Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War, Midterm elections' effect on Ukraine policy, and Kyiv's shrewd negotiation stance.

Ukraine war updates.

• Ukraine’s counteroffensive & outlook.

• As the world is witnessing the joy and exhilaration of liberated locals welcoming Ukrainian troops in Kherson, this is yet another major embarrassment for Russia.

• (side note: but for America’s supply of HIMARS to Ukraine, and Ukraine’s use of these GMLRS strikes on the bridges connecting left and right banks of the Dnieper river- crushing Russia’s logistics pipeline and forcing their withdrawal without an urban fight - a bloody urban combat akin to the one in Severodonetsk (but on a larger scale) would have been unavoidable: America’s decision to supply Ukraine with HIMARS had therefore quite literally saved countless civilian lives).

• The humiliation of withdrawing from a capital city of a region that Putin only recently officially annexed, is too much for even the Kremlin propagandists to spin away.

• Indeed, the failure is so blatant, that both, the Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, General Surovikin and Defense Minister Shoygu refrained from creative rationalizations.

• Gone are the transparently laughable explanations of ‘‘gestures of goodwill’’ - a justification for many previous withdrawals/return of territory to Ukraine.

• Instead, the top brass of the Russian military claimed the necessity of preserving Russian soldiers’ lives, and that retreating to a more defensible position on the (eastern) left bank of the Dnieper river would allow for just that.

• But since when did the Kremlin care about Russian lives (US intel’s latest assessment puts Russian casualties (dead and wounded) for Putin’s adventurism at 100k)?

• Here is a better explanation: trapped Russian forces on the right bank of the river, were under a threat of eventual collapse and decimation.

• And just when Russia’s own military blogs/hawkish social media user base is accusing the Kremlin of callousness and cannon fodder tactics, the Kremlin saw a need to prevent an even bigger embarrassment, and a total annihilation of Russian troops ahead of or during the brutal winter months.

• This is a major victory for Ukraine.

• First and foremost, this is a major military accomplishment: Kherson is a major strategic location that Kyiv managed to secure before the winter slog.

• Ukrainian forces can now concentrate further counter offensives on other territories in Donbas.

• In addition, Ukrainian forces now have a crucial leverage over Crimea: many strategic bases and army/supply depots are now well-within the reach of Ukraine’s HIMARS-launched GMLRS missiles (even without the much-needed ATACMS).

• (side note: Russians have furthermore lost control of a strategic water canal that accounts for the 85% water needs of the Crimean peninsula)

• Add to this, there are now major political and domestic/morale boost achievements.

• The Ukrainian public will now receive a well-needed morale boost ahead of the rough winter.

• (side note: and in spite of the recent infrastructure attacks, the morale was already high, with at least 88% of Ukrainians believing that their country will be a prosperous member of the European Union in 10 years. A positive future to aspire and hope for is a crucial ingredient for the long-term staying power in the time of war).

• And this - in combination with the actual battlefield progress - will shut up (at least in the near future) the Western appeasers pushing Ukraine to settle.

• No Ukrainian government could conceivably sell the Ukrainian public major territorial concessions (which Putin still insists upon) in return for ‘‘peace’’.

• Such a government would not survive a weekend.

• In other words, Ukraine’s hand is much stronger now, than it was in mid-to-late October.

• On the other hand however, withdrawal from Kherson will benefit the Russian army in the medium to long-term.

• Strategically, this was a correct decision indeed: Russians now have a much narrower frontline to defend.

• Their forces will be more consolidated and further Ukrainian progress will be tougher/much slower to accomplish.

• Russia is playing for a very long stalemate - increasing pressure on Ukraine to settle under politically unacceptable terms, whilst recouping for a possible spring counteroffensive: by which point the mobilized troops would have received months of refresher training, and Russia would have secured more weapons from countries like Iran and North Korea.

• New Tools for Ukraine.

