Why the Ukraine War Will Not End Soon, Part 1: Incentives Facing Zelensky and Putin
At the end of the previous cable on the prospects of near-term resolution to Russia - Ukraine war, these cables promised to explain why genuine negotiations to end the Russia-Ukraine war are unlikely in the short-term, despite the fuel shortages, the battlefield attrition, and Zelensky’s declared push for talks.
The primary reason is structural misalignment of incentives, and some of it is also quite paradoxical.
Almost every primary stakeholder, Zelensky, Putin, the Europeans, and the United States, has reasons, different in each case, to prefer that the war continue for now rather than end immediately on the terms currently available.
They do not all want the war to end right away, and they do not all want it for the same reasons.
This is Part 1, covering the two belligerents.
Part 2 will cover the European (EU and NATO leader) countries and Part 3 will cover the interests of the United States.
We will analyze how even outside parties, paradoxically, may prefer continued war to a premature settlement that lacks a favorable strategic outcome.
Zelensky’s Incentives: Maximizing The Leverage He Has Not Had in Years
For most of the war, Zelensky negotiated from the position of weakness and indignity.
And most recently, he suffered enormous pressure from the Trump administration to sign various coercive deals, including the episode in which Treasury Secretary Bessent pushed him toward a minerals agreement, and the humiliating February 2025 confrontation in the White House.
The far right in the United States and in many European countries accused him of being a freeloader, and every increment of support he could get was a struggle to secure for years.
Ukraine was treated as a burden.
Idealists justified defending it out of morality and principle, and out of the importance of not letting Russia get away with a new wave of imperialism.
Pragmatists merely wanted Russia weakened a little before what they assumed would be an inevitable deal, one that would be very damaging to Ukraine’s future and its sovereignty.
Those were the terms Zelensky lived with for years.
In 2026 that picture has flipped, for several concrete reasons.
First, Ukraine masterfully used the Iran war to its advantage.
It established strong diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE and the other Gulf states, secured co-production arrangements with them for drone interference and interceptors, the areas where Ukraine holds significant advantage and expertise, and secured cash, which matters enormously for Ukraine.
Second, Ukraine finally locked in a multi-year loan.
After Orbán’s landslide defeat on April 12 and his replacement by Péter Magyar, Hungary lifted its veto and the EU gave final approval to the €90 billion (roughly $106 billion) loan on April 23.
Of that, €30 billion is budget support and €60 billion is for defense, with “Made in Europe” provisions steering procurement toward European and Ukrainian producers rather than US manufacturers, and Ukraine only has to repay if Russia ever agrees to reparations, which Moscow has categorically ruled out.
This guarantees a minimum base of funding for the next couple of years even without any top-up.
Third, after its flirtations with coercion, the Trump administration did not, after all, cut off intelligence sharing with Ukraine.
On the contrary, it is actively helping Ukraine target key Russian logistics and refineries and helping degrade Russian air defenses.
Unlike the late summer and fall of 2025, Ukraine is not being pestered into a terrible deal with Russia.
This is at least partly due to the distraction of the Trump administration with the Iran war, and partly because it cannot afford another costly political mishap on the global stage, another bad deal backed by the US, after the Iran fiasco. (more on that in Part 3).
