Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Ukraine war updates and the incentives behind Israel vs Hezbollah ceasefire.
Sponsored by Chart API: a one-click online solution that provides real-time tax records for banks and financial advisors. We help financial advisors onboard their customers super fast by preventing the pain of sharing tax transcripts manually. We also help banks make lending decisions faster by enabling income verification and lending risk screening at a lightening speed. Customers share their tax records with one click online consent forms, and connect via their IRS online accounts or commercial tax solutions like TurboTax.
Book your free custom demo here.
Ukraine war updates.
1) Russian forces scramble to prevent the collapse of the Assad regime.
Turkey-backed rebel groups are on the roll in Syria - inflicting devastating losses on the Assad regime and taking several key towns like Aleppo.
Russia clearly lacks resources to get involved decisively - and in fact, the Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s first response was to express “hope’’ that the regime of Bashar Assad would recover control over the situation.
Translation: don’t expect much from us.
But since then, Russia has increased air strikes to blunt the forward momentum of the Turkey-backed rebels.
And this is not just about protecting their puppet regime in Syria - there is a significant risk to their own Naval presence in Syria.
Since if the rebels make it further south to Homs, Damascus will be cut off from Russia’s naval base at Tartus.
This means that Turkey’s (and thus, NATO’s) leverage over Russia will increase.
We shall unpack this situation further in the upcoming cables, but for now, it is important to note that the recent developments are in the interests of the U.S. Israel, and broader NATO.
Turkey is a NATO ally and its proxies are attacking the proxies of Russia and Iran.
For all the rhetorical confrontation between Turkey and Israel (over Gaza), this is functionally in the Israeli interests first and foremost - it weakens the Iran-backed regime and denies space and power to the ‘‘axis of resistance’’ network militias in the region.
This then further severs Iran’s ability to resupply battered Hezbollah (more on that ceasefire deal later below).
In fact, it would be strategically prudent for Israel to solidify this new configuration by conducting further airstrikes against targets and obstacles of the rebel groups on the way to Damascus.
(side note: in fact, the confirmation of this came rather swiftly. Abu Tow, a Syrian rebel leader, gave a statement to Israel’s public broadcaster, Kann, explicitly pledging that his forces would avoid targeting Israeli interests due to “shared enemies.”)
And by attacking and weakening the Russia-Iran axis in Syria, Turkey’s moves (pursued from self-interest) are in full alignment with broader US and NATO interests.
2) Russia escalates its missile threats: Poland and Kyiv outlined as potential targets.
Russia’s foreign ministry has now outlined the location of Aegis ashore air-defense missile systems in Redzikowo, Poland as a legitimate target of potential Oreshnik missile strikes.
The Aegis ashore system is primarily meant to defend against Russian IRBM/ICMBs - firing Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) as interceptors.
Naturally, this is a highly strategic location - so this threat is indeed a major escalation from Russia.
But there are several things of note to consider here:
1) This location is unlikely to be the very next location that Russia would target as discussed before.
There are many more locations such as Kyiv itself (which Putin had once again threatened last week) that Russia would potentially target first before resorting to go after the location of a US missile base.
2) The base is heavily protected and Russian ICBM-based missiles aren’t very accurate.
As a general rule, ICBMs or missiles based on ICBMs are not going to be known for their accuracy - and in fact they don’t need to be accurate at all.
Since most of them will be carrying nuclear warheads when deployed - that is after all their intended use.
So a Russian strike would either likely not hit the precise targets, or Russia could actually deliberately miss the target and aim at some nearby field to ensure little actual damage and casualties (betting on the political signaling instead.)
However, with all that said, this would in fact be a major escalation against NATO.
As such, strong deterrence is needed.
And contrary to what people assume this is wouldn’t not automatically be an escalation towards a nuclear war.
It is not definitely not in anyone's interest to imply that there is a legitimate threat of a nuclear war.
(side note: in fact, it was quite revealing that the first-ever launch of Oreshnik was communicated to the US through nuclear deconfliction/risk-reduction channels - indicating that Russia was interested in defusing the risk of miscommunication-caused inadvertent escalation.)
But a strong deterrence is in fact needed.
It is here that NATO leaders should (initially through backchannels) make it crystal clear that for every military target hit by a Russian missile, several more will be targeted and destroyed by NATO forces in return.
And that such a calculus would not be in Russia’s favor.
If they are so concerned about the use of ATACMS by Ukraine, then they should think again before threatening NATO bases outside Ukraine - since this would lead to an overwhelming response that is much more powerful than what they have suffered to date from weapons supplied to Ukraine.
3) EU military talk & Trump’s new Ukraine appointment.
President Trump appointed the former General Keith Kellogg as a special envoy on Ukraine.
Mr Kellogg is known for his hawkish views on Russia, and has previously advocated for an endgame that sees Russia removed by Ukrainian forces from all the occupied territories - including Crimea.
