Weekly Overview
Ukraine war: Russian adjustments and Ukraine gets a much needed boost.
As Ukraine’s foreign Minister Kuleba was warning of World War II style battles in Donbas, Russia was preparing and making certain adjustments.
Rhetorically, Russian officials delivered some peculiar comments that caught many by surprise.
First there was some fascinating trolling from Foreign Minister Lavrov suggesting that Belarus should be one of the security guarantor states in a possible political settlement with Ukraine.
Leaving aside the obvious idiocy of suggesting that Belarus could ever be an adequate security guarantor, the statement was a public admission that Russia accepted the underlying premise of third parties providing security guarantees to Ukraine.
More interesting and noteworthy comments however, came from the Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov:
1) Peskov publicly admitted the high casualties incurred by Russia, calling this a ‘‘tragedy’’.
Of course, it is important to remember that this particular interview was given to British Sky News: outright denials of facts - now well-known by western audiences - was not going to add to Peskov’s credibility.
Logos has to follow ethos, and so by refusing to deny obvious facts, Peskov aimed to gain some credibility - something that would then allow him to dispute more consequential arguments (like the war crimes in Bucha).
And even if the comments would then be widely reported and spread back in Russia, the likely audience would still be younger, metropolitan social media users: denials of casualties (with abundant video evidence of Russian losses now shared extensively) wasn’t going to be productive either.
2) Peskov then announced the possibility that the war could come to an abrupt end, and that this conclusion could come relatively soon in the "foreseeable future".
As always, there is a well-established difference between Russia’s public statements and its actual conduct: a good rule of thumb is to put the overwhelming weight on observing the actual behavior.
But this particular statement need not be true to have an actual strategic utility.
So then, what was the most likely reason for this pronouncement?
Well, with Putin’s popularity unfortunately soaring, (and even though there are certainly some inaccuracies/selection biases in polls due to a failure to account for the respondents that are simply fearful of expressing their true opinions, these unfortunately, still do not alter the overall trend of the public sentiment), this statement was most likely directed at the US/NATO.
Essentially, this was the message: the war is almost over here, it could conclude soon, don’t complicate matters by arming Ukraine to the teeth, and imposing gas/oil sales bans on us - something that may force us to reconsider.
Of course, no one in the US/NATO should even think of slowing down at this point (more on that later below).
In the meantime, Russia is preparing for the Donbas offensive.
Of the 120 BTGs (Battalion Tactical Group) sent into Ukraine, 40 (mainly those previously on Kyiv and Chernihiv axis) have retreated into Belarus and are currently being refitted, and fully 29/40 are combat ineffective.
There have also been changes in command: a new Army General of the Southern Military District (outranking other district commander Colonel-Generals) Alexander Dvornikov, is now in charge of the Donbas offensive.
Given that Donbas is in S/SE of Ukraine, it makes sense to delegate the matter to the Southern Military District - which have thus far demonstrated less incompetence and have a higher ranking general.
The question is how Dvornikov will coordinate combined-arms offensives with other military districts.
Will he get the overall high command? Or will there be another theater commander to oversee the combined-arms maneuvers?
In a corrupt and rotten political system like that of Putin’s Russia, one can also not rule out some dirty politics being played in the background.
It is unclear for example, how cooperative would the leaders of the Western Military District be?
Given that they have incurred significant losses (with little to show for), some of the commanders might be tempted to passively frustrate the success of the Southern Military District - preventing the performance (and therefore, competence) gap from becoming all too obvious.
Ukraine receives a boost.
On the opposite side, Ukraine is entering this new stage of the war with a major prestige boost - and with additional economic, military and moral support.
First, there was a European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s Ukraine visit.
She visited the scenes of war crimes in Bucha, and later that day, in a joint-press conference with President Zelensky in Kyiv, the Commission President presented the EU membership accession questionnaire.
Promising a membership decision in the matter of weeks and not (the more usual) years, Von Der Leyen delivered some historical remarks:
‘‘Russia will descend into economic, financial, and technological decay, while Ukraine is marching towards the European future, this is what I see."
This is a remarkable accomplishment for Ukraine - only two months ago, the collapse of the Ukrainian government and the Russian army’s easy triumph were the most frequent (and at the time, quite reasonable) predictions.
One has to also note that this is the EU at its finest.
And on a more practical level, the promise of a fast-track to a full EU membership will boost the morale and contentment amongst the general Ukrainian public - making the likely, yet difficult political concessions vis-à-vis Russia, more palatable.
Then there was the historic visit by the British Prime Minister Boris Johnson.
