Why the Istanbul Talks Were Doomed From The Outset: Ukraine’s Strategic Red Lines vs Putin’s Maximalist Illusions
The Istanbul negotiations between Ukraine and Russia produced exactly one measurable outcome: a 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner swap.
But from the perspective of a sustainable ceasefire or comprehensive peace settlement, there was no other substantive result.
With that said, for Kyiv, the strategic consequences run deeper.
This is because Russia demanded that: 1) Ukraine must fully abandon the four territories that Moscow doesn’t fully control: Zaporizhia, Kherson, Luhansk, Donets and, 2) That if Ukraine refused, Russia could annex even more territories - like Sumy, and Kharkiv.
Once again, Ukraine demonstrated it was willing to negotiate in good faith, while Russia pushed forward absurd and maximalist demands.
Putin—yet again—was revealed as the one delaying the peace process.
This clarity matters not because the international community is confused, but because Ukraine must create political conditions in which even Donald Trump cannot plausibly blame Ukraine for obstructing peace.
And this strategic posture opens two paths:
Option A: The U.S., under Trump, doubles down on military and financial support—more weapons, more training, more funding, more intelligence—to change battlefield realities.
Think of what the Biden admin was alredy doing - but add the vigor and energy of the Trump admin.
Option B: If U.S. support slows, Ukraine still receives the weapons it needs—either through direct purchases or European intermediaries, with Europe already having surpassed U.S. support in aggregate and signaling a willingness to do more.
(side note: both Ukraine and EU have openly declared readiness to buy tens of billions of U.S. military hardware. If Trump is so willing to sell them to Arab dictatorships, he should also at the minimum allow these weapons to be sold to European NATO allies and to Ukraine - a nation fighting for its survival.)
Why Peace Was Never a Real Prospect in Istanbul
A meaningful breakthrough was never likely because the war termination preferences of Ukraine and Russia are fundamentally incompatible.
Talks will not yield a new outcome until both sides have their core minimal needs met.
Ukraine requires two essential and minimal outcomes to end/freeze the war at current front lines: sovereignty and security:
1) Sovereignty: Ukraine must retain its full rights as a sovereign nation.
That means for example, the ability to join the European Union or apply for membership without Russian interference.
(side note: surprisingly, Russia hasn’t forcefully opposed EU membership lately.)
That also means the freedom to apply for NATO membership, though Zelensky has indicated flexibility here.
He’s repeatedly implied Ukraine could forgo NATO aspirations as part of a broader peace deal.
And even if Ukraine were to leave NATO ambitions open, the U.S. or other NATO countries could unilaterally block accession.
Thus, NATO is not the real sticking point.
Crucially however, this sovereignty also means the following two elements:
1)The freedom to draft and maintain its own constitution without foreign-imposed reforms or “denazification” narratives from Russia, which are thinly veiled demands for regime change.
2) No formal recognition of Russia’s annexations in Crimea or the eastern territories.
Any Ukrainian government that formally recognized Russia’s annexation would collapse.
It would be unconstitutional and politically suicidal.
In short, NATO is negotiable, but Ukraine’s sovereignty over its political system, its formal, internationally recognized territories, and foreign alignments is not.
2) Security: Ukraine must also guarantee its long-term security.
This includes:
a) Credible deterrence measures to ensure Russia cannot simply regroup and attack again. Ideally, the post-deal environment should be so secure that Russia wouldn’t even consider trying;
b) Firm security agreements with European countries and the U.S.—not like the ineffective 1994 Budapest Memorandum. These agreements must include automatic triggers for large-scale military aid if Russia attacks. (side note: If full defense commitments are unlikely (e.g., the UK or France declaring war on Russia), then at the very least, guaranteed weapons deliveries and material support upon any aggression);
c) A demilitarized zone along the armistice line, peacekeeping forces from Europe stationed in Ukraine—not as passive observers but as an armed tripwire force authorized to respond to ceasefire violations;
d) No restrictions on Ukraine’s military force structure, arms production, or weapons imports. Ukraine must be free to maintain and expand its defense capability. Any limitation would amount to capitulation—agreeing to delay war on Russia’s timeline, surrendering slowly.