More recently Mr Kellogg has advised on freezing the frontlines and to impose extreme costs on Russia if they don't agree to a comprehensive ceasefire.
It is unclear how his views will evolve in January or February of the next year.
But one thing is clear: in the present circumstances, Kellogg would have been one of the best appointments that Ukraine could ever hope for - he has a high regard for Ukrainian leadership, and for the brave troops that have been fighting the Russians for nearly three years now.
It is good that Kellogg will have a lot of influence on Trump and he would likely use that influence to advocate for stronger support for Ukraine if Russia wanted to negotiate in bad faith.
At the very minimum, and even if Trump was to ignore Kellogg, his appointment will still nonetheless act as a deterrent for Russia - in the eyes of the Kremlin, it will make Trump look like the only possible good cop surrounded by bad cops. (national security advisor, Mike Woods, Secretary of State, Michael Rubio, and now, the Ukraine envoy General Kellogg.)
More generally, the recent discussion of potential European troops deployment in Ukraine has also resurfaced.
Countries like Estonia were already pushing for it.
And more recently, there have been reports of secret UK - France talks around a possible deployment in Ukraine.
In addition, Germany's opposition CDU (center-right conservatives) leader Friedrich Mertz would likely take over as the next Chancellor in February.
All of this will lead to an overall context where the floor on the minimal support for Ukraine is gradually being raised.
This means that there isn't much that Trump can realistically do to impose costs on Ukraine.
Firstly, and as discussed before, any drastic cuts in support for Ukraine, could be highly stabilizing, and could lead to bursts of forward advance from the Russian military.
And Trump would surely not want to be associated with this weakness - which he often complained about when talking about Biden.
And secondly, once the Europeans prop up and raise the minimum level of military support for Ukraine, the effective influence of the Trump admin over Kyiv will surely reduce.
This is because if Ukraine was previously holding on by being mostly dependent on the US, well now they will have an extra room for leverage to say no to Trump’s potential demands to capitulate and agree to a horrible and strategically harmful deal.
The Calculated Ceasefire: Why Israel Stopped Short in Lebanon
Israel’s decision to cease operations against Hezbollah, despite overwhelming battlefield success, has left both Israelis and Lebanese questioning the logic of restraint.
In Lebanon, the guns are falling silent—not because either side can claim a definitive victory, but because both Israel and Hezbollah have come to the same conclusion: the costs of continuing the war now outweigh its potential benefits.
When there’s no better alternative, you get a ceasefire.
The decision has sparked controversy, especially in Israel.
Critics like Benny Gantz argue the war has been left unfinished - that only “half the job” has been done.
Yet, these critiques lack a realistic roadmap for achieving total victory.
The army is stretched thin after a grueling year of operations, and the economy groans under the weight of prolonged reservist deployments and disruptions to civilian life in the north.
The longer the war drags on, the higher the costs—without any guarantee of meaningful additional gains.
And yet, instead of reckoning with these long-term attritional costs, domestic critics of Netanyahu seem to advocate fighting on indefinitely in pursuit of goals attainable only with a prolonged Israeli incursion and occupation in Lebanon - and this is not possible give Trump’s reiterated calls for Netanyahu to ‘‘finish the job’’.
In fact, critics of the deal overlook the one crucial element in the analysis: the Trump factor.
Israel’s potential gains in pursuit of a definitive destruction of Hezbollah must be offset by political costs associated with not offering an inauguration gift to Trump upon his return.
And if Netanyahu needs to choose between further destruction of Hezbollah vs appeasing Trump and securing his further goodwill (to then expend that political capital in a potential renewed confrontation with Iran), it is pretty clear that Netanyahu will opt for the latter.
Viewed from this lens then, potential gains from a continuation of the war in Lebanon did not outweigh the strategic gains due to Netanyahu.
Nonetheless, critics like Gantz emphasize the risk of a 2006-style outcome—where Hezbollah rebounds stronger than ever.
But this risk may be overstated - the group’s strategic missteps have left it reeling.
Although it is true that Hezbollah suffered less attrition (in absolute terms) than Hamas (with only few thousand combatants killed vs Hamas’s more than 15k), its senior leadership has been decimated, its supply routes to Syria and Iran cut off and destroyed (and subject to continuous monitoring from IDF going forward - in fact, one of the conditions of the ceasefire is that Hezbollah won’t attempt to rearm) and its missile depots and launch sites have been largely destroyed.
Even its financial resources/banks, and media offices have been destroyed.
This is not an easy recovery.
Israel maintains military and intel dominance over the group.
Its entire raison d’être as Iran’s deterrent against Israel has been undermined.
Far from showcasing its utility, Hezbollah’s performance has exposed it as a liability to Iran’s regional ambitions.
