Cables On The Russian Coup That Did Not Happen.

Can you uncross the Rubicon?

Prigozhin’s uprising: what it was and what it most certainly was not.

• Wagner PMC’s leader Prigozhin’s march on Moscow captured attention worldwide.

• Regardless how this eventually ends (and we should certainly assume that the drama is far from over - even if Prigozhin had ordered his troops to withdraw from their march, and even if some strange (and in the long-term, almost certainly unsustainable) deal was struck between him and Putin), this is a monumental historic event - one that shattered the Russian state to its very (turns out shallow) core.

• To truly understand how much of a big deal this was, imagine the following scenario: a disgruntled leader of a private military company (PMC), say Blackwater, reaches a considerable size (perhaps 1/20th of the US army) and professionalism (recruiting senior and well-connected officials from the US marines, Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, etc), and decides to march on Washington DC, and seizes Richmond, Virginia on the way - seeing no resistance from the general public or from the military forces that abandon their HQ and let these PMC officers in.

• Only in this “incident’’ the city in question was 5x bigger than that of Richmond, Virginia - similar in size to San Diego.

• Now, there are a number of ways to describe Prigozhin’s conduct.

• Some may call it an attempted coup (including these cables), others may dispute this label by pointing out that 1) Prigozhin never openly declared intent to remove Putin (as if such an intent must be spelled out explicitly - it is reasonable for him to keep all of his options open and avoid trapping himself rhetorically), and 2) Coups are usually an affair organized by central power structures to swiftly remove and replace key players from within the government (for example: coup against Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 - when General El-Sisi removed President Mosri, or attempted Turkish coup of 2016 - when a certain group of generals from within the state had attempted to do something similar), and that because this was a rogue player from outside the political establishment/state institutions, it is more apt to describe this as an armed insurgency.

• This intra/outside challenge seems to be an arbitrary distinction - what matters most, is that this was a specific player with capacity to challenge the number 1 power base of his own state, and he did in fact utilize this power to do precisely that.

• Armed insurgencies typically come either: 1) unorganized, or 2) organized but with political objectives other than the takeover of the existing power structures (in other words, they usually have objectives of carving out some territory/local autonomy for the participants of the insurgency).

• And Prigozhin certainly did not have any demands of such nature - he wasn’t interested in fighting a civil war: his only goal was to maximize his own power and diminish those of his adversaries (Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu and Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov).

• But what about a mutiny?

• Possible - and certainly more appropriate than an insurgency, and yet still not fully descriptive of the actual events.

• Mutineers do not typically have grand political objectives, and mutinies are usually backlashes against specific “ground-level” proximate grievances.

• If Prigozhin’s actions were indeed those of a reactionary/backlash type and were also localized in their remit, then we could have labeled it as a mutiny.

• But there is good circumstantial evidence (and in fact, the US intel was apparently aware of this since mid-June) that Prigozhin’s political objectives were driving his conduct - and that this was certainly a premeditated move where he evidently pushed for as much as he could.

• Whatever precise label you put on it however, let us establish some ground rules on what it was not:

• 1) A political show/psyop - this is a surprisingly widespread theory.

• This is of course pure nonsense: a curated drama requires agreement of both participants, and what on earth would Putin gain here other than demonstrating his weakness and lack of grip?

• Maybe see who would potentially join into rebellion? But this would still be a stretch.. an incredibly speculative argument based on precisely zero evidence.

• 2) That this was a CIA operation.

• First of all, why the US would want a psychopathic war criminal in charge of Russia is unclear.

• (side note: at least Putin is a devil that we know, and have studied for years)

• But even if the CIA did have this intent, it is almost inconceivable that they could orchestrate this - and yet this is a theory already taking hold and already being voiced by the “thought leaders’’ of conspiracy-minded far right..

• This is of course pure insanity..But unfortunately we still have to dismiss such baseless ‘‘arguments’’.

