Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War, evaluating Biden's decision to supply cluster munitions to Ukraine.
Ukraine war updates.
1) Ukraine’s interdiction campaign across multiple theaters in north-east and Zaporizhia continues.
There has been some forward progress in Bakhmut - where Russian troops are facing an increasing danger of encirclement.
2) Chinese officials are bragging (in private conversations) that it was Xi Jinping’s private warning that precluded Putin’s use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Allegedly, this warning was delivered during Xi’s Russia visit in March of this year.
(side note: in spite of rhetorical support, the visit itself was notable due to Xi’s refusal to approve the Russia-China Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline - something that would have increased Russia’s leverage and in turn, would have reduced China’s options. We have previously analysed the trip in this post).
Nonetheless, and in spite of Chinese desire for credit, Putin was always unlikely (and still is) to use these in Ukraine - fundamentals matter more than whatever Xi said to Putin.
And we have covered these fundamentals extensively in these cables.
3) Turkish President Erdogan: Ukraine deserves a NATO membership.
This (coming from a country with the largest NATO army in Europe) was crucial messaging ahead of NATO’s Vilnius summit next week.
In his meeting with Zelensky, Erdogan had furthermore pledged continuous military support to Ukraine.
In addition, Turkey had also agreed to (presumably, to the intense displeasure of Putin) send Azovstal commanders back to Ukraine - ostensibly, violating Russia’s demand/condition that these captured soldiers (in return for their release from Russian custody) be detained in Turkey for the duration of the war.
"We are returning home from Turkey and bringing our heroes home," President Zelensky posted on his way back to Ukraine from Turkey.
Moscow was clearly blindsided: “No one informed us about this..According to the agreements, these ringleaders were to remain on the territory of Turkey until the end of the conflict" said the Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov.
Naturally, a welcome side-effect of Turkey’s powerful pro-Ukraine/Anti-Kremlin stance, is Ankara’s somewhat recovered political capital within the NATO alliance overall (and this capital has been rapidly eroding due to its continuous refusal to ratify Sweden - but even this should be resolved pretty soon).
(side note: this is a good wake up call to some ‘‘strategists’’ in DC who are quick to dismiss Turkey’s continuous commitment to NATO - placing way too much emphasis on rhetorical saber-rattling between Washington and Ankara. Fundamental interests matter. Turkey will continue to support both Ukraine and the alliance overall - sure, Russian energy imports, nuclear energy hardware, and inbound investment are all welcome, but at the end of the day, a militarily weakened Moscow, not turning Black Sea into a Russian lake, is first and foremost in the interests of Turkey)
4) Russia lost nearly half of combat effectiveness in Ukraine war
This is the assessment of the head of Britain’s Armed Forces, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin:
“Last year it fired 10mn artillery shells but at best can produce 1mn shells a year. It has lost 2,500 tanks and at best can produce 200 [new] tanks a year..”
This is yet another reminder that America’s support of Ukraine weakens China’s main military ally, and that Ukraine’s success and Russia’s continuous military deterioration is the most effective, and highest ROI investment into deterring Beijing from a possible military adventurism.
5) Russia is partnering with Iran to create a new reconnaissance drone factory in the Russian province of Tatarstan.
Already, 50 ‘Albatross’ drones have been delivered for combat.
6) In spite of continuous Russian attempts to circumvent sanctions, Moscow’s revenue from energy production and exports continues to decline.
In June, Russia’s Federal budget saw a sharp decline in the oil and gas revenues to $6.3 bn - a 26.4% YoY decrease and a 7.4% decrease compared to May!
7) German spies were listening in on Prigozhin - Lukashenko conversation - when the latter was trying to broker a deal to end the Wagner coup.
Admittedly, this is surprisingly impressive - and heartening that an allied European nation is catching up in spycraft - if everyone within the NATO alliance is on the same page in relation to crucial intel, less political capital will need to be expended to convince skeptical allies of common actions (like it first happened pre Feb 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when a lot of allied nations remained skeptical to the very end. French head of military intel even ended up losing his job for this oversight).
This will lead to interesting internal chats amongst other NATO allies - for example, if it turns out that the French or British intel agencies failed to match German capabilities, then there will surely be some awkward discussions between political and intel leaders of allied nations that performed less impressively in snooping around Moscow at such a critical time.
(side note: given CIA’s capabilities and ability to predict Prigozhin’s uprising even sooner than the FSB (allegedly), one would be safe to assume that the US was also listening in - and rightly so)
8) Belarusian President Lukashenko (who brokered the Putin - Prigozhin deal) now says that the leader of Wagner is back in Russia, and that it was unclear whether the Wagner soldiers would eventually move to Belarus (and even though the preparations for their accommodations have already been made, Wagner troops are yet to utilize the military camp - and according to Lukashenko’s adviser, not a single Wagner soldier has even visited the allocated barracks).
