Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War Updates, Saudi peace summit for Ukraine, and the Russia - China frictions resurface once again.
Ukraine war updates.
1) Ukraine’s ingenious air defense system.
British military engineers have taken trucks, launch rails and sensors from various systems, and ASRAAM missiles from their retired Tornado fighter jets, to create a new mobile air defense system capable of firing missiles with probable range of 31 miles and reaching Mach 3 top speeds (around 2,300 miles per hour).
When previously discussing Ukraine’s short-range missile defense system problem (extreme shortage of - resulting in lack of cover for the frontline troops), we did not think of such ingenious designs..
The creativity of British engineers is admirable, though one wonders how sustainable will this be?
How many ASRAAM missiles can the UK and other NATO states afford to provide to Ukraine?
It might be better to focus on the provision of actual SHORAD systems like the German Gepard, American AN/TWQ-1 Avengers, and other NATO tactical SAM (surface to air missile) systems like the British Thunderbirds or Turkish HISARs.
On the other hand (and before any tactical NATO SAMs are deployed - a must), the ASRAAM missiles are most definitely more effective at shooting down low-flying (trying to escape Radars) Russian fighter jets - after all, these are precisely what the ASRAAM missiles are designed to do.
2) $24 billion for Ukraine.
The White House requested Congress for additional $24 billion for Ukraine - good.
In addition, there is also an approximate $6.2 billion nestled within a Pentagon account, dedicated to facilitating the transfer of extant equipment from the US stockpiles to Ukraine.
This is further complemented by an additional $2.2 billion intended for contracting weapons and equipment - earmarked for subsequent deliveries.
Current fiscal projections indicate that these funds will likely remain viable until early autumn.
But the White House was right to seek additional funds at this very moment - not only is it politically more viable to get it done now (instead of leaving it closer to the elections), but at the time of a stalled and slow Ukrainian counteroffensive, this is an essential signal of a staying power - one which will be aimed at rebutting Putins’ calculus that the time is on his side.
3) Zelenskyy Assassination plot foiled.
Ukraine's security apparatus has apprehended an individual suspected of operating as a Russian informant, engaged in the covert collection of intelligence pertaining to President Zelenskyy's itinerary within the Mykolaiv region.
The gathered intelligence suggested that the individual in question (a middle-aged female) was to call in a "massive air strike’’, a plot that was successfully thwarted last month.
That there are attempts on Zelenskyy’s life is not surprising - it is more surprising that they aren’t more of these high-profile ones.
4) Chris Christie continues to rebut anti-Ukraine narratives within the GOP.
Christie’s crusade for practical foreign policy reasoning continues:
“If we cut and run on Ukraine, the next fight is going to be in Taiwan. And there, it's not going to be us just supplying weapons…It's going to be American men and women who are going to be sent three-quarters of the way around the world to fight there.”
Now, these cables have always advocated against attempts to establish a direct link between the invasion of Ukraine and that of Taiwan.
The latter will be a far more daunting challenge for China than invading Ukraine ever was (at least at the time of pulling the trigger) for Putin.
As such, the decision is far more complex and stakes are much higher.
Not only will Xi Jinping have to be broadly sure of success, but he needs to evaluate the risk of a direct military involvement of the US and allies like Japan.
That was never a serious threat for Putin - the risk of NATO’s direct involvement was virtually non-existent.
Consequently, drawing a direct link between the two decisions is just bad analysis.
But indirect links are there: America’s credibility and reputation for staying power are on the line.
And if Russia’s invasion ends up a success, Beijing’s appetites will only grow.
And this is precisely why countries like South Korea and Japan are so invested in Ukraine’s success: as regional allies that will face the brunt of Chinese actions, they do understand (better than anyone) the importance of Ukraine in dissuading future Chinese expansionism and military adventurism.
And so, even though it is analytically not all that accurate to claim that B will necessarily follow A as a predictable next domino, Christie is nonetheless broadly correct.
And besides, from Christie’s point of view, what matters most these days is capturing the attention of conservative voters that are constantly bombarded by idiotic anti-Ukraine arguments coming from Trump, DeSantis and that Vivek guy - these are dangerous not just because they make it harder to help Ukraine, but because ultimately, they undermine the core national security interests of the US itself.
