Logistics of Pursuing Greenland: Free Association vs Territorial Acquisition.
In previous cables we discussed how: 1) Trump was wrong to not rule out the use of military force in relation to the pursuit of Greenland, and 2) But that the pursuit itself is legitimate - there is an enormous amount of Geostrategic value for the U.S. to be found in Greenland.
But a lot of readers have followed up and inquired about the precise logistics of this pursuit: how could Greenland be legally “acquired” - even if they consent?
What would be the precise mechanism and what would be the legal and logistical issues to overcome?
And is there a preferable option to maximize U.S. interests?
To answer these questions, we shall explore two broad possibilities: Free Association and an outright territorial acquisition - with a corresponding (and willing) cessation of sovereignty on behalf of Greenland.
The analysis offered below will presume that the political battle of convincing Greenlanders is over and that there is a will and desire to join the U.S. in one way or another.
And that fight is far from over - Greenland’s politicians are aware of their enormous leverage and have repeatedly expressed disinterest in joining the U.S.
Whether this is genuine or a negotiation tactic to extract more guarantees and lucrative investments is unclear - time will tell (depending on Trump’s counteroffer).
(side note: on a practical note, probably the most persuasive appeal would be the offer of the U.S. passports to the current residents of Greenland. This of course assumes that as part of this appeal Greenland would be offered to become a U.S. State or Territory.)
Free Association vs territorial acquisition.
Option 1: Compact of Free Association (COFA).
Free association is rooted in the principle of self-determination as recognized by international law, particularly the United Nations Charter (Article 1(2)) and General Assembly Resolution 1514 (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples).
It allows non-sovereign territories to exercise their right to self-determination without becoming fully independent states.
The associated territory enjoys significant autonomy and is often considered a non-sovereign entity.
The sovereign state is responsible for matters like defense, international representation, and possibly financial aid, but the relationship is one of partnership rather than domination.
There are a number of notable and relevant examples: the Cook Islands and Niue with New Zealand - where the territories manage their internal affairs but rely on New Zealand for defense and diplomatic representation.
Even more relevant: the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau, which are in free association with the U.S. under Compacts of Free Association, allowing for U.S. military presence and economic assistance.
(side note: also, although Denmark is the sovereign over Greenland after the 2009 Self-Government Act, Greenland secured significant autonomy over its internal affairs - and Denmark retained responsibilities over handling foreign policy and defense. So this too is almost a de facto free association relationship.)
For a Compact of Free Association to take place, both parties will need to ratify.
Under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, Senate ratification would be needed - since this would be a treaty.
Although, securing a 2/3 majority wouldn’t be hard since this would be done all in a civil and consensual manner and most of the Senators would see the clear strategic value of Greenland.
Greenland would need to ratify this too, and the situation over there would be a tad bit more complicated - since Greenland would first need to declare independence from Denmark (unless a COFA was designed in a unique way which preserved Danish sovereignty as well - but this is highly unlikely for myriad of legal and political reasons.)
The upside is pretty clear: the U.S. will secure more investment and military access to the island.
But there are a number of downsides:
Agreements establishing free association often include provisions for unilateral or mutual termination, allowing the associated territory to pursue independence if it chooses.
In other words, hypothetically, Greenland could always dump this deal if say China offered a better alternative: this is very unlikely to happen of course, but it could happen.
The island is very small population wise, and China could potentially sway (or even bribe) a few key voices to its cause.
This is not to say that Greenland would then become a base for Beijing - but even a decision to keep both the U.S. and China at equal arms lengths would be a devastating blow to the U.S. interests: it would mean loss of access to bases and other rights previously ratified under the treaty.
Once again, this is not likely to happen - but it could happen.
In addition, to sweeten the deal, the U.S. would have to offer something more than the current status quo: more investment, more money etc.
As such, it is worth asking: what would the U.S. truly get in return for a COFA that it is not already getting via Danish (a NATO ally remember) permission?
The U.S. already has a significant military footprint in Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base).
As the U.S. military's northernmost installation, Pituffik Space Base plays a critical role in missile detection and space surveillance.
It hosts the 12th Space Warning Squadron, which operates the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS).
This system is designed to detect and track intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that could pose a threat to North America.
But if the U.S. wanted to increase its current footprint or set up a new base, would Greenland really object?
How likely is that? Not very..
In addition, as discussed before, Greenland is located at a strategically crucial Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap—a crucial maritime choke point.
But if the U.S. had the desire to increase its naval assets to monitor this gap more stringently, it is inconceivable that a NATO ally Denmark would refuse?
What about investments into oil and Rare Earth Elements (REEs)?
Once again, the biggest potential opposition would presumably come from the native Greenlanders - not Danes.
And a Free Association treaty cannot guarantee that these natives don’t change their mind later on.
As such, it is worth asking: given the potential downsides and lack of guarantees, is it really worth all the political hassle and extra costs to secure a ‘‘deal’’ which is still reversible?
Would this really be a huge improvement on the current status quo?
As of today, it is not at all clear if the U.S. is to secure some concessions above and beyond what it currently enjoys.
Perhaps, if that happened, it would be worth reconsidering a COFA option.
But in the meantime, territorial acquisition and Greenland becoming a U.S. Territory or a State seems to be more attractive as an option.
Territorial Acquisition.
A good example of a relatively recent territorial acquisition was the Alaska Purchase (from Russia) of 1867.
In addition, a good example of the territory ending its sovereignty in the post WWII /under current U.N. rule is found in East Germany.
Under the German Reunification of 1990, the state of East Germany voluntarily dissolved and integrated into West Germany, forming a unified state under the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Here too, Greenland would need to first break independent from Denmark and thereafter, voluntarily dissolve its sovereignty.
How this would work in practice:
Once terms are agreed upon, the treaty is signed by the parties.
For the Alaska Purchase, U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward and Russian Minister to the U.S. Eduard de Stoeckl signed the agreement.
In the U.S., the treaty must be submitted by the President to the Senate for consideration.
The U.S. Senate must approve the treaty by a two-thirds majority vote.
This is outlined in Article II of the U.S. Constitution.
Legislative appropriation.
If the treaty involves financial expenditures (which it likely will), Congress would have to authorize the necessary funds.
For the Alaska Purchase, the U.S. Congress approved the payment of $7.2 million to Russia on July 14, 1868, through a separate appropriation bill.
In the case with Greenland, locals may demand Federal injection of a specified pre-agreed sum into local treasury/government as a condition to becoming a U.S. Territory or a State.
In fact, this would be a smart move from Greenland: they could insist on a specified one-off sum to ensure a strong starting point.
Clearly, politically, this is going to be harder to pull off than a simple COFA agreement/treaty.
But with that difficulty comes advantages not available for the COFA option: total U.S. Federal sovereignty over the land.
Washington wouldn’t have to deal with perpetual risk of COFA being canceled depending on political circumstances.
Of course, it is also better for the local population: they would become U.S. citizens and enjoy the power of the U.S. passport.
As it stands, we are way off either option.
But as of today, COFA is not nearly as compelling of an option as U.S. territorial acquisition of Greenland: if we are going through all that political hassle (both options require a Senate approval for example), and investing all these resources, it is far more advantageous to go for an option that secures these rights in perpetuity.
And once again: this very route offers more guarantees and rights to the local Greenlanders as well.
It is a win-win all around: the U.S. acquires an important asset and Greenlanders enjoy being citizens of a global superpower.
Reminds a bit of how Texas became a state- with significant differences. I think they would opt for statehood. If so, pressure would dramatically increase to add Puerto Rico and DC as states. Democrats might hold it up on those grounds.