Weekly Overview
Putin provides further signals of his near-term plans - the West must respond in a forceful yet calibrated manner.
Previous cables looked at the three primary exit options for Putin: 1) Continuation of the original plan/regime change, 2) Switch to a compellence strategy, and 3) Winding down operations, showcasing territorial gains, and declaring a major victory.
Further signals are now indicative of Putin’s chosen path - at least in the short-term.
It is now becoming clear that Putin is not considering a wind-down of the invasion.
There were a number of indicators of him choosing a mix of the first two options - meaning that, unfortunately, the situation is going to get much worse before it gets any better.
We shall take a closer look at these signals, and thereafter turn to the West’s policy options - the response from the US/NATO, must be forceful and compelling - whilst still allowing for the possibility of face-saving off-ramps in the future.
Indicators of a chosen path
a) Putin’s address to the nation: where he repeated the absurd label of ‘‘Neonazis’’ in Kyiv, blamed the Ukrainian government for civilian casualties, accusing them of using ordinary citizens as ‘‘human shields’’ (and blamed them for the deaths of Indian and Chinese students - providing the leaders in Beijing and Delhi with a way out of confronting Russia directly), and built mythos around fallen soldiers and a well-known commander - honoring them as ‘‘heroes’’.
Putin then reiterated his beliefs that Ukraine and Russia were a ‘‘one nation’’.
This clearly doesn’t sound like a commander that is creating rhetorical contexts for de-escalation/premature declarations of victory based on territorial conquests in the south and the east of Ukraine.
For if Kyiv is still described as a nest for Neozasis, and if the ‘‘one nation’’ claims are still repeated, then Putin is forced to act in a consistent manner - and ending operations without securing major political concessions would simply contradict all his messaging, and thus crush his credibility.
And there were indeed some more direct indicators involved as well: Foreign Minister Lavrov promised to fight until ‘‘the end’’, and in his call with the French President Macron, Putin warned that Kyiv’s ‘‘refusal to accept Russia’s conditions’’ mean that ‘‘the worst was still to come’’, and that Russia would be pursuing a ‘‘full control’’ over Ukraine.
Such statements cannot be made lightly.
Therefore, Putin either:
1) Calculated that the premature declaration of victory (with certain territorial gains) may be a tough sell, and that he would lose an unacceptable level of ‘‘threat display’’ credibility/prowess, and that he would thus have to continue the operations until the victory would become more convincing.
And the tough talk may thus be a deliberate ploy to persuade Zelensky to grant him significant face-saving political concessions such as: declaration of neutrality, recognition of Crimea, recognition of DNR and LNR, and declarations that a NATO membership will never be pursued (perhaps demanding that it is also enshrined in the Ukrainian constitution), or;
2) Putin genuinely believes that a regime change is still possible, either by a) decapitation/assassination/coup, 2) siege of Kyiv and a grinding long & bloody fight to defeat the government (with a corresponding horrendous civilian death toll), or 3) Infliction of further pain and demanding the resignation of a ‘‘Nazi’’ Zelensky (and his government), and thereafter creating a ‘‘representative’’ transitional government that would hold new elections (without question, under the supervision of Russian troops).
And in addition to expressions of implicit strategic intent, Putin also displayed some indirect signals.
In his aforementioned national address, Putin offered an extra compensation of 5 million rubles ($52,000) to the families of the soldiers fallen in Ukraine.
In addition, there will now be extra 2.9 million rubles ($30,000) for all wounded soldiers - accompanied with further monthly disability payments.
By displaying such open-handedness at such an economically challenging period, Putin simultaneously aims to (amongst other things) achieve three important tactical objectives:
a) Soothe and address the (by now, well documented) low morale within the army.
In previous cables, we have explored the curious phenomenon of abandoned Russian hardware and captured soldiers unaware of combat missions.
There are now further excellent reports that provide corroborating evidence.
I recommend reading the above report in its entirety, but here is an indicative quote:
‘‘Lieutenant Kovalensky said he learned Russia would invade Ukraine only the evening before the tank columns began moving, and that soldiers at the rank of sergeant and lower were not told where they were driving until after crossing the border."
