Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War, Russian Navy suffers a major defeat, and Putin's psyops on 2024 elections.
Ukraine War Updates.
1) Ukraine’s progress.
Continues on both the Bakhmut and Zaporizhia axis.
Recent progress in Zaporizhia (especially, west of Verbove) has forced Russians to bring in more air defense systems from Bakhmut - increasing vulnerability of that city to further offensives.
In other words, we are reaching a point where Russians have to make unpalatable choices around which of the occupied cities are to be left vulnerable to attacks.
2) Ukraine destroys Russia’s S-400.
These are the most advanced air defense SAMs in the Russian arsenal - a major blow to Moscow.
With F-16s on their way to enter the battlefield in the upcoming months, S-400s will surely become an even higher priority for targeting.
And it is certainly in the US/NATO interests to supply Ukraine with ATACMs and other long-range missiles to take them out and avoid a scenario where S-400s get a chance to train their software on the most common fighter jet in the NATO arsenal.
3) Reminder on the significance of the Russia - North Korea alliance.
We have previously discussed how the budding alliance between Putin and Kim is a major threat to both Ukraine, and to the wider US & allied interests in the Pacific.
We also discussed how this should be countered, but unfortunately, most of the media/analyst community attention is still allocated into lighthearted dismissal of this threat.
Too much time is being spent on ridicule around the Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov’s statement that the discussions between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un were “very informative”.
That there is anything to learn from a country on a brink of starvation is truly comical.
What is not however, is the serious level of support that North Korea could offer to Russia.
In 2022, the Russian military used a total of 12 million artillery rounds against Ukraine.
And this is a problem, since at this point in time, it is generally well-understood that Russia can only produce around 20,000 rounds per month - of the Soviet-remnant 152mm-class artillery shells.
This is why the 10:1 artillery advantage in 2022 (when Russia was firing around 60k a day to Ukraine’s 4-5k) has fallen drastically.
Russia now fires between 10-20k a day, and even this seems unsustainable.
So there is a lot that North Korea can do for Russia - it sits on a stockpile of 152mm shells in the tens of millions range.
(side note: naturally, many of these may have expired and thus defective/dangerous to transport. But this is also (a reasonable) speculation only - what we do know is that Russia will get a lot of shells.)
And Russia’s reciprocity is of major concern too.
Although Putin himself mainly hinted on cooperation (mostly) around satellites - promising transfer of knowhow, the meeting that followed - between Kim and the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in Vladivostok suggests a wider range of possibilities.
During their meeting, Kim inspected a selection of Russia's cutting-edge weapons.
Air power assets like the Tu-22MS, Tu-95MS, and Tu-160 strategic bombers, alongside the Su25SM3, Su-30SM, and Su-34 fighter-bombers and MiG-31I missile carrier armed with Kinzhal missiles.
Kim furthermore inspected frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov, an advanced Uranus anti-ship missile system, and the sophisticated Kalibr cruise missiles.
This is no joke - if North Korea gets its hands on even a few of these advanced weapons, the balance of power in the Korean peninsula will change significantly.
North Korea already has a clear edge in brute artillery-based firepower - sophisticate air power, cruise missiles, and naval assets is what they lack - Russia can help to alleviate these gaps.
Naturally, this is a signal of leverage for both Moscow and Pyongyang, but the Kremlin in particular may use the threat of transferring these advanced conventional weapons to strengthen its hands in a Ukraine-related negotiation with Washington.
If Ukraine’s counteroffensive culminates in several weeks without a major breakthrough, then a smart thing for Putin to do would be to seize on this opportunity and use the North Korean angle to demand concessions from Washington on Ukraine.
One hopes that Washington will not be swayed by such short-term changes in the dynamics - fundamentals matter more, and Russia is still losing this war on a grand scheme of things.
What is needed for a decisive Ukrainian victory (or a battlefield progress strong enough to pressure Putin to negotiate a withdrawal in earnest) is West’s political will to provide all that Ukraine needs to defeat the Russian army on the ground.
And given the astonishing contrast between the minimal real cost, and the enormous upside of defeating Russia in Ukraine, it is extremely disappointing that there even exists a not so insignificant risk of this not happening: that there is even a chance of the political will eroding away, and Putin being right in his bet against the political resolve and staying power of the West.
The Russian Navy suffers major losses in the Black Sea.
