Ukraine War Updates.
1) Ukraine repels Avdiivka counterattack - inflicting heavy casualties on Russia.
Russia’s assault on Avdiivka has resulted in a heavy toll: around 50 tanks, 100 armored vehicles, and 900 personnel according to Ukraine.
Even if these numbers are inaccurate and/or exaggerated, the directionality of claims is correct and well-corroborated by Russian military bloggers/telegram accounts.
Although the proximate aim of this attack was to probe Ukrainian defenses and achieve a breakthrough/catch Ukraine off-guard, in the grander scheme of things, Russia’s success in Avdiivka would have led to a significant morale loss both in Ukraine and in the West: it would have once again turned the tables and changed the narrative.
There was also a signaling effect of this attack: even when it was already clear that the assault on Avdiivka was largely doomed, Russia doubled down, and in doing so, it was implying a sheer capacity to not only defend its lines, but also to be fine with wasting so many resources on this small town (there is some logistical value to to Avdiivka - but not something you give up 50 tanks for when you are still at a point of producing only around 200 new tanks a year).
2) Ukraine gets ATACMS.
Finally, and after a very long delay, the Biden admin delivers the weapons that it should have had delivered at the outset of this counteroffensive (and ideally, much earlier) - not at the end of it.
Ukraine was quick to use these longer range (100miles+) ATACMS missiles to great effect: destroying 14 Russian helicopters and causing significant damage to an airfield.
That the US was about to supply ATACMS to Ukraine was in the news for the past several weeks now.
It is therefore astonishing that Russian commanders did not preemptively redeploy their helicopters to a base farther away from the frontlines - safer from the reach of ATACMS..
Just this episode alone shows extreme ongoing negligence in the Russian army.
3) Opposition wins elections in Poland - good news for Ukraine.
The Ruling PiS (Law and Justice) party was defeated by the broad coalition of political parties (Civic Coalition) led by former PM and the EU Council President Donald Tusk.
Although the ruling party had a stellar record in helping Ukraine, things started to change in September - when a petty dispute over grain imports from Ukraine led to an overreaction from the Polish PM - who then announced a pause in military aid to Ukraine.
More importantly, the dreaded bloc of Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland united in their reluctance to help Ukraine has now been avoided.
Although the new PM will have to deal with a PiS-aligned President (who will undoubtedly block/veto a lot of proposed legislation) and a constitutional court appointed by PiS, these are lesser political problems than the gloomy alternative that would have faced Ukraine.
The judicial independence spat with the EU will most likely be resolved very soon as well - meaning $37bln of EU funds will now be unlocked for Poland.
And that money will help Warsaw to further its aid to Ukraine: both directly and indirectly (through political capital gained from a happier Polish public that will now enjoy the spoils of extra $37bln).
4) Biden addresses the public and asks Congress for $105bln for the border, Israel, and Ukraine.
This significant allocation of funds (if Congress was to approve) would encompass $61.4 billion allocated to Ukraine, including $44.4 billion designated for the Department of Defense equipment to bolster their armament, replenish weapons inventory, and continue delivering essential military support.
Additionally, the request includes $14.3 billion for Israel and $9.15 billion for the State Department, earmarked for the provision of humanitarian aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Gaza.
In addition to these allocations for international affairs, the White House is also seeking $13.6 billion from Congress to address the issue of migration along the southern border.
This comprehensive package encompasses $6.4 billion for border operations, including holding facilities, $3.1 billion for additional border agents, $1.4 billion for migrant shelters and services, and $1.2 billion to combat the fentanyl crisis.
And in his national address, Biden spoke of strategic importance in helping Ukraine and Israel - and (correctly) linked Hamas to Iran (and once again warned the latter from joining the war).
(side note: and to further underscore Biden’s warning, the USS Carney (monitoring for Iranian proxy activity in the Red Sea) then used its Aegis air defense system to intercept & destroy Houthi-launched 19 missiles and drones aimed at Israel. The very fact that Yemen-based militias (that have nothing to do with Israel and Palestine) had joined the attack against Israel shows the extent to which Iran is orchestrating these attacks and provoking a wider conflict - something that those quick to condemn Israel must remember.)
Perhaps his most important point was this: “When terrorists don’t pay a price for their terror, when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and death and more destruction. They keep going. And the cost and the threats to America and the world keep rising. [emphasis added]”
This is of course spot on, and precisely the type of national address these cables were advocating for mere two weeks ago: “The Biden admin must do a better job in presenting a pragmatic, national-security/national interest-based argument in favor of a continuous support for Ukraine….The cost (in both blood and treasury) to Americans in dealing with such an unstable world will be much higher than the current level of US support at mere 0.18% of GDP and with no American troops on the ground.”
For far too long the national security discourse was dominated by intellectually deficient and extremely lazy false dichotomy between two binary choices: either America must intervene to prevent an acute national security threat or it must remain detached and ‘‘stop being the policeman to the world’’.