Saudi peace summit: unlikely to produce concrete outcomes - but useful in other ways
The peace summit held in Saudi Arabia saw the attendance of senior officials from more than 40 countries.
Ostensibly, this was a continuation of the Danish peace talks held in June - but the hosts of this one had a range of additional realpolitik motives (more on that later below).
The attendance was also more populous and notable - China skipped the Danish talks and joined (along with the EU, the US and India) the ones held in Jeddah.
The limit of premature peace talks.
First off, (according to a senior EU official privy to the ongoing talks) there has been some directional progress: an agreement has been reached on the establishment of working groups tasked with elaborating upon the key points outlined in Zelenskyy's comprehensive 10-point peace plan.
At the same time, a distinct cohort of ambassadors will work to explore potential resolutions to issues like global food security, nuclear safety, environmental stability, humanitarian assistance, and the liberation of detainees of war along with the abducted Ukrainian children.
These proposed solutions are to be thereafter discussed at the level of national security advisors.
In addition, a separate assembly of ambassadors stationed in Kyiv will work on establishing grounds for further technical discussions.
The ultimate goal seems to be to: 1) gather enough ground-level and commonly agreed facts, and 2) come up with outlines of potential solutions, 3) for them to be thereafter discussed at a higher level by the heads of states at a later summit.
In other words, these are diplomatic “shaping operations” - and there is nothing wrong with all that.
In fact, this is a necessary gruntwork that has to be done at some point in any case.
But it is important to not confuse these movements with actual progress towards a qualitative resolution of the conflict.
The fundamentals matter the most - and they point towards the impossibility of a genuine peace deal: neither side is ready/willing to give up on their war aims.
Ukraine is rightfully pursuing the liberation of its territories - there is still 18% of it under Russian occupation.
Kyiv estimates (correctly) that either it will liberate all/most of it, or it will liberate enough to dissuade Russia from further entrenchment - softening it up for a genuine concession and resolution of this conflict.
Moscow sees this differently - they are convinced of the strength of their defensive lines.
They can also see that Ukraine is still not fighting with the advantage of air power, or weapons like ATACMS, that their counteroffensive is likely to culminate in the fall: when further advances will be harder to make (due to both the weather and the dwindling stock of ammunition), and that 2024 will be an election year in the US - when Biden will likely face either Trump or DeSantis - both are at best ambivalent on Ukraine, and by then, if Ukraine is unable to secure further gains, Biden will face a strong pressure to ‘‘negotiate” (force Ukraine to give up territory) with Russia.
In other words, both sides are betting on the success of the current military strategy - and a genuine peaceful resolution to the conflict is thus impossible to attain.
Consequently, and at the end of the day, it really doesn’t matter where the talks are held or who attends them - if neither side is interested in giving up on their current military strategies.
But beyond this obvious fundamental obstacle, the summit itself - with its current format (mere two days of talks) and its host country - was not well-designed functionally to deliver any serious peace.
There was a serious “mismatched incentives” problem.
From the Saudi perspective, and with an acute awareness of the fact that a genuine solution to this conflict is not happening any time soon, dragging this thing out and creating a format where Saudis can entrench themselves for the duration of this process is in Riyadh’s interests.
In other words, Riyadh’s ultimate incentives point towards the preservation of optionality.
In the meantime, the Saudis get to play all sides and boost the Saudi prestige (by pushing for a lengthy process in which they are thoroughly entrenched).
Considering the overall context from Riyadh’s perspective makes it all pretty clear why this is in fact the case: there is currently a stalemate on the battlefield, and fall is approaching - Ukraine is about to exhaust its critical ammo sustaining its forward offensive, and advanced weapons to ensure an edge (like ATACMS and F-16s) still remain a distant possibility.
In addition, in just one year, there are going to be elections in America - a lot can change.
With this very high level context, there are (broadly) two scenarios and plans of action to consider:
1) Saudis could attempt to push for a genuinely pro-Ukraine and just peace in earnest, and then end up annoying Russia - who might not be defeated/forced into concessions.