• With all that said, and with an important caveat that these are still early days, and we will undoubtedly need to wait and see to a) collect more credible evidence on precisely what did/did not happen in the 24 hrs of June 23-24, and b) determine medium and long-term implications based on the conduct of both parties and other players/stakeholders involved, there are still a number of inferences and observations we can make: and some of these will in fact be based on first principles and can be maintained with a significant level of confidence.

Events leading to and triggering the attempted coup.

• Regular readers of these cables are now well-aware of our focus on Wagner and their antics leading up to the events of June 23.

• Since early January, Prigozhin has been consistently intensifying his rhetoric against Shoygu and Gerasimov.

• He frequently painted them in a negative light - labeling them corrupt and incompetent (whilst emphasizing the bravery and competence of his own troops).

• It is also true that Wagner did in fact accomplish a lot (in comparison to the overall poor performance from the rest of the Russian military).

• The only major battlefield accomplishment from Russia in the past six months was a direct result of Wagner’s “human wave attacks” - at an enormous toll too (with estimated 20k KIAs from the Russian side).

• And in addition to concrete results, Prigozhin has always been a master of social media: using his telegram channel, he frequently posted videos of himself right where the action was (to be fair, he did in fact lead from the front and put his life in danger), contrasting this with the soft/passive image of the actual leaders of the Russian military: Gerasimov and Shoygu.

• He frequently accused these leaders of deliberately hampering Wagner’s progress by limiting ammo - ostensibly, to take away Wagner’s glory (in the process, he positioned/painted himself as the true patriot being pulled back by corrupt and selfish bureaucrats).

• This all culminated in direct personal attacks (calling them “fat cats”) against the two military leaders.

• Back in early May, these cables highlighted these insults, and outlined the unpalatable dilemmas faced by Putin:

• “Wagner leader Evgeny Prigozhin published a new self-made video full (standing by the side of dead bodies) of extreme rhetoric and personal insults directed at the Russian military’s top brass - Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu and Chief of the General Staff (and head of the overall Ukraine command) General Valery Gerasimov.”

• In that very post, we also emphasized the unpalatable dilemmas face by Putin: punish Wagner and risk losing this valuable tool, or do nothing and appear weak and not in control: incentivizing Prigozhin to push for more and his own security apparatus leaders to hedge their bets/coalition build as alternative ways of protecting their skin.

• Putin refused to punish them back in early May - these cables have emphasized how complacent this was from Putin: if an autocrat is not seen as being in charge, then he truly is not - as simple as that.

• Earlier in June, the Ministry of Defense (Shoygu) decided that enough was enough, and that it was time to bring Wagner back in the fold.

• The Defense Ministry proposed to establish new military contracts for all private military companies to come under direct supervision and control - this was a necessary but exceptionally belated move.

• Putin hesitated for days, without making a clear decision.

• He finally endorsed the plan only weeks ago - in fact, only in last week’s cables we labeled Putin as a “reluctant administrator”.

• Days later, Prigozhin claimed to have been attacked by the helicopters sent by the Defense Ministry.

• (side note: and this was not the first time he claimed to have been under lethal fire by Russia’s military. He has also previously accused the ministry of mining the roads on the way out of Bakhmut - ostensibly to target Wagner troops withdrawing from the city when handing the control back to Russian military)

• He rebelled and marched into Russia- destroying several air force aircrafts in the process.

• (side note: but a WaPo report shows that the US intel was already aware by mid-June, that Prigozhin was plotting a move, and that senior US military and admin officials were briefed on the matter of Prigozhin making a possible move against Russia’s defense ministry on Wednesday - fully two days before Prigozhin’s actual attempt on June 23. So either: 1) The helicopter attack was a ‘‘false flag’’ operation/excuse for Prigozhin to launch his putsch, or 2) This was a genuine attempt by the ministry to get rid of Prigozhin (unaware of Wagner’s imminent plans), or 3) The order to eliminate Prigozhin came directly from Putin - who was (alongside US officials) also aware of Prigozhin’s intent)

• This was clearly not an incident dropping out of nowhere - the conditions were ripe for this to happen.