Clearly, expecting a quick victory, Putin decided to err on the side of too much secrecy - an error for which he now pays dearly.
His promises of lavish compensation are therefore essential in attempts to stop further deterioration of morale.
The policy also helps to prevent families of fallen soldiers joining the wider anti-war movement in Russia - which could rapidly escalate the internal political situation in Russia.
b) Signaling to the US/NATO: your sanctions will not deter me from proceeding with my plans.
This is similar to what Iran did as a response to Mike Pompeo’s maximum pressure strategy - when they doubled down on funding proxies and building more drones - precisely when their economy was on the brink of a collapse (before it stabilized to permanent extreme poverty).
Naturally, such signals must be dismissed - this is nothing more than a cornered, grievously injured beast, lashing out to appear stronger than it is.
c) Message to (primarily) the financial elites and the general population: everything is under control, our economy will be just fine. Would I promise to spend this much money if we were in real economic trouble?
An anthropologist would call this ‘‘honest signaling’’ - a signal that derives its persuasiveness from the extreme burden that it imposes on the displayer of the signal.
But given the high cost undertakings, Putin might also want to avoid protracted and high-casualty urban warfare - so then, perhaps, this is also an inadvertent signal that Russia will double down on the strategy of securing Ukraine’s submission by cost infliction: pummeling Ukraine with indiscriminate artillery, MLRS, ballistic/cruise missiles, and air strikes - until either Zelensky government is removed (by those willing to appease Russians), or Zelensky himself concedes to Putin’s demands.
The rising cost of war and the unsustainable status quo
Against the context of all this Kremlin signaling, the cost of war keeps rising.
Russia has caused a serious scare after shelling the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant - the largest nuclear power plant in Europe.
(side note: certainly don’t be surprised if we soon hear that they have found some ‘‘evidence’’ of the Ukrainian plans to create a nuclear weapon)
In the meantime, the civilian death toll keeps on rising, and the number of Ukrainian refugees has exceeded more than 1 million people after only 10 days of fighting.
In the meantime, there is a significant risk that Zelensky may be pressured into accepting a humiliating settlement with Putin.
We have previously covered how Zelensky’s very first foreign policy speech in the early hours of the war laid down a context to agree to (otherwise unacceptable) significant concessions.
The same complaints about the lack of Western support are now being repeated in relation to the ‘‘no-fly zone’’ and aircraft provisioning.
While his grievances are indeed legitimate and must be addressed (more on that later on below), the tone of his appeals allows for a wiggle room to provide significant concessions to Putin.
Indeed, there are rumors of the Israeli PM Bennett (acting as a quick messenger between Moscow and Berlin) and the Turkish president Erdogan as being willing to play the role of key interlocutors and broker a peace deal.
Although a genuine settlement protecting and advancing Ukrainian interests is welcome, a humiliating capitulation is not.
This would not only allow Putin to snatch political and strategic victory from the jaws of defeat, but would also once again reward him for his use of military aggression (encouraging future similar adventurism from both Putin and his more senior friends in Beijing).
The Ukrainian people would also lose morale and will to fight future incursions - what is the point? If after all that effort, Putin is still going to secure a political & strategic victory?
Such a deal would also almost certainly damage the popularity of the Zelensky government - making a future regime change/bloodless Russia-backed coup more likely.
Everything must be done to prevent this eventuality - empowering Ukraine to negotiate from a position of strength.
Before delving in deeper into the necessary additional economic sanctions and significant military support, let’s briefly address what not to do.
Three things:
1) Openly calling for an assassination of Putin - exactly what a current US Senator Lindsay Graham did:
First of all, who was the intended audience for such an appeal?
Putin himself?
At the time of a never-ending speculation about Putin’s alleged mental ailments and paranoia, how wise is it to feed raw materials into his confirmation bias machinery?
How prudent is it to provide prime-time content for Russian propaganda?