And Russia which exits this conflict with a victory - and if it retains the occupied territories, it will certainly be a victory - no matter how costly or pyrrhic - will be strong and ambitious enough to remember the Saudi transgressions: soured relations, and weaker influence and leverage over Russia would necessarily follow.
2) Saudis could instead, hedge their bets - accepting the reality that stalemate is the most likely outcome.
Riyadh could then keep playing all sides: by being moderately tough on Russia, it can extract concessions.
It could, for example, demand pro-Saudi alignment on the OPEC+ oil production cuts/spurs.
Under this scenario, if peace talks lead absolutely nowhere, Saudis can still be remembered as a fence-sitting country that was tougher on Russia than its geopolitical peers and other countries of the Global South.
In fact, by excluding Russia from the summit, Saudis have already acted tougher than other Global South heavyweights like Brazil, India, Indonesia, or Egypt.
Crucially however, by not burning the bridges completely, Riyadh would be well-placed to recover and resume its transactional realpolitik vis-à-vis Moscow.
On the other hand, if Ukraine was to somehow succeed in its counteroffensive and was to either: 1) win outright, or 2) succeed in pressuring Russia into an unfavorable (to Moscow) peace treaty in alignment with (even if not in full carbon copy of) Zelensky’s 10 point peace plan (that first and foremost demands full sovereignty over all occupied lands), Saudi Arabia would then be remembered as a hitherto neutral state that stepped up its game and excluded Russia from peace talks when it was still enjoying an upper hand (occupying 18% of Ukraine and shielded very well by its heavily fortified defensive lines).
In other words, staying in the spotlight for as long as possible and pushing for a broadly favorable pro-Ukraine terms whilst not burning all bridges with Russia, is the most pragmatic and strategically prudent (and highly cynical) foreign policy that Saudis are both incentivized to follow, and one in fact they are actually likely to implement.
Here is the kicker: you could replace Saudi Arabia with any other fence-sitter country of medium or significant global geopolitical heft, and the fundamental calculation would not change.
That is to say that only a genuinely pro-Western, NATO, EU or G7/G20 state would be interested in pushing for a maximalist pro-Ukraine stance in such peace summits.
But then again by definition, such a summit would fail to rally the countries of the Global South, and the major swing states.
And here is where the value of the Jeddah summit comes in: it is not designed well for the grand ambitions to which it aspired.
But it is however useful in many other ways.
Practical, near-term accomplishments of the Saudi peace summit.
And we shall thus unpack the main instrumental geopolitical benefits secured from the peace summit in Saudi Arabia:
1) Russia’s isolation continues.
And it matters a lot.
First, there was South Africa’s inability to guarantee that Putin would not be arrested on an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant (and Putin clearly didn’t want to share the fate of the former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir - who, back in 2015 had to flee South Africa when the local courts disagreed with the government and were willing to execute the ICC warrant) - all amounting to an embarrassing fact: Putin will not be present for the BRICS leaders summit in South Africa this August.
Then there was the Russia - Africa summit held in St Petersburg - which saw the attendance rate plummet from the previous 43 to 17 member states.
And those who did attend, expressed their public displeasure for Putin’s decision to renege on the Black Sea grain deal - leading to widespread hunger in Africa.
Indeed, Kenya’s presidency had gone even further - accusing Russia of a ‘‘stab in the back”.
And now, we have Russia excluded from a major summit held by an ostensibly neutral state.
Saudis had hitherto never taken a major public stance - their refusal to invite Russia to this summit was a major event in itself.
Russia’s perceptual isolation will gradually lead to its actual isolation.
This is because, with Russia’s prestige melting away on the international stage, it will be much easier for the marginal swing states to join the bandwagon of diplomatic pressure and sanctions.
In other words, there is a social proof, or safety in numbers effect going on.
And as a corollary, the more countries are willing to take a stance against Russia, the weaker is Moscow’s hand in imposing a cost for such unfavorable behavior.
At this rate, Russia will simply not be able to afford to impose any bilateral costs to dissuade further unfavorable foreign policy from the countries of the Global South.
