Weekly Overview
Estimated Reading Time: 4 mins, 56 sec.
U.S. sanctions Turkey
There is a lot of speculation on whether Turkish assurances of using their own domestic ‘ASELSAN’ software on S400 would have been sufficient in reducing the threat to the F35 program.
Turkey maintained that since they would use their software system, Russians would not be able to capture the F35 radar signature.
It is probably true. After all, Turkey wanted to purchase 100 F35s - putting them at risk was clearly not in Turkish interests.
In terms of technical capacity to do that - highly plausible.
Russia’s Rosoboronexport aims to sell a lot of these to the Chinese too - you can bet they will be installing their own software - and would not purchase if they could not.
In fact, Rosoboronnexport specifically pitched that flexibility/feature to Turkey
By doing this, they also caused U.S. sanctions to look unreasonable and misplaced.
However, all of that is in the past now.
Given that the U.S. committed to sanctions and warned Turkey repeatedly, sanctions were inevitable
Not following through would have damaged the credibility of U.S. threats.
We already had Obama with his unenforced red line in Syria.
Creating a habit of unfulfilled threats would damage U.S.’s diplomatic power.
Having said all of that, there is a method to implementing such unpleasant [and sanctioning your NATO ally is indeed unpleasant] acts with such diplomatic finesse that the long-term relationships should not suffer.
In this particular case, only 50% of what was needed was accomplished.
The fact that only defense procurement industry [and specific individuals leading them] were targeted, and that wider sanctions on Turkish economy were avoided was indeed good.
BUT: why were these sanctions introduced under ‘Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) ‘ ?
Countering Adversaries
Turkey is most definitely not an adversary. It is a second largest NATO army that the U.S. needs in furthering its foreign policy goals re Iran and Russia.
Given that sanctions were so narrow in their scope, why not use a simpler legislation as an authoritative base?
A legislation more neutral in its language?
Or lesser executive orders?
Avoiding the insult of this label was especially important given the regional context:
1. Turkey is distancing itself from Iran and getting closer to Israel.
In fact, just this passing week it reinstated an ambassador in Israel [after 2 years].
[Recall how I said last week that conflict with Iran was possibly manufactured as a face saving excuse for rapprochement with Israel]
Iran is now likely to use its own media/propaganda channels in Turkey to inflame the public mood against the U.S.
And have an actual subject matter to work with - U.S. sanctioning Turkey as America’s adversary .
2. Vladimir Putin wants to pull Turkey away from its traditional alliance with the U.S.
Back in 2016, Putin gave a firm backing to Erdogan during the attempted coup incident - when U.S. leaders waited too long for a proper response condemning the failed coup - hoping for Erdogan to be toppled.
Erdogan did not forget that.
And now this passing week Putin called Erdogan ‘a man of his word’.
Same week when the U.S. considered Erdogan’s reassurances as insufficient and imposed sanctions on Turkey.
Not a coincidence.
Of course Turkey/Russia relationship is complicated with potential clashes in three major theaters: Libya, Syria and now South Caucasus/ Azerbaijan.
Nevertheless, these areas of conflict have largely been discussed and agreed upon.
So at least in the short-term, Russia could inflict the U.S. a geopolitical loss by pulling Erdogan away from leading Turkey to side with its natural long-term allies: NATO and the U.S.
EU sanctions on Turkey
For its conflict with Greece over mediterranean gas exploration.
It is notable how three major EU powers wanted to avoid sanctions.
Germany, Italy and Spain wanted to initially go on with negotiations.
Why these three countries? For what reasons?
All realpolitik.
Let’s start with Germany: It does not like how Macron is leading EU’s foreign policy and creating new alliances in the Balkans and with Greece.
With UK gone, Germany definitely feels entitled for such leadership. It also wants to avoid being outvoted in the European Council and in the Council of Ministers.
So preventing these new alliances solidifying over successful campaign against Turkey is quite important.
There is also a more pragmatic reason: if Turkey gets confrontational, will it once again threaten the EU with its Syrian refugees?
If Turkey encouraged these Syrians to emigrate into the EU, rest assured that majority would flow into Germany.