At the time when the main land-based counteroffensive was yet to produce any breakthroughs, the Ukrainian army accomplished a rare feat - it used the UK-supplied storm shadow missiles to destroy a KILO-class Russian submarine docked in Crimea.
(side note: Ukraine also deployed Naval drones to attack a Russian patrol ship.)
Now, there is still a debate on whether the submarine was actually destroyed - it was dry docked and many experts believe that repair is still possible.
But in practice, it is as good as dead at this point - the damage that it had sustained was significant, and the ensuing fire was notable.
Repairing it (even if possible) will surely take significant time and resources - not to mention a threat of further attacks.
Even on a symbolic level, this is monumental - a first Russian submarine lost to enemy fire since WWII.
On a tactical level, the KILO class submarines are capable of carrying Kalibr cruise missiles - one more launchpad for these missiles is now gone.
But perhaps the most significant implications are strategic:
1) The Port of Sevastopol hosts 4 (now that one is gone) KILO-class submarines, and because Turkey (exercising its duty under the Montreux convention) has closed the straits to the Russian warships into the Black Sea basin, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is not able to replenish the losses that it sustains.
And this in turn leads to;
2) If these strikes continue, Russia will either have to abandon the Black Sea (for the duration of the War) or reinforce Crimea with advanced air defense systems/ SAMs.
Both options are bad, but if they go for the latter, then it is probable that many short-range SAMs will also need to be redirected to the Crimean peninsula (away from the main frontlines of Zaporizhzhia) - this will then allow Ukrainian companies and battalions to move further ahead with lesser threat to the accompanying air power (mainly drones for now, but also, low-flying F-16 in the near future).
In the meantime, this is an excellent opportunity for the West to make another push for a reinstatement of the Black Sea grain deal - threatening (behind closed doors) further targeted military and intel aid to Ukraine to specifically carry out similar attacks against Russian warships and submarines docked at Crimea.
Putin’s messaging gambit - almost all upsides.
That the 2024 US presidential elections would feature Putin as a de facto Fox News pundit was always a given.
And so, it was not at all surprising when Putin seized upon another devious opportunity and commented on Trump’s legal woes: “What’s happening with Trump is a persecution of a political rival for political motives…This shows the whole rottenness of the American political system, which cannot claim to teach others about democracy.”
This is a blatant manipulation so obvious that only Trump could fall into.
Naturally, if Trump wins, he will surely remember (and be reminded of) Putin’s support for the ‘‘witch hunt’’ narrative.
In fact, Putin has a major advantage over Zelensky in this regard - he can go all in against Joe Biden, and give his full support to Trump - whereas Zelensky cannot.
Zelensky could not even entertain such notions - but he also needs to lay a foundation for the eventuality of Trump winning the election.
And here, the most that Zelensky could do, was to appeal to Trump’s better angels, giving him a reputation to live up to: claiming that Trump would ‘‘never” support Putin because “that isn’t what strong Americans do.”
Yet another blatant Trump ego management technique on display: since you are a strong American = you would never support Putin.
It is comical how little foreign leaders think of Trump that they think (probably, not incorrectly) that such obvious appeals could even work.
But back to Putin - since he is a man that always tries to maximize his options, this statement should therefore be viewed from that lens - and it is pretty clear that it is almost all upside for him:
1) If Trump wins: Putin now has his (and crucially, his followers’) goodwill. Since Ukraine is turning (weirdly) into a Dem/Traditional GOP vs MAGA issue, Putin will have a lot of political capital with the strongest Trump voices in the media and in formal political institutions.
It is entirely plausible that the new Trump admin would push Ukraine to offer Putin major territorial concessions (threatening to withdraw military/financial aid otherwise) - rewarding Russia for this invasion, and essentially, granting Putin a solid victory at the end.
(side note: at least that is how Putin interprets (probably correctly) Trump’s hyperbolic promise to negotiate and settle the war in one day)
In addition, there is a particular group of foreign policy neophytes that still propose granting Putin a win in Ukraine in return for his commitment to distance from China - exactly the type of game that Putin would love to play..
2) If Trump loses or is otherwise disqualified/incapacitated: a significant part of the GOP base (strong MAGA wing) will not forget Putin’s support for their leader.
Trump may be gone, but MAGA will remain, and many will continue to influence the policy via Congress (or worse yet - by pressuring a non-MAGA GOP President to soften the support to Ukraine).
3) Bonus point no matter what happens: Putin is insinuating a solid, friendly relationship with Trump.