Without these terms, no Ukrainian government can accept a peace deal: it would be a strategic trap.
II. What Russia Wants—and Why It’s Unacceptable
Let’s now look at Russia’s demands, particularly through the lens of the divergence between Russian state interests and Vladimir Putin’s personal imperatives.
The distinction is important, because there is not much trouble in securing Russia’s state interests here.
Ukraine is not demanding anything that would make it a threat to Russia’s national interests.
For example: Kyiv is not asking a NATO or U.S. base to be built on its territory (though even then it would not be as much of a threat as Finland - a new NATO member - already is.)
Neither is it asking for long-range U.S. missiles or even nuclear weapons to be stationed on its lands.
The European force to be stationed in Ukraine is going to be small - around 40-50k tripwire force.
But Putin’s personal goals diverge from Russia’s state interests.
And herein lies the major sticking point.
Putin’s position is driven not just by state logic, but by personal reputation, regime durability, and historical legacy.
As such, he is demanding things appropriate only for the 19th century:
1) Full Control Over All Annexed Territories: Requiring Ukraine To Abandon Its Lands.
Putin has formally annexed four regions in eastern Ukraine.
But Russia doesn’t fully control them.
Putin is demanding Ukraine abandon all of the four contested eastern territories, even areas Kyiv currently controls.
Why? Because partial control of these annexed regions would expose Putin’s weakness.
After years of bloodshed and propaganda comparing himself to Peter the Great, failure to “liberate” the territories Russia claimed as its own would be seen as humiliation.
This demand is not about strategy—it’s about personal prestige and narrative control.
Moreover, if Russia stops now without full territorial control, Putin opens himself to domestic backlash—especially from ultranationalists—further threatening his political survival in the long-term.
But for Ukraine, abandoning territory it controls is simply absurd. It won’t happen.
2) International Recognition of Annexations.
Russia demands that Ukraine must recognize Crimea and the four occupied regions as Russian.
Again, this is not something Russia as a state would need to end hostilities—it’s a Putinist maximalist goal intended to legitimize his war, secure domestic political wins, and secure his legacy as a conqueror.
Recognition of annexations is a nonstarter for Ukraine and its Western allies.
3) Ukrainian Demilitarization.
Russia insists that Ukraine:
a) Limit its military to a reduced size;
b) Ban imports of advanced Western weapons;
c) Prohibit stationing of any European forces on Ukrainian territory.
These conditions are an attempt to permanently weaken Ukraine—to leave it vulnerable to future invasion and unable to deter or resist Russian aggression.
All of these demands directly violate the core Ukrainian requirements of sovereignty and security.
Accepting them would amount to Ukraine placing its national fate in the hands of the Kremlin.
The Strategic Impasse
In short, no deal is possible today.
For a deal to be even remotely conceivable:
1) Putin must drop demands for recognition of annexations;
2) He must abandon the goal of demanding that Ukraine must give up territories under its control - all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson;
3) He must cease calls for demilitarization and exclusion of foreign troops from Ukraine.
Only then can an armistice—along current front lines—be achieved.
Even then, it would likely resemble a Korean-style frozen conflict, with legal questions deferred until Russia undergoes political change.
But that’s not where we are.
Putin is still pursuing delusions of grandeur at extraordinary cost to Russia’s long-term interests.
He is prepared to sacrifice years, lives, and economic vitality to preserve the myth of victory.
The war will end either 1) when one side wins definitively (unlikely), or 2) when Putin’s calculus shifts.
When he sees that prolonging this war brings him no closer to his dream of imperial triumph, and only weakens Russia further.
That shift has not yet occurred—because Trump and Europe have not yet imposed the costs and pressure needed to force it.