Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Handling Pelosi's Taiwan Trip Crisis.

Nancy Pelosi’s Planned Taiwan trip: a major test of Washington’s resolve.

• House speaker Nancy Pelosi is planning a trip to Taiwan in August - a first visit for a house speaker in 25 years.

• (side note: and crucially, not unprecedented)

• This would be yet another major gesture to Taiwan from Washington: after (importantly, former) US officials picked by Biden - retired Admiral Mike Mullen (former chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and Michele Flournoy (undersecretary of Defense for policy in the Obama administration) visited Taiwan in March.

• Naturally, Beijing was angered by the planned trip.

• China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs cautioned US officials to “strictly adhere to the U.S.’s one-China policy”, and warned that Pelosi’s potential visit “would seriously violate the one-China principle and the stipulations in the three China-U.S. joint communiqués and harm China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity [emphasis added].”

• It is that last part that got Washington all riled up: there is indeed a legitimate concern that China may overreact - claiming infringement of its territorial integrity.

• This is because, now that this statement has been made, Chinese refusal to respond with concrete actions will look weak: America is harming your territorial integrity and you are doing what exactly? nothing? All talk, no action?

• In other words, if China does not act, all future diplomatic protestations would have to rely on even tougher language - to make up for the loss of credibility (a vicious cycle - making future uncontrollable escalation more likely).

• The worry that China may indeed act out, is also made much more likely by the overall context (at least from Washington’s perspective).

• The potential trip would happen about three months before a Communist Party congress - where Xi Jinping is expected to violate well-established norms and secure an unprecedented third term as President: he simply cannot afford to look weak at such a precarious moment of his rule.

• The worst that could happen.

• A military escalation: there is a risk that Beijing may decide to declare (and threaten to implement) a no fly zone over Taiwan ahead of the potential visit.

• This would then put the ball on America’s court - imposing an impossible dilemma: a) back off and you look weak, or b) proceed and face an almost certain military escalation.

• Alternatively, Beijing could engage in a sudden de facto no fly zone: escorting Pelosi’s plane with Chinese fighter jets: preventing the plane from landing.

• All of these come with significant risks of an uncontrollable/unforeseen escalation: a single mistake could lead to a severe confrontation.

• Which is precisely why the worst case scenario is (on the balance) still unlikely: what if China does get dragged into a war?

• They are clearly not ready for a major war against the US - and they know it.

• Their Air Force and Navy is not adequately prepared for a protracted confrontation with the US.

• And they certainly wouldn’t be able to mobilize enough forces on a short notice to successfully invade Taiwan.

• As such, responses that are much less severe are more likely.

• Beijing could repeat the 2020 scenario: when China responded to HHS Secretary Alex Azar’s trip to Taipei by sending fighter jets crossing across the median line of the Taiwan Strait.

• A similar move could be pulled off again - potentially on a larger scale.

• In addition, China could also respond by violating the ‘‘territorial integrity’’ of a local US ally: whether that is Philippines or Australia (for example, by sailing a warship through their territorial waters).

• The PLA’s Navy could engage in deliberate violation of maritime borders as a show of force and willingness to respond proportionately.

• Temptations.

• Of course, the threat of escalation is not the only reason why Washington is annoyed by Pelosi’s potential visit.

• There is an upcoming Biden - Xi phone call: where the US President will attempt to a) re-introduce some stability into the relationship, and b) potentially carve out specific areas where tariffs may be removed - easing out supply chains and reducing the cost-push inflation here at home.

• In addition, and at the time of threats over Taiwan, China granted the US a major diplomatic victory : Beijing distanced itself from Moscow in the strongest terms possible since the start of the war (a behavior that Washington wants more of, and is therefore unwilling to disincentivize its future repeat).

• Speaking at the Aspen security summit, China’s ambassador to the US, Qin Gang put a major dent into the previously announced ‘‘no limits’’ partnership between China and Russia.

• He suggested that there was a ‘‘misunderstanding’’ about the actual nature of Russia-China relations, adding that “China-Russia relationship is not an alliance.”

• This is significant - such pronouncements and public repeats of underlying realities (the true nature of the relationship as has always been argued by these cables) are diplomatically damaging even in good times.

• Loud proclamations that China and Russia are not in fact allies at the time that Russia is in the middle of a war and facing global sanctions - now that is extraordinary.

• Indeed, the Chinese ambassador could simply stop at ‘‘misunderstanding’’ - refusing to comment further.

• China is clearly trying to disassociate itself from Russia’s invasion - context matters: Qin Gang is probably the fourth most important Chinese representative on the global stage (After Xi, his premier Li Keqiang, and Foreign Minister Wang), and it is inconceivable that statements of such gravity were not pre-approved by Xi himself.

• And unlike Iran (which doesn’t have much too much lose on the global arena), Chinese leaders not only refused to back the Kremlin’s ‘‘preventative war of self-defense” narrative, but they have also: a) refused to provide weapons, and b) major Chinese companies have thus far abided by the US sanctions.

• The timing of these comments matters: Beijing is playing hot and cold - offering a diplomatic win to Washington whilst threatening a retaliation over Taiwan.

• It is an indirect offer of an exchange: we distance ourselves from Russia, you don’t push our buttons on Taiwan.

• And this exchange could have worked well if conversations were kept strictly private - without Beijing’s public threats to retaliate.