This is not how the world works, and Biden’s speech emphasized this point: sometimes, incurring costs, taking a stance, and getting involved is the only way to prevent much costlier and dangerous entanglements in the future.
The global world order - dominated by America’s rules, norms, and institutions - is a geopolitical world order that benefits Americans (and the rest of the law-abiding world - hence why most other advanced nations want to ally with the US and not Russia or China) the most - but like a well-kept garden, it requires constant attention watering, and sometimes, you need to get your hands dirty and take out the weeds before they crowd out the rest of the plants.
How the Israel vs Hamas war affects Putin’s plans.
As discussed in the previous cables, Russia is walking on a tightrope between Iran and Israel.
A lot is at stake for Russia - that Israel has thus far refrained from providing Iron Domes and other lethal equipment to Ukraine (in exchange for Russian SAMs turning off when Israeli fighter jets strike Iranian militias in Syria) is a diplomatic success for Putin - who is generally on good terms with Netanyahu.
Now, it is true that to date, Russia has limited its rhetoric to vague pro-Palestine statements - ignoring the issue of Hamas, and Israel’s potential conflict with the other Iranian proxy - Hizbullah.
But when it comes to actual foreign policy behavior - real conduct - Russia has displayed a surprising pro-Israeli stance.
Moscow is trying to balance pro-Palestine rhetoric with a pro-Israeli conduct.
A good example of this careful balancing act came in the form of U.N. Security Council votes.
On Wednesday, the US was the only country to exercise its veto power within the U.N. Security Council to block a resolution that sought a cessation of hostilities to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.
Naturally, Washington is the only country that cannot afford to be seen to tie Israel’s hands: and cessation of hostilities (no matter how legitimate the reason - in this case, delivery of aid), would reverse the Israeli momentum, allow Hamas to regroup, recoup, and recover, and create a new political status quo - where Israel would be perceived as the party re-starting the war, as opposed to reacting to one that started on October 7th.
And when America is blocking such measures, it is not only acting in Israeli interests - Washington itself is interested in preserving momentum and deterrence against Iran.
It cannot afford to look anything less than 100% behind Israel - Iran will latch onto any sign of hesitation, and its weight will dramatically increase - when Arab states (observing US hesitation) would hedge even more towards Tehran.
That this was a legitimate national security priority for the US was quite clear.
But that Russia abstained from this vote - as opposed to voting in favor of this resolution (as most of the other Security Council members did) was worthy of note.
This certainly is a pro-Israeli conduct.
But such subtle measures may not cut through the media noise - which focuses on statements and rhetoric.
Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, even a prominent Likud member (PM Netanyahu’s party) promised to retaliate against Russia (for their ostensible failure to back Israel against Hamas).
And the threat was quite specific too: “After we win this war... we will make sure that Ukraine wins... Russia will pay for what it did... [emphasis added]"
Now, this is of course just one individual not holding a cabinet post.
But the sentiment is widely shared: Russia’s subtle gestures may be remembered at the very top - but that very leadership will be pressured to help Ukraine by a wider general public sentiment that will want a payback for Moscow’s moral ambivalence in the war against Hamas.
With that said, let us now unpack a range of areas where the Israel vs Hamas war will have an impact on Putin’s near-term plans.
1) Ukraine.
In the short-term, and if the War is reasonably contained (without escalating to an extent that pulls in Iran/its assets like Hizbullah into a full-on participation) Russia is a clear beneficiary of the war between Israel and Hamas.
For a start, it is an opportunity and yet another data point to highlight the failure of the US-led ‘‘rules-based order”: Russian propaganda is quick to highlight how an escalation was inevitable, given that Gaza was essentially run as an open-air prison (as part of an Israeli apartheid state) - all with at least a tacit support from the US.
At the very outset of the Israel vs Hamas war, Deputy Chairman Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev was quick to say that the US should have been “busy with” working on “Palestinian-Israeli settlement” rather than “interfering” with Russia and providing Ukraine with military aid.
In the meantime, a Russian propagandist Sergei Mardan said what we all have been thinking about: “[Hamas vs Israel war] will take its [America’s] mind off Ukraine for a while and get busy once again putting out the eternal fire in the Middle East.”
It is pretty clear that Russian propaganda will milk the Israel vs Hamas war to demoralize Ukrainians: emphasizing the fact that with this raging hot war in the Middle East (which as of today, consumes more bandwidth and media attention in Washington than the war in Ukraine) will serve as yet another excuse and an argument against arming Ukraine.
If previously, Taiwan was used as an excuse to deny aid to Ukraine (that is, only the intellectual faction/ Elbridge Colby and Co was pushing for this angle, the Marjorie Taylor Greene wing didn’t even attempt to intellectualize their resistance to additional aid) now it is Israel (which, in strict military terms does not make sense; at least for now, the type of armament support that Israel needs - like replenishing the Iron Domes, is different from what is needed by Ukraine : ATACMS /F-16s, 155mm artillery shells etc).
