Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Israel's path remains unobstructed, and the Biden administration is close to a major foreign policy win with Turkey.

Iran loses further deterrence after soft response to Israeli attacks on Hezbollah.

• As Israel is amping up its airstrikes, killing further senior commanders (latest senior figure being the head of missile forces), there are largely crickets in Tehran.

• Even though Iran’s Supreme Leader has seemingly entered the end game of delusional thinking by posting on X that ‘‘Hezbollah is the victor’’, there hasn’t been any indications of this ‘‘victory’’ on the actual battlefield itself.

• (side note: one hopes that Khamenei would declare Russian troops victorious next. Since that would mean Ukraine decimating Russian forces and liberating its lands)

• Instead, we see Hezbollah getting decimated - with more of its ammo depots and senior figures vaporized.

• Hezbollah forces did launch a ballistic missile targeting Tel-Aviv, and it is true that given the heavy payload (approximately 1,500lbs) of Qadr-1 missiles, the potential destruction would be not so insignificant, Hezbollah probably wanted to avoid actual impact given that no cheaper drones/smaller missiles were launched simultaneously to overwhelm Israeli air defenses.

• Indeed, launching precisely one ballistic missile (allegedly, targeting HQs of the Israeli intel agency Mossad) at the Israeli capital is a good way of ensuring its interception - which it was.

• Hezbollah’s ballistic missile launch was therefore largely demonstrative in its nature.

• It aimed to achieve largely three goals:

• 1) Warn Netanyahu that future escalation could lead to major civilian casualties in Israel - if even few of these ballistic missiles get through, given their payload, quite substantial number of civilians could end up being killed.

• And such civilian costs would lead to political costs - after successful decimation of Hamas, killing of Ismayil Haniyeh and a number of Hezbollah leaders, airstrikes on Beirut and pager attacks, Netanyahu has largely regained the lost popularity (over October 7th attack);

• But Hezbollah’s missile launch is a warning for Netanyahu to not get too cocky and cash in his winnings (and end hostilities) while he can.

• 2) Demonstrate willingness to hit back and therefore, save some face amongst its dispirited followers;

• 3) Signal to Washington that there would be significant costs to Israel/civilian casualties.

• For the U.S. further escalation is not good strategically (requiring the U.S. to redirect further air defense supplies/naval assets to the region) but also politically too - at the time when Trump is accusing Biden admin policies for leading the current chaos across the entire Middle East, the last thing that the Democratic party ticket needs is a further escalation that results in major civilian casualties in Israel.

• And when it comes to the U.S. at least, Hezbollah’s tactics may be working - as the Secretary of State Antony Blinken is frantically involved in shuttle diplomacy to avoid a larger war.

• But White House exaggerating the seriousness of Hezbollah’s one-off easily interceptable ballistic missile strikes serves another purpose: inflate Hezbollah’s response and therefore, enable it to save face in a potential climb-down.

• And Perhaps Khamenei’s delusional and totally uncredible declaration provides an excuse for Iran’s inaction: if Hezbollah is indeed winning, then it follows that there really isn’t much need for Iran’s decisive involvement in support of its proxy.

• One thing is largely clear however, there is no appetite in Iran to back Hezbollah with full force.

• In fact, at the very moment that Hezbollah was getting pummeled by Israel, Iran’s President Pezeshkian signaled further softening during his appearance at the UN General Assembly - indicating willingness to negotiate a new nuclear deal.

• All this weakness whets Israeli appetites even further - the IDF Chief of Staff warned troops to be ready for a ground incursion in Southern Lebanon.

• And why wouldn’t Israel do just that?

• Why wouldn’t Israel decimate Hezbollah when the timing is seemingly so opportune?

• We have previously published a separate post evaluating Hezbollah’s capabilities, but here is perhaps the key extract:

• ‘‘Overall, it is tough to evaluate how much real damage Hezbollah would be able to inflict in 2024.

• But it cannot possibly be 10x that of Hamas.

• Taken at its highest, even if we assume that Hezbollah proves to be 3-4x as lethal as Hamas, the cost to Israel would be tolerable.

• For context, IDF losses are 3.7 deaths per day of fighting against Hamas in Gaza.

• Even if those ratios were to triple, and the most intense period of war with Hezbollah was to last say, twice as long, then in 6 months, Israel would lose around 2k troops.”

• And thus far, it seems like Hezbollah will not be even 3-4x as lethal as Hamas - perhaps 2x at its highest.

• And to be clear, the above estimate was in relation to a full-scale war lasting for many months - until Hezbollah was defeated definitively.

• If the war aim is far more limited - if it only involves the return of all displaced Israeli’s to northern territories, and destruction of Hezbollah facilities in Southern Lebanon/establishing a buffer zone, then the total cost to the IDF will be far more limited.

• Given the strategic, tactical (and political for Netanyahu) gains, it seems well worth it.
  
  

Washington and Ankara are close to solving the F-35 issue.