What The Leaked FSB memo shows about Russia-China relationship: how strategy and incentives will influence Putin's response. Part II.

Leaked FSB memos are not all bad news: serving at least some of Putin’s strategic interests.

• There are at least two ways how Putin can use the FSB leaks (on how the Russian counterintelligence service worries about China’s overreach and Beijing’s conduct in undermining Russia's national security interests - more details in this NYT report and in our previous post) to his advantage and make the most of the tactical and strategic gains from this opportunity:

• 1) Signal to Beijing that Moscow is not very happy - without taking concrete steps to parry.

• It is a way for Putin to express and communicate his displeasure to Xi Jinping : "We know.. We are well aware. And look, our national security establishment is very, very worried and treats this seriously."

• This then creates two situations:

  1. It means that Russia can gain more leverage over China, and Putin himself can push for more concessions—whether it's on trade or more help from China—because he can always rely on the fact that there's a strong contingent of security establishment which is worried about China - and that this relationship needs extra sweeteners for Putin to keep those worried happy and not very antsy.

  2. It will also signal a need to at least reduce the tempo and severity of these Chinese infringements (if total passivity and cordial relations aren’t possible), to essentially calm it down: "You are now encroaching and now creating a very bad situation for us where we have to respond in some way. Time to cool it off."

• 2) Message to the West: Russia is not a lost cause and with sufficient inducements, it can be pulled out of China’s orbit.

• Second benefit: a subtle signal to the West—or maybe even not so subtle—that Russia isn't fully in bed with China and can in fact be peeled away from China.

• This would then raise the reverse Kissinger hopes of Trump and even the EU, an increasing strategic competition to China.

• This is a very interesting situation because, as discussed before, there are no objective reasons to believe that this is plausible in any near-term event.

• With that said, however, Putin is interested in creating that ambiguity and potential.

• With that potential alive, it would be harder for players like the EU and the US to completely write-off Moscow as a terminally lost player.

• It will be harder to come to a consensus to completely isolate Russia, to completely burden with sanctions, because as long as there is even a flicker of hope of peeling Russia away from China, the harshest measures have less likelihood of being imposed.

• Because there will always be that "what if" question in the back of the head of major policy makers and leaders in the West.

• And for Trump specifically, this has always been one of the biggest objectives. Even before elections, he repeatedly said how he could pull off Putin from Xi Jinping or un-unite them in his terms.

• It's not likely anytime soon.

• With that said, however, Putin may want to create that impression that it is likely, it is plausible, that there is some friction between China and Russia.

• And so it is definitely in Russia's interest to float that possibility, to incentivize reduction in sanctions, incentivize appeasement-promoting policies from the West and especially from the US that's obsessed about confrontation with China.

There are limits and strategic risks to this play.

• It is important to note, however, that there are limits to this gambit.