Together with Russian counterattacks the goal is to demoralize leadership in Kyiv (if not the entire general population) and convince them that they should “negotiate” and cut their losses.
This is unlikely to work (at least for now).
But even if it doesn’t work on Ukrainians (or their Western backers), it can work on the domestic audience: it is easier to sell the viability of success in Ukraine when the West is indeed distracted by yet another major conflict.
2) Oil prices.
The ongoing (and thus far, only a week-long) war has not had a significant impact on oil prices with both Brent Crude and WTI moving within $5 range averaging around $87 and $90 respectively.
It is possible that the market is not yet seeing a major risk of a wider war, but in any case, the ongoing conflict will likely act as a floor for the price of oil - this is already great for Russia, as it means that the effect of recent Saudi production cuts (of 1 mln barrels per day - which are to be in effect for the rest of the 2023) will not wither away anytime soon.
Additionally however, if the conflict does escalate, and there is a need to impose further pressure on Iran (beyond refreezing the $6bln held in Qatar), then the US and its allies may turn the heat on Iran’s sanction-busting illegal exports of oil - it has long been estimated that merely enforcing the sanctions properly and using US Navy to crackdown fully on such shipments could end up removing almost an extra 1 mln barrels of oil per day from the global markets.
This would surely have a further effect to raise the prices (before they settle by end of this year and probably lower by early 2024 - when extra 670k barrels per day are expected from Brazil and Guyana).
In other words, and in the short-to-medium term, Putin is likely to benefit from the simmering tensions in the Middle East.
3) Expanding conflict means pressure on Russia to help Iran in Syria.
As discussed in previous cables, that Israel refused to supply Ukraine with Iron Dome air defense systems, and with lethal weapons in general, is a major diplomatic coup for Putin.
He has fully utilized his personal (rather warm) relationship with Benjamin Netanyahu to a maximum effect: there is nothing more that Russia could have realistically wanted from Israel on the Ukraine front.
But a growing conflict between Israel and Hizbollah, other Iranian militias, and even with Iran directly, is going to make it much harder for Putin to maintain the current delicate balance in his realpolitik games in the Middle East.
That Israel is occasionally ‘‘mowing the lawn’’ in Syria by targeting Iranian militias is actually in the Russian interests.
In fact, one of the reasons why Putin intervened in Syria directly in 2015 on behalf of the Assad regime, was his desire to prevent the fall of the regime into Iranian hands - since without Putin, only Iran would become a guarantor of the regime’s security.
And Iran gaining this much influence and leverage over the Middle East would have been unacceptable to Russia.
So when Israel is conducting air strikes against Iranian militias, Russian S-300 air defense systems in Syria become peculiarly inactive..
There is a clear coordination going on and Iran is aware, and is not taking it personally.
One has to remember that this corner of the world is still operating by the 19th century principles of the OG Bismarck..
Iran and Russia are not true allies of course - they are partners of convenience: enemy of my enemy is my conditional, limited friend with a looming expiration date.
But this current arrangement will come under a significant strain if Israel ups the ante.
If Hizbullah was to (on Iran’s orders) declare a full-on war on Israel (or if Israel begins one preemptively) then the pressure on Russia to help Iran in Syria will increase dramatically.
This is because, under this scenario, Iran would use the Iraq - Syria - Lebanon pipeline to transfer funds, soldiers and weapons to Hizbollah.
Naturally, Israel would want to cut-off this supply chain where it is able to do best: in Syria.
But with higher stakes (faced by Iran) come higher expectations from Moscow.
Putin will therefore find it increasingly difficult to tip-toe around expectations from both countries that hold significant leverage over Russia’s ability to prosecute the war in Ukraine.
Russia depends on Iranian missiles, drones and rockets.
On the other hand, if Moscow was to make Netanyahu’s life harder in Syria, then Israel would not forget this: and once the war with Iranian proxies/Iran was over, Israel would not have as many remaining incentives to not help Ukraine with lethal weapons.
4) More going to Lebanon means less going to Russia.
This would be the most direct hit to Russia’s campaign in Ukraine: every ballistic missile, Shahed drone or shorter-range munitions that are allocated to Iranian proxies are by definition unavailable to Russians.
And this a significant problem, since North Korea is thus far only helping with 152mm shells (although they could help with long-range ballistic missiles too, and perhaps they do already, but we simply do not have a definitive proof of this just yet).
Russia is insuring itself against this danger by recruiting help of Iranian engineers to build domestic drone production in Russia - but these are not going to come live for some time, and realistically, it will likely be the end of 2024 before they start producing serious output.
It is only natural therefore, that in a protracted conflict with Israel, the priority for Iran would be to save their proxies - especially Hizbullah.
Putin knows this, and even if he somehow managed to maintain a delicate balance between Israel and Iran (previous point), for this reason alone, a larger-scale war in the Middle East is clearly not in Russia’s interest.
Wow lots of great information.