• The US will send another $400 million to Ukraine, with new “Avenger” air defense systems (in addition to last week’s first delivery of NASAMS) included in the package.

• Spain will also send two more HAWK air defense systems, and Italy (beating thus-far, many negative expectations of the Meloni government) is readying a new arms package for Ukraine - including air defense systems.

• But the scale of aid is nowhere near adequate for a winning army to finish off Russians in Donbas.

• Indeed, it is worth noting what is missing (in addition to adequate scale) from these packages: no major “offensive” weapons.

• No MQ-1C gray eagle drones, no major battle tanks like the M1 Abrams or German Leopards, and no fighter jets.

• And why is that?

• Why is the US and NATO not doing everything possible to help Ukraine end this war sooner rather than later?

• Perhaps the unfounded worries of ‘‘escalation’’ still remain.

• If so, this is a major policy failure that will only prolong the war and suffering, and will strengthen Putin’s hand: who is betting precisely for the eventuality of a very long war of attrition gradually sucking oxygen from the Western public support for Ukraine.

• Washington takes important steps to fill in the gaps in Russia’s periphery.

• These cables have previously advocated for a stronger US presence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia - two strategically crucial regions that are breaking away from Russia by seizing the opportunity presented through the war in Ukraine.

• Russia's traditional spheres of influence prefer to move closer towards the West.

• And it was therefore great to see Washington stepping up and taking early steps in filling in this power vacuum.

• This past week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken hosted the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in DC: praising both for ‘‘courageous steps’’ taken in direction of a major peace deal between the two countries in the Caucuses.

• If this final peace treaty is signed and adhered to, both Azerbaijan and Armenia will break away from the Kremlin’s grip.

• Russia’s peacekeepers will no longer have an excuse to stay in Karabakh and act as an ‘‘arbiter’’ (in reality an instigator. Russia is allied with Armenia and will always be interested in preserving the conflict to play both countries against each other - maintaining its influence and leverage over the region).

• But a good start must be followed through.

• Both countries are taking risks in choosing Washington to arbitrate this peace deal (especially Azerbaijan - which unlike Armenia, is not a formal military ally of Russia).

• Washington must therefore see this process through, and secure the independence, freedom and prosperity of a strategically valuable and hitherto volatile region of the South Caucasus.

Midterm elections: mixed effects on Ukraine.

• As I am sure all readers are aware (and if you are not, then you are probably reading a wrong publication), Democrats produced significantly better than expected results in the midterms.

• A lot of this had to do with defective and obviously incompetent extreme candidates advanced by the GOP (abortion and Dodds ruling implications were undoubtedly another factor driving out voters for Democrats).

• But here, we shall focus on the foreign policy implications.

• Going forward, and within the right context, we shall analyze how the new composition of Congress affects a broader array of foreign policy issues like Iran, China, Taiwan etc.

• For now However, let us start with the most consequential issue of them all: the war in Ukraine.

• This is a particularly pressing issue, in light of the previous no more ‘‘blank checks” comment made by Kevin McCarthy.

• Here is a broad conclusion: nothing will change too radically in relation to policy on Ukraine in the medium to short term.

• And this is because: 1) GOP will have a very narrow majority in the House, and 2) Traditional hawks of the Republican party will insist on bipartisan continuity and will argue that there has not been any strong evidence (either in actual results or exit polls) that voters dislike the current policy on Ukraine advanced by the current Biden administration.

• (side note: the traditional GOP foreign policy establishment will draw further confidence from the fact that pro-Trump candidates showed poor results in a number of otherwise easily winnable seats.)

• But this is a tentative prognosis only for the short-to-medium term.

• In the long-term, and especially if the war in Ukraine turns into a very slow grind/stalemate (Putin’s current strategy) and the economic recovery is not sufficiently on track, the GOP could gradually change its tune in action and not just rhetoric.

• This is particularly the case given that a narrower majority will increase the power and leverage of extreme right members of the Republican party.