Prigozhin’s whereabouts have not been confirmed, but it would be highly strange for him to be back in Russia at the time when his offices are being raided, and the media attacks continue to discredit him (by publishing photos demonstrating opulence and excess, from raids on his ‘‘palace”) and crush his reputation for being ‘‘a hero/warrior on the frontlines” (who loved to contrast himself with the ‘‘fat cats’’ of the formal military top brass).
As discussed in the previous cables, Putin is accumulating political capital necessary to ‘‘get rid of’’ Prigozhin - after the footage of public support for Prigozhin in a city of 1mln+ that he had captured during his failed coup, the Kremlin cannot risk to “liquidate’’ him before stripping him off his reputation for bravery in the Ukraine war.
For Prigozhin to receive Putin’s favorite ‘‘poisoned tea/balcony accident” treatment, he must first be labeled as an opulent warlord far removed from a common man - and this is exactly what is taking place right now.
(side note: whether Prigozhin’s actual final fate will follow those of previous traitors is thus far unclear. We are not aware of full details of the ongoing, and “behind the scenes” power dynamics. But one thing is clear: Putin definitely wants to preserve that optionality).
Biden was right to approve cluster munitions for Ukraine - critics rely on outdated arguments and moot points.
Last Friday’s new $800mln security package for Ukraine contains (for the first time) funds for the supply of dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM).
We have previously discussed Ukraine’s desire for DPICM - a class of cluster munitions (primarily, a 155mm M864 artillery shell first produced in 1987) that can be fired from both Howitzers and even HIMARS.
These are “area-effect” weapons and cover a large surface area, but come with a “dud’’ rate of approximately 2-6% - the unexploded and lingering shells pose risks to civilians and soldiers, and if not cleared effectively, have a potential to do so for many years.
The risks to friendly forces are also potent - we have previously discussed how these munitions led to the killing of 22 American personnel in Iraq in 1991 (and in addition to a horrific loss of human life, causing an additional slowdown in advance on the Kuwait airport).
Now, there is in fact an international Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008) - this bans the use, transfer, production, and stockpiling of the weapons.
But none of the relevant parties in this particular debate - the US, Ukraine or Russia - are signatories to this convention.
So the main opposition to Washington’s transfer and supply of these munitions would need to be made on merits.
(side note: there is domestic US legislation prohibiting the production, use or transfer of cluster munitions with a failure rate of more than 1 %. But the Biden admin can bypass this by drawing from existing stockpiles and relying on the Foreign Assistance Act - this would allow the president to provide aid, regardless of appropriations or arms export restrictions, as long as he finds that doing so is imperative to advancement/protection of the US national security interest)
Now these cables have previously highlighted the ethical and practical dilemmas facing the decision-makers in Washington: it was not an easy or clear-cut decision at all.
But since we have last considered the issue in 2022, a lot has changed, there is now a new context, new battlefield realities (adding to the argument in favor of the effectiveness of their potential use), and new revelations that remove or render most of the previously valid practical/ethical concerns moot - and Biden’s critics fail to account for these.
So then, let’s look at two main objections and how they are no longer as potent and relevant as before -
1) Unacceptable risk to civilians.
This would have been a much stronger argument if none of the parties to this conflict had previously used cluster bombs, and that this was still a red line/taboo in this war.
In fact, both sides have used these, and Russia in particular, has utilized these weapons across a number of battlefield scenarios - including in dense cities.
Now, it does not follow that just because a mistake has been made previously, we should all give up and continue committing similar mistakes - after all, two wrongs don’t make a right.
But the overall context matters, both sides have used these weapons before, and are in fact likely to use them in the near future - especially when both Ukraine and Russia are running out of more conventional artillery shells.
Consequently, and given that these weapons are likely to be used by both sides, would it not be better that at least one side (Ukraine) gets to use more modern and up to date munitions with a much lower dud rate?
To date, Ukraine has been using older, Soviet-era cluster munitions with a dud rate of around 6-11%.
Pentagon estimates that the cluster munitions that will be delivered to Ukraine will have a much lower dud rate of 2.35% - isn’t it far better therefore, that Ukraine gets to use these vs older Soviet ones?