They no longer need to create fake news to argue that the US aims to conduct a regime change whenever it suits their needs.
Why make Putin’s job of painting a monster out of NATO much easier?
Why help him in his efforts to convince ordinary Russians that this malevolent force has been encircling Russia, and that the war in Ukraine was justified?
It is a disservice to thousands of brave Russians protesting against this war in the streets of Moscow and St Petersburg (with 4,300 of them detained on Sunday) - the very last thing they need, is a sitting US Senator tweeting half-baked ideas about regime change and assassination of Putin.
It makes their job of undoing the years of brainwashing much harder.
Secondly, if the intended audience is a potential coup organizer, then encouraging them over a tweet is the worst tactic ever.
If there is someone willing to coordinate with Americans around a possible move on Putin, then that individual would be in contact via covert means.
No one on the fence about making a move on Putin is going to be convinced by a silly tweet.
2) Softening sanctions or refraining from imposing tougher ones - submitting to Russia’s blackmail vis-à-vis the Iran deal.
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, blatantly blackmailed the US over the possible JCPOA/ Iran Nuclear deal: “We have asked for a written guarantee … that the current process triggered by the United States does not in any way damage our right to free and full trade, economic and investment cooperation and military-technical cooperation with the Islamic Republic.”
The circumstances are far less nuanced than what the aforementioned statement makes it seem like.
Russia knows that the US is desperate for an Iran deal - and wants to trade on softening the existing sanctions in return for Moscow’s cooperation (a potential roadblock that was undoubtedly appreciated by the Israeli PM - even if not openly expressed in his Saturday’s meeting with Putin).
(side note: of course, the Kremlin is also interested in delaying the implementation of the JCPOA and thus the return of Iranian oil into the global marketplace - a scenario that would somewhat compensate for a potential oil embargo on Russia)
As a quick refresher, Russia plays certain technical roles in the implementation of the JCPOA - its primary contribution mainly consisting of shipping out the excess enriched Uranium to Russia, and assisting in conversion of the Fordow nuclear plant into a research facility.
These cables have always advocated against the JCPOA - it is a terrible deal with a number of loopholes, and sunset clauses - crucially, it merely delays the problem - instead of solving it.
But regardless of the JCPOA’s content, the Obama admin’s decision to include China and Russia - two American adversaries into the process/ insisting on the P5+1 format, was a significant mistake.
As predicted, neither China nor Russia helped in implementation of the deal - Beijing is actually buying sanctioned Iranian oil.
The US could have avoided all this mess by only involving the EU (of course, ideally they wouldn’t have this deal at all).
All of the tasks assigned to Russia, could have been performed by France.
But regardless of the actual deal (and it is increasingly likely that there will unfortunately be one after all), the US must not under any circumstances acquiesce to Russian demands.
The sanctions imposed on Russia are wholly irrelevant to its role vis-à-vis the JCPOA.
Washington should be confident in its stern stance and dismissal of unreasonable Kremlin demands - even Iran (eager for the financial windfall) is irritated with Russia.
3) Overexaggerating the threat of a Nuclear war
Putin’s latest statements - where he compared the Western sanctions to waging an actual war, have once again raised alarms about his potential to escalate.
First of all, a nation willing to declare a preemptive war on NATO (over sanctions or military aid) would not be negotiating its role within the JCPOA..
Secondly, although it is prudent to not dismiss any of Putin’s threats, it is also important to get some perspective - we cannot let him bully the whole world into submission by constantly implying threats of a large-scale (potentially nuclear) war with NATO.
It is unwise to look at risks of escalation by immediately jumping to the worst case scenario.
Since if we start doing that, where do we stop?
Is it worth to risking a nuclear war with Russia over let’s say, tiny Estonia?
(no offense to the few readers from Tallinn)
What about the Suwalki gap between Kaliningrad and Belarus?
What if Russia was to occupy that mostly empty territory (which still belongs to NATO) without much bloodshed, and force a response - what then?
Do we not send in the troops to reaffirm Article V commitments?
Because we are afraid of an escalation?
