Why the War Will Not End Soon, Part 3: Trump And The U.S. Interests Involved
Part 1 covered the belligerents, Zelensky and Putin, and why each prefers continued fighting to the deal on offer.
Part 2 covered Europe, whose interest in a longer war fundamentally rests on a closing window of favorable leadership in place in key arenas, and the chance to degrade Russia decisively before that window shuts.
This final part covers the actor whose disposition some may argue matters most of all, the one Putin is counting on above every other: the United States, and specifically Donald Trump.
(side note: these cables disagree that Trump’s disposition matters the most. Now that 1) Europe foots almost all of the bill for the continuous war in Ukraine, and 2) Ukraine has established its own defense military base for core operations (that has led to 90% of Russia’s casualties and most of the damage from deep strikes), what the U.S. may or may not provide remains important but arguably, no longer existential for Ukraine. With that said, it is true that in some key areas, like intel sharing and giving access to key technologies like Patriot missiles, the U.S. holds enormous leverage over both Russia and Ukraine’s prospects in this war.)
The surprising conclusion is that Trump’s political interests and America’s medium-to-long-term strategic interests both point, right now, toward the war continuing rather than ending on premature terms.
This is not the impression Trump gives, and it is not a policy anyone in Washington would state plainly, but it is where the incentives lead.
The Visible Warming
Let’s start with what is already observable: at the G7 summit in mid-June, Trump signed onto a joint statement pledging to reinforce Ukraine’s momentum and to tighten sanctions on Russia, a notable departure from the far cooler posture of a year earlier.
Indeed, a Ukrainian official reported that Trump had encouraged Zelensky to “act more boldly” to pressure Moscow for concessions.
Then, last week, Trump confirmed that he would grant Kyiv a license for co-production of PAC-3 (Patriot) interceptors for Ukraine.
And Trump signaled that the Russia oil sanctions eased during the Iran war would be reimposed as oil flows again through Hormuz, saying Iran would soon be “in the rearview mirror.”
Much of this is basic Trump calculus and instinct, the reflex to align with the winner.
Zelensky looks like a winner right now, on a stronger footing than in years, and Russia looks like it is on the back foot.
Trump wants to stand next to the party that is winning, and at this moment that party is Ukraine.
But the deeper reasons run past instinct.
Whether Russia is forced to abandon its maximalist demands and accept a strategic defeat, or merely suffers heavy additional attrition before the lines are frozen, both outcomes serve American interests.
Even six or seven more months of attrition at the current rate would be a gain for Washington.
The reasons divide into Trump’s personal political interests and the United States’ structural strategic interests.