• The House Freedom caucus, and extreme Putin appeasers (like rep Thomas Massie) may very well align to use their outsized power (given the razor-thin majority) to keep the rest of the GOP policy platform hostage to their particular demands: and this could very well include reduction of support offered to Ukraine.

• In addition, the GOP may have a further indirect yet still negative impact on the Biden administration’s ability to pursue a consistent and coherent policy on Ukraine.

• For example, the GOP may use its small majority to launch congressional commissions and hearings around the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan.

• They could investigate Hunter Biden (laptopgate), refuse to consider/confirm the appointment of crucial diplomatic/national security personnel, and some GOP members have even suggested the possibility of launching impeachment proceedings (without even being certain about specific legitimate grounds for these).

• All of these could very well suck out the necessary oxygen, momentum and political capital from the Biden admin: hampering its ability to continue pursuing a strong policy on Ukraine.

• So then, a careful conclusion is that no major changes are on the horizon on the policy towards Ukraine and Russia.

• (side note: it also did not help that Wagner (Russia’s mercenary forces) chief, and a close Putin ally Yevgeny Prigozhin openly admitted to interfering in the past US elections - and announced his intent to continue doing so in the future. Softening on Russia within this context will be particularly politically difficult even for the most isolationist extremes of the GOP).

• But over the long-term, there is unfortunately still a possibility of a waning support for Ukraine - especially if the current admin gets engulfed in manufactured ‘‘scandals’’ to be then investigated in Congress.

Ukraine’s negotiation stance: a shrewd tactic imposing dilemmas on all parties involved.

• Whether through pressure or persuasion from the White House (the revelation of which (as discussed in last week’s cables) was extremely damaging to Ukraine), Kyiv altered its maximalist stance on negotiating only with Putin’s successor, and has announced its minimal red line conditions for serious negotiations of peace with Russia.

• These conditions were outlined by the President Zelensky in his speech:

• 1. Restoring territorial integrity of Ukraine.

• 2. Respecting UN Statutes.

• 3. Paying off all damages caused by war.

• 4. Punishing all war criminals.

• 5. Guarantees that a similar invasion will not happen again.

• Now, before we consider full implications of this stance, it is important to note that not all conditions are as equally weighty - neither do they command equal urgency in their implementation.

• For example: restoration of territorial integrity of Ukraine is an absolutely must have condition - a non-negotiable point.

• On the other hand, reparation payments and prosecution of war criminals are conditions that are hard to implement fast: assessment of precise damage, how best to demand reparations, and finding/prosecuting war criminals (and agreeing on practical prosecution criteria) will all take time.

• Naturally, it is inconceivable that leaders in Kyiv do not understand this, and one might therefore argue that this is a deliberate ploy: adding difficult to implement provisions is a carefully designed additional leverage for Ukraine: it is a bargaining chip that can be negotiated away.

• Zelensky could for example agree to form separate working groups / commissions to deal with these matters separately if other core conditions were to be met with agreement.

• As such, this is a smart tactic - yet one that could have been presented differently: these conditions should not have been listed as ‘‘core’’ conditions - precisely because they are so easy to park for later.

• Listing them alongside with other truly core conditions (like territorial integrity) diminishes the weight of the actual core conditions by mere association: after all, if two of the five core conditions can be negotiated, how truly core are the rest?

• Consequently, it would have been more prudent for Zelensky to advance only three core nonnegotiable conditions, and then make pronouncements around the necessity to discuss the issue of reparations and war criminals as well.

• Zelensky could then agree to park that issue as a bargaining chip - and do so without harming the perception of solidity for the remaining truly ‘‘red line’’ core conditions.

• With all that said and done, and overall, the stance advanced by President Zelensky was very powerful and one that will most certainly create dilemmas on all relevant stakeholders.

• Implications.

• 1) Ukraine has once again reaffirmed that it is the reasonable party that is happy to negotiate and advances demands that are in line with the UN Charter.