Or what about the Pacific region?
What if China repeats its nuclear threat to Japan (over Taiwan), expecting the US not to risk a nuclear war?
(side note: now would be a good time to definitively abandon the ‘‘no first policy’’ use (of nuclear weapons) - something that only makes us more vulnerable, and instead of reducing the likelihood of an overall escalation, actively incentivizes a bold strike against our key regional allies)
If and when an escalation takes place, and provided that key backchannel communications remain open, fighting a conventional war is in the interests of both nuclear powers.
(side note: of course a potential conventional war with a nuclear adversary must be fought with possibilities of off-ramps and humiliation-preventing ceasefire options - so that the last-ditch attempt to resort to nuclear weapons is never considered. But that is a matter of a much longer discussion)
What to do going forward: stronger economic sanctions & further game-changing military aid
a) Economic sanctions
We have previously discussed the sanctions to date - they are quite effective, and certainly do/will take a toll.
But if the sanctions thus far are 6/10 on the intensity scale, (with post-Crimean invasion of 2014 being a mere 1/10 - if that), we need to up the ante and increase the intensity to at least 8/10.
We need to sanction Russian oil.
Back in October of 2021, Russia made $500m a day from the sale of oil & gas - and that was before the current spike in prices (today’s numbers are probably closer to $750m).
The truth is that without making a significant dent in Russia’s energy revenues, starving the Kremlin from lack of USD and Euros (and reserves/ability to fund this and future wars) will be very tough.
It is (unfortunately) still not politically feasible to introduce an EU-wide gas import ban - but we can and should start with oil.
Firstly, the US itself should lead, and be the first country to place an oil import embargo on the Russian oil - with only 13.5k bpd imported from Russia, there wouldn’t be a significant/noticeable effect on the gas prices in the US.
Secondly, the US should revisit the successful Iran sanctions playbook from the NDAA 2012 - where the combination of a phased approach (and exemption from sanctions in return for reduction of purchasing the sanctioned oil over the next 6 months) and the creation of escrow accounts (where the money from the sale of oil accumulates and remains in the purchasing country’s territory - piling up and incentivizing the reversal of undesirable behavior to secure the funds) effectively reduced the sale of Iranian oil from 2.5 m bpd to 1m bpd in around 16 months.
Russia exports 5 m bpd - and the same phased approach to US/EU led secondary sanctions, would be the best way to prevent a sudden rise in the prices of oil.
Naturally, the prices will still rise - but with a phased approach, these will:
a) not be too dramatic, and;
b) the increase in prices would incentivize the OPEC producers to increase the supply -the risk of even more consolidated shale oil resurgence will move them - OPEC simply cannot afford high prices for too long.
Indeed, even though last year most shale companies didn’t invest into drilling, staying in ‘‘maintenance capex’’ mode of operations, things will change with higher prices.
The West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil is trading at $115 - compared to $86 just two months ago - with such high prices (which will rise even further even with the phased approach to Russian oil sales) they can grow their production, protect their margins, and deliver higher returns to shareholders.
Further Military Aid
There is currently a raging debate over the potential imposition of a no-fly zone over Ukraine - and as things stand, the possibility of one taking place seems remote.
Indeed, the NATO Secretary-General dismissed this notion, and even the UK’s PM rejected the idea.
At this point, one has to also mention that the British PM Johnson’s dismissals were framed terribly - saying that this is not something that UK ‘‘can do’’ , was a really bad choice of words.
Firstly, because it technically can - it simply will not do so out of legitimate policy concerns.
Secondly, surely Johnson could have found a better way to rationalize the refusal to impose a no-fly zone?
Was there really no better frame than one of a loud proclamation of impotence
The British PM should have been more confident when framing his refusal - “the UK can, but will not do so at this very moment’’ .
That’s it - no need for claims of incapacity and helplesness to justify a refusal.
What can & should be done right now:
1) The US is currently in discussion with Poland - on provisioning 29 Russian MIG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine.
This is welcome, but Poland is not the only former soviet country in possession of these fighter jets - Slovakia and Bulgaria have those too.