Walking in the streets of Kyiv, side-by-side with President Zelensky, the British PM was essentially shoving the bitter reality into the face of Putin - the very city that Putin failed to take, and alongside the President he failed to topple, was now welcoming the British PM.
Johnson’s framing of the visit was also noteworthy:
The use of the term ‘‘barbaric’’ was surely not chosen lightly - for if Russia is barbaric, it follows that it shouldn’t be reintegrated into the global rules-based order as a full-on member enjoying all of the privileges available to other states - at least not until Putin is in power.
(side note: contrast this with the Austrian Chancellor’s shameful visit to Moscow - an in-person meeting between Putin and a leader of an EU member state, so soon after the Bucha massacre - simply pathetic pandering)
Johnson is essentially crystallizing the narrative for a long-term isolation of Russia: he is sticking to his previous word - where he advocated against renormalizing Putin once the war was over.
These prestige boosts and diplomatic overtures, were furthermore accompanied by concrete practical help.
Both the EU and the UK are going to provide further financial aid to Ukraine: Britain is to provide a loan guarantee (via World Bank) in the amount of $1bn, and the EU will add a further €1bn to the €9.1bn fund to help Ukraine and other neighboring states dealing with the refugee crisis.
(side note: but in the grand scheme of things, this is really not that much. Ukraine will need a new “Marshall plan’’ to be funded by the US, EU, G7 and Australia/New Zealand)
Ukraine will also receive further military aid from the UK: 120 armored vehicles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
In addition, the US will join in providing the anti-ship missiles, Slovakia and Czech Republic are also helping out: by providing soviet T-72 tanks and S-300s air defense systems.
This is all welcome news.
Anti-ship missiles are going to be crucial in breaking the economic blockade imposed on the Ukrainian Black Sea ports.
These will also aim to prevent potential amphibious landings (if Russia was successful in Donbas, and the campaign to take over Odessa was to be renewed), and with a range of 139 km, possibly enable Ukraine to attack ships that launch kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea (or at least force them further away from the coast - allowing more time for S-300s air defense systems to shoot them down in air).
Outlook and challenges.
Russia is clearly angling for a decisive military win in Donbas - Putin needs something to show for all these (now publicly admitted) ‘‘tragic’’ losses.
Putin’s objectives are to secure and expand territories in Donbas, fully take over and control Mariupol, solidify the Russia-Crimea ‘‘land bridge’’, decimate the ‘‘Azov’’ Battalion (to sell “denazification” successes back in Russia), and thereafter look at his options and act accordingly: either pushing further to attempt at taking over the entirety of the Black Sea coast (with Odessa being the prime jewel), or compel a Kremlin-friendly political settlement.
But this is the best case scenario - a more realistic outcome will be somewhere in the middle.
Even though there are now widespread satellite images of new armored (8 mile long) columns moving into Donbas, they do not necessarily prove Russia’s overwhelming prowess.
Still in control of Kharkiv, Ukrainians have a base from which they can launch multiple attacks on Belgorod-Izyum supply line.
And precisely because they retained control of key areas in the east, that 8 mile long convoy is moving slowly on a narrower secondary road - making it an even easier target for the Ukrainian attacks.
Kyiv will furthermore continue to benefit from a superb American /NATO intel - Russia simply cannot hide its movements anymore.
Precisely because it is going to be a more conventional open field battle, Russian movements will be easier to spot and predict.
Having said that, Ukraine does face significant challenges: the upcoming battle is not similar to the ones that Ukraine excelled at.
Even if they delay direct confrontations (focusing on supply lines and smaller scale special op hit and run attacks) at some point, Ukrainian forces will be forced to engage in a frontal assault of some sorts - and here is when the Russian military will benefit from the superior firepower.
Their fighter jets will not have to even cross into the Ukrainian air space to launch cruise missiles that will target Ukrainian heavy artillery/MLRS and command & control units.
And Russia will have a basic numerical edge in the number of available armored vehicles/tanks and support artillery.
(side note: but Ukrainian will to fight will stay strong as long as Russians continue missile strikes against the innocent civilians, encouraging revenge-seeking public sentiments.)
And this is where it is important to note that Ukraine is still not receiving military aid and the speed and scale that it needs.
Ukraine is yet to receive MIG-29 fighter jets, and there is a strong need for more ground firepower in the form of artillery and MLRS systems - NATO countries possess plenty of ‘‘Smerch’’ BM-30 MLRS systems.
There is also still a huge room for infliction of further economic pain on Russia.
The EU is yet to ban Russian gas imports - with lower energy needs, spring is the ideal time to do this.