How not to respond.

• Biden’s initial response was a total blunder.

• He commented that America’s military leaders thought that the Pelosi trip was “not a good idea right now”.

• And as if this was not bad enough, Biden then added that he was not aware ‘‘what the status of it [the planned trip] is” - this demonstrates lack of communication and cohesion.

• If the intention was to demonstrate how little Biden worries about the trip (that he did not even check-in on the latest updates), implying lack of concern over Beijing’s threats - well that does not work when you precede the statement by a military analysis expressing worry over a potential confrontation.

• At the end, Biden appeared both concerned and clueless at the same time - a difficult feat to accomplish.

• Biden should have never used military’s advice in such a manner.

• Firstly, because he now revealed that the US military was indeed worried about a potential escalation: this is a message to Beijing that their threats have worked, and they now have an incentive to double down.

• Secondly, the role of the military is to counsel the President on all matters military - not political.

• The US Military is doing its job when providing an assessment on the military risks of the potential visit - Biden is not doing his job when he then uses this advice as a crutch to lean on and justify his political stance.

• By dragging America’s military into the present discourse, Biden added legitimacy to Beijing’s claims that the issue was one of a potential military confrontation over alleged violation of territorial integrity of China.

• Biden should have kept the issue on the level of political discourse - refusing to accept the Chinese framing of the upcoming trip.

• Indeed, Biden’s weak response expressing apprehension and confusion (and nothing else) creates two major consequences:

• 1) Beijing can see very clearly that its threats and intimidation tactics have worked: American leaders are worried about the potential conflict.

• China is now incentivized to double-down and increase the intensity of their threats.

• And this is already happening.

• Just a few days after Biden’s comments, on Monday, China’s foreign ministry warned that Beijing was ‘‘seriously prepared’’ to respond if Nancy Pelosi was to proceed with her travel plans in August.

• China is now hinting at a concrete action - instead of just limiting the response to the realm of diplomatic measures/protestations/notes etc.

• 2) America’s regional allies are watching closely - if Washington is going to display weakness and lack of resolve, how confident should they be in their own posture over Taiwan?

• We have previously discussed additional FONOPS (freedom of navigation missions) through the Taiwan strait - and how it was essential that many more of the local allies should be involved in engaging (in more frequent) FONOPS.

• Well, for that to work, our local allies must be certain that America would not waver in times of crisis and confrontation.

• Biden’s response thus far, does not inspire much confidence needed to join Washington in confronting Beijing with a stronger unified stance.

• Going Forward.

• Washington has two major objectives in this crisis: 1) Demonstrate resolve and render Chinese threats useless, and 2) De-escalate from an outright conflict.

• This one is a tightrope, and will require a highest level of diplomatic finesse.

• President Biden must certainly use his Thursday’s phone call with Xi to provide private reassurances: platitudes that clearly demonstrate that America’s policy on China remains (at least formally) unchanged.

• And this must be done in a formal, legalism filled language - nothing to appease Xi’s ego, convincing him that he has an upper hand, and that he could push for more in public.

• But make no mistake - although there could potentially be a debate around the initial wisdom of Pelosi’s planned visit to Taiwan, there can absolutely be no backtracking now.

• If Pelosi cancels the trip, China will essentially demonstrate to the whole world that it has a veto over the travel itinerary of American statesmen: that it can intimidate and bully the US into submission.

• And although it would be a stretch to claim that this would crystallize America’s decline as a superpower on the global stage, this is precisely how media all across the world will portray the incident: and what is true in global public perception, could arguably (in many cases) matter more.

• America is already paying the price of Biden’s weak conflict-avoidance statements on Ukraine - where every other major speech was peppered with Washington’s desire to avoid a nuclear conflict with Russia (a desire no doubt shared by Putin, but one that was wisely omitted from his speech - demonstrating more resolve and willingness to escalate).

• A cancelled trip would cede escalation dominance to China: it will embolden Beijing to repeat (surely increasing their frequency as well) similar intimidation tactics in the near future.

• America submitting now, will not prevent a conflict - it will merely delay it: China will be incentivized to rinse & repeat until the US will be forced to act.

• And in the meantime, the US would lose respect and trust of its allies.

• Our major allies and regional partners: AUKUS, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, ASEAN countries, Pacific islands, are all watching.

• Weakness and appeasement will reduce allied trust in America’s resolve: reducing their willingness to take risks when we need them.

• Swing states amongst the ASEAN, and in the Pacific, will start to hedge their bets - adding to China’s influence.

• Even countries in Africa, Middle East and LATAM will be more willing to hedge their bets and invite in Chinese influence.

• And perhaps most importantly for the short-term, Putin will be watching too: he will surely taste the blood in the water - potentially adding to Chinese threats and introducing new ‘‘red lines’’ in Ukraine (for example, further NATO aid) - threatening major escalation if those lines are crossed.

• Appeasement and shows of weakness do not resolve conflicts - they merely delay them to a point where they must be confronted at even more disadvantageous settings.

• Whatever private assurances Washington delivers to Beijing, the trip must go on as planned: and if needed (as assessed by the US military), Pelosi’s plane must be accompanied, protected, and escorted by American firepower.

• The whole world will be watching America’s next move: this is a time for iron will and resolve - not for hesitation, uncertainty and weakness.