(side note: even so, admittedly, we need to be careful about the 2.35% claim - this excellent NYT report highlights how those Pentagon tests were conducted in pristine environments with harder surfaces (that lead to higher explosion rate/lower dud rate) vs mushy, battered land full of softer soil and farmland of eastern Ukraine - both factors will likely lead to a higher dud rate)
Finally, one must also take into account three additional factors that turn the question of civilian risk into a moot point:
a) Ukraine is littered with unexploded Russian munitions - the longer this war drags on, the risk to civilians grows even bigger.
If cluster munitions can improve Ukraine’s odds of success in this counteroffensive (which it can - more on that later below), and consequently, lead to a shorter war, then the overall risk to civilians will also reduce.
b) Refusing to supply Ukraine with cluster munitions is unlikely to protect the Ukrainian civilians from the use of these weapons overall - Russia has used them before, and is likely to do this again.
Ukraine’s use is likely to be concentrated on defensive entrenchments/multiple layers of Russian trenches devoid of civilians.
Russia on the other hand, has demonstrated an unquenchable appetite to use any and all types of weapons regardless of the context - indiscriminate use of munitions is literally part of their modus operandi.
So then, we would end up having a scenario where the party causing most of the risk to civilians will be able to continue as before, whereas the country trying to liberate its lands will be hampered from utilizing all available tools to aid its advance.
c) At the end of the day, this decision around trade-offs is one for Ukraine to make: Ukrainian government is best-positioned to weigh different risks and conclude whether the use of cluster munitions in their counteroffensive is going to create a net-gain to the safety of their civilians.
Moreover, it is Kyiv that has the most powerful incentive to use these weapons with utmost care - after all, it is their land, it is their country, and once the occupied territories are liberated, it will be their civilians left to face the danger of unexploded cluster munitions.
(side note: and one thing we know about the Zelensky government, is their extreme care and sensitivity towards protection of Ukrainian civilians even as the scale and intensity of the war continues to rise. For example, loss of two civilian lives (after a failure of the bomb shelters to accommodate them promptly) led to massive media attention and a headache for the Ukrainian government. Zelensky was quick to order an inquiry/investigation and direct resources to fix the problem with utmost urgency. Unlike the Kremlin (in relation to any civilian life - be it Russian or Ukrainian), the government in Kyiv is highly sensitive towards the risk posed to their citizens)
2) Little effectiveness in return for high costs.
This is yet another erroneous assumption - that just because these cluster munitions lack precision, they must necessarily be less effective in the battlefield.
First off, it was Russia’s indiscriminate use of imprecise artillery warfare (leveling entire cities) that allowed them to secure most of their early gains, disproves this assumption entirely.
And even on the Ukrainian side, most of the weapons/munitions used are in fact 155mm artillery shells - it is the least precise weapon that got both the US and EU scrambling to amp of military-industrial production in order to meet Ukraine’s high expenditure rate (as of last Spring, north of 3-5k shells a day).
Unfortunately, and in spite of the fact that this war was a test ground for the most precise, and advanced/hi-tech weaponry, this is still a war of attrition.
So the cluster munitions are going to be effective, and for a number of specific reasons:
1) They will be highly useful to break apart large Russian formations and dug-in positions in the layered trenches of Donbas.
2) Precisely because they are area-effect weapons and require less exact targeting, they can be fired at a much faster rate, and provide essential fast cover to the advancing columns of Ukrainian brigades engaged in the counteroffensive.
3) Being area weapons, they will be able to suppress Russian fires/artillery with higher efficacy - providing more time and cover for Ukrainian troops to clear their paths through minefields (perhaps the most difficult task of this counteroffensive in Zaporizhia).
4) Impact on Russian morale: presumably, the frontline Russian soldiers have enjoyed a boost of confidence as Ukraine struggled to break through their formations (there is no scientific way to measure this, but at the very least, that is the impression one gets from Russian military bloggers/telegram channels).
Facing modern and more efficient cluster munitions will surely put a major dent into this morale boost.
5) Perhaps the most crucial point (at least in the short-term): Ukraine’s western backers will gain some time to amp up the production of more conventional artillery shells in order to meet Ukraine’s future/anticipated demands.
This argument was put most succinctly by America’s National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan:
“We need to build a bridge from where we are today to when we have enough monthly production of unitary rounds…This is the moment to begin the construction of that bridge so that there isn't any period over this summer or heading into this fall when Ukraine is short on artillery.”
That Ukraine needs to resort to the use of cluster munitions is of course unfortunate, but on balance, the decision to provide these to a nation fighting to get rid of occupiers was a correct one: it is Kyiv that is best-placed to assess the gruesome risk-reward ratio of using these tools.
It is the Ukrainian government that is most incentivized to protect its civilians - and given that they estimate (correctly) that using cluster munitions will lead to better overall outcomes in this war, it was only right for the Biden admin to help.