusting/shifting as well - in other words, as (and if) this trend continues, more and more GOP-leaning moderates will sway towards the ‘‘let’s stop helping Ukraine survive” camp.
2) The shift will embolden both Trump and even DeSantis to pursue a more openly anti-Ukraine rhetoric: the Overton window will shift, GOP leaders and potential candidates (like Mike Pompeo) calling for more US aid will find themselves in the minority camp - with their messages necessarily muted and/or sanitized to not rile up too much opposition from the GOP base.
In other words, Biden will be faced with: a) more hesitant/unconvinced swing voter demo, b) in a rhetorical environment where calling for an end to Ukraine aid is ever more politically acceptable, during c) a period of time going into the election year where a recessions or at the very least, a slowdown of the economy is ever more likely.
What can Biden do now?
He has two options:
He can temper his aid and hedge - in which case Ukraine will not secure an outright win - and more likely will lose.
Under this scenario, all of ‘‘taxpayers’ money’’ (which is still a tiny 0.25% of US GDP) would have gone to nothing: the GOP and the wider media will label this whole affair as another episode of ‘‘getting involved in foreign wars where we don’t belong”.
The political cost of Kyiv’s defeat would be 10x that of a failure in Afghanistan.
This is of course only the first scenario.
The second option: one that a) saves Ukraine, b) advances US national security interests, c) upholds global rules-based order - which underpins prosperity and safety of the entire world, and d) one that benefits Biden politically, is to double down and offer everything possible to ensure Ukraine’s victory.
If Ukraine falls, Biden will leave the office as a loser - overseeing two major foreign policy failures.
If Ukraine wins, or at least recovers more territory and moves into a position of higher security, then Biden will be remembered as a leader that saved a nation of 44 million from a brutal occupation: and did this without triggering a WWIII or without getting US troops involved.
To ensure that the second scenario becomes the reality, the Biden admin must not hesitate to back Ukraine with full force and might of the US: no more delays, hesitations, and unfounded fears of ‘‘red lines’’ that are apparently visible only to some WH staff members.
Russia’s soft power play in the Global South & South Africa’s defense drills with Russia and China
The 2nd wave of “Scramble for Africa” continues: as the US Treasury Secretary, Janet Yellen was touring the continent, trying to convince the skeptical locals that US is a far better bet and a strategic ally than China, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was also not too far away: in South Africa, where he discussed (with his South African counterpart) preparations for the 2nd Russian-African summit slated for July 26-29 in St. Petersburg, and in the meantime, secured some diplomatic wins.
Lavrov had multiple objectives to accomplish:
1) Firstly, to send a general message that Russia is not isolated - that it has allies in the global south - including relatively well-off countries like Brazil and South Africa.
The importance of this signal goes beyond the maintenance of global prestige and domestic political messaging.
This particular signal has a further practical utility: it provides an excuse, a copout for many supposedly neutral ‘‘swing states’’ to refuse implementing sanctions against Russia: since, clearly, Moscow is not isolated, and any sanctions would simply add friction and self-harm instead of causing much intended effect.
2) Secondly, Lavrov was pursuing Russia’s long-term strategic objective: directing trade settlements from USD to national currencies.
This shortens the reach of America’s sanctions.
On this, Russia is already seeing some progress: the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries have already started conducting trade in national currencies of respective parties.
BRICS is also granting loans from its “New Development Bank” in national currencies.
A new proposal to create a BRICS currency reserve, if successful, will be yet another significant boost to Russia.
No doubt, Lavrov was working on this too.
3) Finally timing his trip a month ahead of the trilateral (Russia, South Africa and China) Naval drills off the South African coast, was deliberate posturing to appear as the orchestrator of the upcoming military exercises.
Russia is reminding China that it can use its soft power in Africa to make Chinese involvement in the continent more palatable.
The US-led narrative that Beijing engages in the predatory ‘‘infrastructure loans’’ to subjugate impoverished African states is extremely worrying to Beijing.
And just when Washington (and Brussels) are about to increase their spend on the continent, Russia’s potential soft power utility rises.
When it comes to Africa, Russia is not spending nearly as much as the US, EU or China - or even as much as Turkey.
But Moscow is happy to send its Wagner troops (hard power) to prop up insecure but mineral-rich states/dictatorial regimes (sometimes abandoned by the West - like in the case of Mali) in return for diplomatic alignment in the UN.
Russia’s propaganda - its whataboutism that the West is patronizing towards Africans, uses them as pawns on the global chessboard, and doesn’t really care about international justice (as it claims to in the case of Ukraine) also resonates to some extent (soft power).
There were even some diplomatic successes for Moscow to brag about.
For example: South African Foreign Minister complained about secondary (Russia-related) sanctions and questioned the authenticity of Western concern for Ukraine - by juxtaposing it with indifference towards occupation of Palestine.
None of these little victories will matter too much if Russia is defeated in Ukraine.
Moscow will not be in a position to play global imperial games - in its characteristically cheap and opportunistic way.
But until that thorough defeat of imperialism takes place, Russia will continue deploying these ploys - and will try to collect as much utility and thus leverage vis-à-vis Beijing as it can.
Re the corruption in Kyiv issue. How do internal regime politics play into this subject? In other words, is political life in Ukraine completely frozen? Who’s looking over Zelenskyy’s shoulders/breathing down hi