Overall, there are 70 MIG-29s available to NATO states - all of them should be sent to Ukraine - to be replaced with American F-16s.
But NATO has further helpful soviet era weaponry that it can provide to Ukraine.
Greece has plenty of s300 SAMs - those have been utilized quite successfully by Ukrainian forces - shooting several SU-34s and forcing other fighter jets flying low (and thus becoming vulnerable to Stinger and Igla MANPADS).
Same applies to T-80 tanks, BTRs and soviet era Grad MLRS systems - any & all soviet era weapons must be shipped to Ukraine - they require minimal training and thus little if any adaptive period.
2) NATO assistance with command & control - Ukraine getting accepted to NATO’s Cyber Defense Center (Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, or CCDCOE) was great news.
But Ukraine must receive further, more definitive help with command & control functions.
Just like the EU embassies have relocated to Lviv, an alternative C2 center must be formed in western Ukraine - with senior NATO advisers providing close-combat intel & tactical assistance.
3) Ukraine must be readying itself for a prolonged warfare - these cables have repeatedly berated President Zelensky for delaying the crucial mobilization until the very last moment - now, a similar mistake must not be made in relation to preparations for a lengthy war.
Ukraine needs to build up a fresh second army from scratch - with training centers in western Ukraine and Poland.
This new army must be modeled after Poland’s territorial defense force - and trained specifically for sabotage and urban warfare.
4) Humanitarian aid to cities facing Russian onslaught.
Russia has a unique solution to the insurgency problem - making the most high-risk territories uninhabitable (by targeting key life-sustaining infrastructure like water utility facilities and power plants) - driving out people and thus making a sustained insurgency unlikely.
A serious humanitarian effort is necessary to counter these tactics.
It is also an opportunity to invite China into the game - create a double bind by publicly urging China to demonstrate involvement in humanitarian efforts.
If they comply, they will inevitably butt heads with Russia - if they refuse or implement half-heartedly - a significant shaming campaign & reputational hit is in order.
A win-win tactic that must be pursued.
5) Protecting the Black Sea coast of Ukraine.
Putin will undoubtedly try to take the cities of Odessa and Mariupol, and possibly, the entirety of the Black Sea coast.
Ukraine no longer being a Black Sea country will amount to a significant accomplishment for Putin.
He could even declare victory by claiming that the ‘‘Fascist regime’’ in Kyiv is no longer a Black Sea power - and that all Russians are now much safer.
Everything must be done to prevent this eventuality - Ukraine must be supplied with further anti-ship missiles, and Kyiv would most likely have to devote a significant chunk of its military resources to the defense of the crucial coastal cities.
Even though originally not intended for ships, Spike/NLOS must also be offered - with a range of 32 km, these are more effective at longer distance strikes (requiring precision) than the traditional NLAW (800m) and Javelin (2.5km) missiles.
Not only would these be effective against amphibious landing ships and even large frigates (with enough saturation), but such systems would also be extremely valuable as anti-tank weapons during the battle for Kyiv - allowing for a longer range precision strikes - even prior to the gruesome urban fights.
Political winds may yet change, and the no-fly zone may in fact become a reality - especially if the civilian death toll reaches extreme numbers, and there ends up being an even more overwhelming public support for the implementation of a no-fly zone (three out of four Americans already support the policy - although, one suspects that most don’t know what it actually entails).
But in the meantime, there is still a lot that can and should be done to ensure the survival of Ukraine, and prevent the humiliating capitulation of a nation that has so far demonstrated nothing but bravery and resolve.
You touched on Taiwan in this cable. I was considering that now would be a perfect time for Taiwan to declare it's independence of China as a separate democratic country and link the process to Ukraine's fight at self-determination without a bigger neighbor trying to control it. Then the the US, UK, Australia and/or Japan could recognize this new state. With most of the world strongly behind Ukraine, I doubt China would risk bringing on the world's ire just to keep a democratic people from just wanting to determine their own future the same as Ukraine. What is your opinion?