Why Italy?
Italy is allied with Turkey in Libya.
Both Italy and Turkey support the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).
Turkish and Italian defense ministers met in October to discuss common strategy in Libya.
They also talked about Eastern Mediterranean…
No doubt, Turkish defense minister was seeking Italian support on that matter. Tit-for-tat.
Why Spain?
Spain and Turkey are long-standing allies.
Starting from January 2015, Spanish patriot SAMs have been protecting Turkish southern flank under NATO’s operation ‘active fence’.
[Undoubtedly another factor adding to Turkish confidence in shooting down the Russian SU-24 fighter jet later that November]
Spain has been a long and loud proponent of updating EU’s custom union with Turkey.
Spain also has a lot of investments in the Turkish banking sector.
Sanctioning and hurting Turkish economy would have an adverse effect on its own economic interests.
Finally, both countries have issues with separatists: ETA in Spain and PKK in Turkey.
In this regard, success of one in putting down secessionists is a precedent of acceptable conduct for the other.
So overall, both countries are interested in the strength and success of each other.
This is of course good for the U.S. - it is always better to have NATO countries invested in each other - as opposed to the alternative..
It is also good to have sub-blocs within the EU that the U.S. could manipulate and re-direct for its own narrower interests.
China tests Russian interest for a deeper partnership
China’s FM Wang Yi says deepening ‘‘comprehensive strategic partnership in …various areas and ….at different levels’’ with Russia is one of the diplomatic goals for China in 2021.
In ‘‘various areas’’ and at ‘‘different levels’’.
What does that mean? Increasing Russian involvement in Belt and Road initiative?
Perhaps opening and operating joint bases in Africa and Middle East?
Chinese support for Russia in Kuril Island disputes [with Japan] in return for support in Taiwan?
All of these are probable Chinese goals.
In none of these areas of cooperation would benefits distribute proportionately.
In all of the aforementioned areas, China needs Russia more than the other way around
In regards to Belt and Road initiative in particular - expansion of that project is actually against Russian interests in central Asia.
Under no scenario having Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan more dependent on Chinese infrastructure investments and ‘Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’ (AIIB) loans is advantageous to Russian geopolitical interests.
Chinese FM made these public [and quite high profile] statements a month after having a private phone call with Russia’s FM Sergei Lavrov.
China is now observing for ‘‘compliance testing’’.
Would Russia’s FM ping back on the same level [high level statement/interview to a leading national newspaper/press conference segment] and with the same scope and enthusiasm?
Probably not. Not in Russia’s interest.
In fact, knowing that China is the enemy no 1 for the U.S. , gives extra maneuverability to Russia.
Russia could use that leverage for a new reset with the U.S.
Doubly true with Biden’s new State Dept [that is likely to follow the tougher Victoria Nuland line]
Taiwan aims to join the TPP
Yes!
U.S. should do everything to get them in.
This would be an excellent first step/precedent for regional powers to engage in trade deals with Taiwan.
Currently, no one wants to piss of China by openly entering two-way trade deals with Taiwan.
So a multilateral TPP is a good method to build buy-ins from the regional states.
Get them on diplomatic collision course with China.
This is all part of the area-denial tactics re Taiwan.
Treating Taiwan as a state independent of China will create long-term precedents and increase the cost of potential Chinese invasion.
Israeli Missile Defense Cooperation With Gulf States
Israel says it is open to future missile defense cooperation with gulf partners.
This of course primarily benefits the gulf states.
Israel has nothing to learn from them in these trainings.
Increasing costs of conflict for Iran is definitely the primary reason for Israel to engage in this endeavor.
There is however another reason
The mere idea of sharing missile defense techniques with Arab states would have been unthinkable a year ago.
So this is now new messaging from Israel: that they don’t consider gulf states as enemies anymore..
This is a very smart diplomatic trust building exercise.
A further benefit to Israel : freer access of Mossad agents across the region - now that the awkwardness of potentially being in conflict in future is determined to be highly improbable.
And this suggestion [of low likelihood of future conflict] is implied [furthering its plausibility] and demonstrated by the Israeli willingness for joint trainings in important defense matters.