And in doing so, he is reviving the “Trump is Putin’s stooge” narrative, and reactivating the “Russia hoax” debates that have consumed so many years of America’s political discourse.
And any domestic political conflict and instability in the US, is already a good outcome for the Kremlin.
How this could backfire for Putin.
1) Preemptive Trump-proofing.
Last week, we discussed how the EU has now overtaken the US as the main sponsor of Ukraine’s war efforts.
Our European allies are stepping up and preparing for a scenario where American support is no longer a given.
This is good.
But Putin blatantly cozying up to Trump will create incentives for similar Trump-proofing tactics in Washington.
Biden admin and Dems in Congress are already scrambling to pass further legislation to further equip Ukraine for a lengthy war.
But mainstream and non-MAGA GOP members will sense similar pressure to align with Dems and Trump-proof the US government.
In other words, Putin’s blatant statements may push all non-MAGA politicians (regardless of party affiliations) to rally together, join forces, and pass all possible pro-Ukraine funding/legislation (especially, measures that are harder to reverse - such as commitments to train more troops/F-16 pilots) before Trump takes over in January 2025.
2) Opposite signaling pressure if Trump comes to power.
In spite of all the pro-Putin sentiment uttered by Trump, it is not at all a given that he would in fact pursue a pro-Russia policy in office.
Zelensky may be right, and Trump’s own first term is a good precedent for that.
No matter what Trump says, the hawks surrounding him may in fact push him in the opposite direction - like they did last time.
After all, let’s not forget that it was under Trump admin that:
1) Ukraine was finally supplied with lethal weapons (like the Javelin missiles - something that Obama admin shamefully refused to provide) that significantly increased the cost of military operations for the rebels in Donbas - reducing the number and scale of actual fighting.
In other words, a foreign policy that actually worked in containing Russia.
2) In 2017, the US engaged in air strikes against the Syrian regime (for chemical weapon usage) when Russian troops were already there - protecting Assad.
Just 4 years before that, under the pre-Trump admin, (and when Russia did not have a presence in Syria like in 2017) Obama declared red lines for Assad and then failed to honor them.
3) Trump admin imposed a number of high profile sanctions on Russia - starting with the August 2017 sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions act (CAATSA).
And this happened only eight months into his presidency - when Trump’s public rhetoric towards Putin was much softer than in the subsequent years.
4) Russian ‘‘Kaspersky labs’’ cybersecurity company was banned from use by the US government.
5) By the end of 2017, the White House National Security Strategy document officially identified Russia (and China) as adversarial to the US.
6) US released the ‘‘oligarch list’’ and a number of Russian entities and individuals were sanctioned under the Global Magnitsky Act.
7) There were indictments in relation to the cyber attacks and election meddling
8) Under Sec of Defense Mattis, the US-led coalition killed around 300 Russian (Wagner) mercenaries in Syria - as an act of self-defense and retaliation.
So overall, yes Trump was publicly soft towards Putin - but when it comes to substance, his admin was definitely not pursuing pro-Russia policies.
Many more (and certainly larger in scale) sanctions and retaliations should have been implemented - especially in relation to cyber attacks and election meddling.
But on the whole, the Trump admin was tougher on Russia than Obama admin ever was - in fact, it was the toughest admin on Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union.
And history may in fact repeat itself - we might get another Trump admin where experienced and hawkish foreign policy leaders resume the traditional US policy - and maybe even with far more vigor.
(side note: of course all this may be wishful thinking. Unlike last time, Trump is not falling into the Presidency by surprise. He now has MAGA institutions producing their own foreign policy line/leaders that Trump would surely want to populate the White House, State Department and the DoD with. But overall, still premature to completely write-off a future Trump admin as pro-Russia.)
But even with all that said and done, and even if Putin’s gambit backfires and Trump’s new admin follows orthodox foreign policy and continues its support for Ukraine (perhaps, even with more intensity), it could still be argued that this is still a better outcome for Putin than a traditional politician occupying the White House.
To see why, just watch this pro-Kremlin academic (video attached below) and Deputy Dean of World Politics at Moscow State University how Trump is seen as a ‘‘destroyer’’ in Russia.
In other words, even if things don’t work out on a macro scale, for the Kremlin, it is still better to have someone prone to causing internal chaos and division.
That at least serves as an internal distraction in the US, and creates multiple openings and tactical opportunities for short-term gambits fan like Putin to explore and exploit.