Moreover, such developments allow for the compliance ladder effect to kick-in - once the taboo of snubbing Russia is broken, it is much easier to then persuade a hypothetical fence-sitter state to take a more meaningful action - one with more economic & diplomatic consequence.
2) Russia’s internal regime comes under further pressure.
Putin’s pitch to his financial elite is very simple: 1) I am the only one who can reliably guarantee a modicum of internal order, and 2) You stick with me and I will make sure you are rewarded for loyalty.
With Prigozhin’s attempted coup, the first part of this value proposition came under a significant strain.
Putin was then incentivized to double-down on the second part of the equation: hence the recent decisions to give up on even the pretense of rule of law and to effectively seize and giveaway the assets of foreign companies (like those of Danone and Carlsberg) to the business leaders close to him.
But the summit in Jeddah was an alarm bell to this financial elite.
If they could previously feel safe in the knowledge that they can always take their assets to the Gulf monarchies (even if the West shunned them), now, that too cannot be taken at face value.
What if the current trend continues?
What if countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar succumb to the Western pressure?
What if their assets: their yachts, properties and bank accounts will no longer be safe even in these safe havens?
After all, changes on the ground are often first announced by directional political winds - and those are increasingly not blowing in the right (for Russia) direction.
3) Creating a wedge between Russia and China.
China said that the summit in Jeddah helped to “consolidate international consensus”
Now put yourself into Putin’s shoes when hearing this: your ‘‘ally’’ (apparently, a partner of ‘‘no limits”) attends a summit that Russia is excluded from, and says that 1) there is a consolidation of international consensus on the peace in Ukraine, and that 2) this is a good thing.
International consensus? Without Russia’s presence?
Clearly, any consensus arrived between the attending 40 states - heavily represented by the West - is not going to be a pro-Russia consensus.
If so, why is China so cheerful about this?
Why is Beijing so excited about an international consensus that excludes Russia?
Well…Naturally, China is more concerned about its own diplomatic heft and global reputation than the specific national security interests of Russia.
Beijing has a bigger fish to fry - it is in an existential struggle with the US, and convincing the world that it is not a menace to the global order - that it will not openly support Russia’s conquest of Ukraine, is far more important than pleasing Putin.
China still has a reputation to lose - unlike Russia, it is still being invited to polite company - like this very summit..
Nonetheless, it is also important to not overstate this - China is clearly not interested in Russia’s defeat either.
In fact, an ideal scenario for China is a freeze in the current status quo: that Russia’s gains are solidified - and it is rewarded for aggression (demonstrating to the entire world that NATO was not powerful enough to prevent occupation of 18% of Ukraine).
But further war, and uncertain outcomes, as well as disruptions to essential commodity trades, is decidedly not in China’s interests.
Furthermore, one could even go further and argue that the lack of sanctions relief for Russia is also in China’s interests: for it will make them even more dependent and will guarantee supply of energy at favorable (to China) terms.
This is especially important now that China’s economic growth has slowed down and the country is facing a risk of a deflationary spiral: it needs a fiscal stimulus, and cheap energy to supply its engines is of utmost importance.
But leaving aside these extreme outcomes (Russian triumph vs total humiliation), there are a number of gray area messy scenarios and outcomes that China could be persuaded into accepting.
And every time that Beijing participates in such talks, it is necessarily forced to moderate its rhetoric - limiting its own future scope of action.
And every such moderation will turn into a point of friction with Russia.
Russia is isolated, and cannot afford to lose full diplomatic backing of China.
Consider how the Kremlin was so quick to react to the aforementioned Chinese statements.
Moscow and Beijing have “identical or largely concurring approaches towards international affairs”, said Russia’s Foreign Ministry in a statement following a call with the Chinese officials after the Jeddah summit.
Translation: hey everyone.. just to be clear.. We are still allies!
Never mind that the Kremlin felt a powerful need to have a quick emergency call with their Chinese friends to confirm just how strong their alliance is.
Pathetic.
The Jeddah summit was successful in revealing the very brittle bonds between Russia and China, and given that Beijing has openly called for more summits of a similar format, we should be in for a treat..
And in strategic terms, the more unsure Putin is of China’s backing, the more likely it is that he is forced to reconsider his maximalist war aims.