• Clearly, the Kremlin is not ready to agree to a withdrawal of Russian troops and return of territories in Donbas.

• As a result, the burden of failure to negotiate will now be placed upon the shoulders of the leaders in the Kremlin.

• Credit where it is due: President Biden strengthened Ukraine’s hand and solidified the global perception of justness of its cause, by declaring that Russian withdrawal was a must have for genuine resolution of the war:

• ‘‘I don’t think the conflict will be resolved with Russia and Ukraine until Putin gets out of Ukraine”.

• 2) Dilemma for Putin.

• Agreeing to even consider negotiating under these core conditions pronounced by Ukraine, will be a significant blow to Putin.

• For a start: it is a complete contradiction of Russia’s ‘‘annexation’’ of the four regions in the east of Ukraine.

• Even to consider negotiating under such terms, would imply that Russia’s formal declarations and executive orders amount to very little: nothing more than worthless pieces of paper and delusional declarations.

• Secondly, Putin would essentially admit to the existence of a new status quo: that he is so desperate to wrap everything up, that he is willing to contradict everything he said to date.

• That would also defang all of the Western appeasers who were hitherto advancing lines of argumentations like ‘‘how do you think this ends? Putin agreeing to withdraw and humiliate himself with his tail between his legs?”

• Putin’s agreement to negotiate under such terms, would answer the aforementioned hypothetical question with a ‘‘yes yes he will” - further reducing the pressure on Ukraine to offer something ridiculous in return for an end to this war.

• And precisely because the current terms are so unacceptable and humiliating, Putin is unlikely to consider negotiations at this stage.

• As often repeated in these cables, until the point is reached where Putin loses all his hope of winning this war on the battlefield, there can be no prospect of a diplomatic solution that does not violate core fundamentals of international law and the sovereignty of Ukraine.

• From Ukraine’s perspective therefore, this is a win-win proposition: either 1) Russia agrees to negotiate under the principles of international law and sovereignty of nations, or 2) the war continues, and Ukraine’s Western backers have little legitimate reason to refuse continuous financial and military aid: after all, what are they going to suggest?

• Which leads us to another dilemma.

• Dilemma for the West.

• Ukraine’s backers in the global West/EU/NATO now have a very little legitimate reason to refuse their full backing to Ukraine.

• After all, Ukraine did its part and offered to negotiate.

• Which one of these core conditions is so unreasonable that failure to start negotiations can be blamed on Kyiv?

• What would France or Germany want Ukraine to do? Offer territorial concessions?

• That the fundamental provisions of post-WWII international law be suspended to appease Putin?

• And besides: no Ukrainian president could possibly survive rewarding Russia with occupied Ukrainian land.

• Any Ukrainian leader willing to concede any new (post Feb-24 invasion) territory whatsoever, would most likely be swiftly removed in a coup - even before the Ukrainian people have a chance to rise up and take the matters into their own hands.

• Ukraine’s position is therefore very solid and unassailable.

• And President Biden’s comments about the necessity of Russia’s withdrawal provide a further rhetorical backing to this powerful stance.

• In the meantime, the fundamentals have not changed.

• As often repeated in these cables, until the point is reached where Putin loses all his hope of winning this war on the battlefield, there can be no prospect of a diplomatic solution that does not violate core fundamentals of international law and the sovereignty of Ukraine.

• And for this to happen, the military aid offered to Ukraine must be escalated: Kyiv must have access to all legitimate tools of war that provide it with an ability to conduct rapid counter-offensives, and enable it to strike military targets deep within Russia.

• The best way to force Putin to negotiate is to amp up the pressure on the battlefield: he will then be forced to come around to the negotiation table - hoping to avoid another humiliating press conference talking about the necessity of withdrawal from the officially ‘‘annexed’’ territories.

• Few more of such press conferences, and Putin’s regime will start to face existential threats: precisely what needs to happen for Putin to give up on his delusional aspirations in Ukraine, and agree to discuss terms of ending the war.