And yes it will cause some economic pain, but even Germany - a large industrial economy relying heavily on Russian gas, is predicted to realistically suffer only a 2.1% contraction in its GDP.
That is a price worth paying - one that can be redressed later on with some help from the wider EU and the US.
In addition, oil sales are yet to be sanctioned based on the Iran playbook/phased approach.
With further direct (intercepted radio communications between Russia’s occupying officers) and indirect (an outright fascist propaganda published on Russia’s prime-time news agency Ria-Novosti: calling for the elimination of Ukraine as a nation) evidence of a genocidal intent behind Russia’s atrocities against peaceful civilians mounting, now is the ideal political context for the introduction of further oil and gas sanctions.
(side note: Italy seeking an alternative gas deal in Algeria was an early tentative sign of a movement in that direction)
Ukraine is about to enter a crucial next phase in the war - the Western help must not be slowed down due to bureaucracy or (worse) indecisiveness.
Sweden and Finland should join NATO without further delay - handling Russian threats.
The latest NATO summit in Brussels was comparatively much more productive than the previous engagements: going beyond mere rhetoric and producing a concrete consensus in supplying heavier arms to to Ukraine.
But as NATO representatives listened sympathetically to the Ukrainian Foreign Minister’s warnings about World War II style battles in Donbas, agreeing to support Kyiv, there was something else on their minds as well: the question of Swedish and Finnish membership.
These cables have previously advocated for precisely this scenario: that with Russia weakened and distracted, both Sweden and Finland must be welcomed into NATO - and without delay.
Both countries will benefit immensely from a NATO membership, but let’s also be clear about this: NATO’s present members will most likely benefit even more.
And this benefit goes beyond the narrower (and more immediate) policy goals of confronting and containing Russia.
It is certainly true that both Sweden and Finland possess powerful, modern militaries (and on per capita bases, probably much more powerful than many of the current NATO members), and that their membership would stretch Russian military thin: expanding the surface area of attacks that the Russian military would now have to plan for (current NATO/Russia border amounts to 766 miles. If Finland joined Poland, Baltics and Norway in NATO’s eastern flank, then that border would more than double in length).
But the benefits go beyond that of added firepower and capacity in confronting Russia.
Geostrategic benefits.
1) Crucial leverage over the Barents Sea and the Arctic territories and routes.
This is important for primarily two reasons:
a) Two more countries (out of eight in total) with a claim to the Arctic (and thus, to the 22% of the world’s oil & gas resources lying beneath) will now be NATO states.
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, each country benefits from an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 200 miles out from its shoreline (and up to 350 miles under certain geological conditions).
That’s extra 200 miles per each country added to NATO’s claim and reach.
b) With ice melting rapidly, the importance of northern routes for shipping and trade will become even clearer.
Since 1979, the Arctic’s ice coverage has decreased by over 25% - and at this rate, a transpolar passage/reliable trade route could become a plausible scenario by mid 2030s.
Such a trade route will cut journey times extensively - becoming an immensely profitable option.
The Northern Sea Route already allows for a much speedier trade route between Europe and Asia (two to three weeks faster than the Suez Canal option).
A transpolar passage would cut this time by further two days - this is a significant margin: amounting to a difference between profit and loss for a number of potential trade ventures.
And the increasing importance of these routes will necessarily imply more Chinese/Russian investment into their respective Arctic naval forces.
Sweden and Finland could cooperate with Norway - providing additional resources to boost Norwegian navy in the Barents Sea - this could be in the form of extra manpower as well as financial/technological cooperation.
NATO will need a stronger Arctic navy presence: both to enable effective enforcement of potential trade restrictions/sanctions/blockades on China (if/when they occur), and to also enable a stronger forward posture in potential confrontations with the Russian/Chinese navies.
2) The US/NATO will benefit from the ability to place additional THAAD/Arrow 3 missile defense systems closer to Russia’s northern pole: where a potential hypersonic missiles could be launched against the US/Northern Europe (a route most likely to be taken by China as well - if they were to attack the US).
3) Washington will increase its leverage within the EU.
The most reliable NATO allies are those that depend on America’s shield the most - and just like the Baltic states, the two new northern NATO members will also depend a lot on the US protection.
Consequently, with two rich EU countries joining NATO, Washington’s influence within the EU will inevitably increase.
For example, in all likelihood, the US would then have a stronger influence in shaping the EU’s China policy.
Just by the virtue of basic numbers - it would now have more EU countries directly depending on the US military protection and guarantees: that is a significant leverage.
Russia’s reaction.