Since October 7th, its decision to bind itself (post-fact) to Hamas has alienated even its own base in Lebanon.
What was once a symbol of resistance has become a source of suffering for the Shia community it claims to defend.
And so, for all its faux posturing and declarations of victory last week, Hezbollah agreed to delink its military operations from Hamas and the situation in Gaza.
Gone is the insistence on a ceasefire in Gaza as a precondition for Hezbollah’s own ceasefire with Israel.
Let us further unpack the main strategic accomplishments of the 10-week campaign against Hezbollah.
Three main threats - all neutralized.
1. Strategic threat from Iran.
The fact of the matter is that Hezbollah has now been downgraded from its previous status as the most well-armed and menacing non-state actor/organization in the world (that honor will most probably be now claimed by the Houthis).
Hezbollah’s hitherto role as a deterrent for Iran has been shattered.
Prior to the September campaign, it was a widely held belief (both in the West and in the Iranian regime circles) that Hezbollah could unleash a major combat operation in response to strikes on Iran - that the threat of major escalation on the northern Israeli border would somehow deter Tel-Aviv from launching these strikes on Iran.
This was always a theory thin on actual facts - even if Hezbollah performed its very best, it was simply not going to impose costs high enough to deter Israel from pursuing a military objective that they believe (correctly) is of existential nature: precluding the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon.
But there was still hope that Hezbollah could perhaps impose sufficient costs to influence a wavering Israeli leader.
Well, all of these theories were proved to be pie in the sky assumptions made by the senior leaders in Iran.
The failure of Hezbollah to play this crucial role was on a full display in October, - as Israel struck Iranian targets, Hezbollah’s inability to respond revealed its impotence.
Iran’s deterrent strategy of relying on the axis of resistance groups is now in tatters.
Hezbollah has been all but decimated, and Houthis/other militias are either too far or too weak (or both) to matter.
(side note; at least for now. The only possible exception to this claim is Houthis’ ability to cause chaos in the Red Sea. And how Russia/Houthi partnership evolves is still an open question - largely predicated on the Western ability to deter the Kremlin from this ever closer partnership with Houthis.)
2. Border Breach and Mass Infiltration
The nightmare scenario of a mass Hezbollah infiltration has been entirely defused.
Years of fortification in key border villages like Khiam and Bint Jbeil—25 years in the making—were obliterated in a matter of weeks.
With these forward positions lost, Hezbollah’s capacity for a surprise border assault is effectively nonexistent.
3. Short-Range Rockets and long-range missiles and drones.
Hezbollah’s vast stockpile of short-range rockets, once capable of raining havoc on northern Israel, has been systematically dismantled.
Today, what remains of this arsenal is largely ineffective.
Sporadic volleys miss their targets by an average of a kilometer, and for every thousand rockets launched, casualties are negligible.
In addition, the much-hyped long-range missile arsenal has proven to be more bark than bite.
Inaccuracy renders these weapons terror tools rather than strategic assets.
Israel’s intelligence and preemptive strikes have further eroded their threat.
The once-feared drones are now met with increasingly effective Israeli countermeasures.
And even when they occasionally penetrate the defensive shield (like that attack on the IDF complex), these drones still carry limited payloads and cause minimal destruction.
A Ceasefire, But for How Long?
The ceasefire may not be the end of the story.
Some in Netanyahu’s orbit are already framing this as a tactical pause, with speculation about resuming hostilities in February.
But that scenario seems unlikely.
For one, the Israeli public and military are weary.
For another, external factors—such as Donald Trump’s looming presidential inauguration—could shape Israel’s next moves in unexpected ways.
A new definitive demilitarization campaign against Iran’s nuclear facilities (and a possible regime change attempt) may take precedence over getting bogged down in Lebanon.
What Comes Next?
As the dust settles, the focus shifts to what has changed—and what hasn’t.
Hezbollah has been diminished, both militarily and politically, but not eradicated.
Israel’s northern border remains tense but more secure than before - Hezbollah will now face difficulty moving south from the Litani river.
(side note: that areas south of this river must be demilitarized and act as a buffer zone was a condition of the UN 1701 resolution that halted the 2006 war. But this was never implemented.)
Yet the real question lies beyond the battlefield.
Can Lebanon seize this moment to chart a new path, free from the grip of Hezbollah’s shadow?
Or will it remain mired in the cycle of proxy wars that have devastated its people for decades?
Here, the U.S. must lead and seize upon the strategic opportunities to help Lebanon reconstitute itself as a functioning state and to get rid of the cancer of Hezbollah acting as a significant power-broker/political player.
(side note: we have previously discussed how the U.S. may attempt to do this.)
To be clear, Hezbollah will (for the foreseeable future) remain a potent non-state force in Lebanon’s public life.
But there is an opportunity to sideline it as a major political player in the core functions of the state.
And this opportunity must not be squandered.