Russia’s initial reaction was predictable: vague threats of retaliation.
On March 12th, Russia warned that Finland and Sweden’s decision to join the NATO would lead to “serious military and political consequences”
But after weeks of extreme attrition and casualties in Ukraine, Russia now realizes that its threats (however vague) have little teeth, and the Kremlin spokesperson, Peskov’s statement is a clear evidence of this bitter and reluctant acknowledgement:
‘‘We'll have to make our western flank more sophisticated in terms of ensuring our security’’.
Obviously, this is substantially (and qualitatively) different from (previous) outright threats - of course Russia was going to boost its Western flank: who did not expect that?
The pressing question is whether Russia is going to do anything else and in addition to this rather tepid and expected response?
Most likely not: Russia has little options here.
Invading Finland (and/or Sweden) is out of question - there are no capabilities and resources available to invade an enormous country with access to more sophisticated military tech than Ukraine.
So then, what else is Russia going to do?
Compellence strategy? Threaten and implement ‘‘demilitarization’’? Strike key military installations in Finland?
And besides, by attacking an EU country, Moscow would cause huge headaches for China.
It is extremely likely that under such a scenario, the EU would suspend all commercial relations with every single country that doesn’t join the sanctions and participate in economic isolation of Russia - and China would thus have to choose between a definitive break with Russia or the EU.
Short of using a nuclear weapon against Finland (a scenario so implausible that we will not even evaluate it) there are no good options for Russia.
But then again, in evaluating Putin’s next steps, we shouldn’t exclusively focus on what is rational.
Putin may indeed calculate that a war with Finland would be an easier domestic sell - there are more legitimate security concerns, and the potential opponent is not a slavic country.
He may also estimate that (without sending in troops for an outright land warfare), a war with a country of 5 million people, and relying solely on long-distance air/hypersonic missile strikes, may not cause too many casualties - which would in any case be justified as the necessary costs of achieving an overwhelmingly desirable objective of preventing Finland’s membership of NATO.
And with a soaring domestic popularity, and a realization that he has already burned the bridges with the West (who are hoping to see some sort of a regime change) he may be tempted to do it.
Given all this, the US/NATO must not leave anything to chance, and must ensure a smooth transition for both Sweden and Finland.
Ensuring a fast and secure implementation.
1) Time to full membership must be shortened.
It is already challenging that the Finnish government has announced upcoming parliamentary debates after the release of its report on a potential NATO membership on April 13th.
Giving Russia several more weeks to respond is a mistake - by then, Russia would have had an opportunity to consolidate its forces, focusing only on Donbas (a relatively easier theater with inbuilt advantages).
This means that Russia would have secured additional bandwidth to test the waters/conduct military operations.
Indeed, with a recent airspace violation against Finland, there are already some early indicators that Russia is signaling its displeasure and exploring certain options.
Further delays must be prevented at all costs by:
a) Ensuring a NATO/Sweden alignment - if Finland joins, Sweden should follow suit immediately (and Sweden’s major opposition party certainly understands this - meaning that the ruling party will have fewer roadblocks to surmount) - not doing so/delays would cause complications for Swedish national security, and;
b) Ensuring that there is a NATO-wide alignment in approving the membership applications instantaneously. It is unlikely that any NATO member would object against a Swedish/Finnish membership, but there is still some risk that some (like Hungary) might, and/or could cause delays - this must be prevented at all costs: There should be an informal agreement to approve the membership applications before the formal applications are made.
Approval must be a formality capable of being granted instantaneously (meaning: matter of hours not days).
In addition, and as soon as Sweden/Finland apply for a membership, US/NATO must offer interim security guarantees.
Secretary General Stoltenberg already hinted at this:
‘‘We will find ways to address concerns…regarding the period between the potential application, and the final ratification’’.
NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) must be ready to be deployed to both Sweden and Finland as soon as these applications have been made.
In addition, the US must openly announce interim security guarantees in relation to both Sweden and Finland.
Deterrence by denial (convincing that an invasion would fail) did not work with Ukraine because President Biden preemptively ruled out the involvement of US troops - the very same mistake must not be repeated here.
Swedish/Finnish membership of NATO would provide enormous benefits to all current members - especially to the US.
And in the meantime, the US/NATO must be ready to pay an advance: by guaranteeing their security during the highly precarious transition period.
Good stuff. Yes, get Sweden and Finland in ASAP. As to Ukraine in the EU, yes. My question, how will Turkey react? Their EU application has been stalled for decades. At this point, despite their democratic shortcomings, I’d admit Turkey as well. It would promote goodwill and annoy Russia.