• Putin should have seen this coming in slow motion - but as highlighted in a number of previous posts, he has grown exceptionally complacent, and actually rather weak.

The crucial 24hrs: what plausible inferences we can make & what are their implications.

• 1) Prigozhin marched into Rostov with his army and columns of trucks (carrying personnel and supplies) and apparently faced very little/no resistance on the way.

• This is indicative of the poor state of Russia’s internal defense structures: those guarding the Putin regime: the FSB, Rosgvardia, and general police, produced zero impact/resistance.

• Moreover, upon entering the city, Prigozhin took over the HQ of the Southern Military District (in charge of a significant amount of frontline operations on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine).

• Once again, he faced zero resistance, and not only: he found key generals at the HQ.

• Prigozhin’s march was announced hours before via his telegram/social media accounts.

• Why weren’t the key generals of the Southern Military District evacuated somewhere safe - away from Prigozhin’s grip?

• If the determination was that the defense of the HQ was impossible at such a short notice, surely the second best alternative would have been to protect and preserve crucial generals of this command & control center?

• How does it make sense to leave them behind to be captured as hostages?

• Why were there no orders to evacuate them - making sure that Prigozhin could not get his hands on key generals and thus use them as bargaining chips in a future negotiation?

• All of this is indicative of massive confusion and incompetence in the command & control structure of Russia’s formal military - and within the Kremlin itself.

• It is one thing to fail in detecting/preventing Prigozhin crossing the border - quite another to then waste hours and fail to evacuate key personnel.

• 2) The Chechen militia - Kadyrov’s “Akhmat” forces proved useless as ever.

• These TikTok warriors offered zero help to Putin.

• Some of them were apparently sent to Rostov - where they were quickly detained (without any resistance) by Wagner troops.

• Others were sent to Moscow - apparently to guard a bridge.

• True to their form, they published a few TikTok videos with epic soundtracks.

• Putin must have already suspected that these “fighters” were in fact of very limited actual utility, but this was the final confirmation of the obvious: in times of crisis, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov is exceptionally useless.

• (side note: more than anything, their involvement helps with the Kremlin’s PR. It is useful to show to other ethnic minorities in Russia - amounting to a disproportionately high amount of conscripts fighting in Ukraine - that they are not alone: look at cool Chechens. You can a) be an ethnic minority, b) fight for “ multicultural Russia”, and c) be cool)

• 3) Locals of the city with more than 1 million residents welcomed (with food and drinks) and sent off Wagner soldiers as heroes.

• Just look at this footage of Wagner troops leaving Rostov - with chants of support.

• Now, contrast this with the attempted coup in Turkey - when hundreds of thousands of people came out in the streets - blocking military personnel and even tanks!

• In other words, the Turkish leader who failed to win a majority of parliamentary seats a full year prior to the coup (and back in 2015 - when Turkey was not a Presidential system - when Parliamentary elections were all that mattered), garnered more real and intense public support than Putin (with all his political opposition either murdered or in prison) could ever hope for.

• There is no footage of even one Russian civilian coming out in the street challenging Wagner troops.

• This must surely be a belated wake up call to Putin - his regime is in real decay.

• True, he has pacified most of the population - ensuring ennui, and apathy-driven compliance, but a warlord challenging his rule is treated to a hero’s send off by citizens of a major Russian city - hours after Putin labels them as traitors in his national address.

• 4) Russia’s “elite” remained largely quiet.

• They were busy escaping the chaos.

• Outbound flights to destinations like Istanbul and Dubai were very rapidly sold out.

• We didn’t see major celebrities and/or industry/business leaders come out a) publicly, and b) unequivocally in defense of their state (let alone Putin).

• Not a single regional governor or member of the Duma (parliament) came out publicly in Putin’s support in the first 13 hours prior to Putin’s speech.

• The fact Russia is a mafia state that has failed to secure genuine loyalty from its subjects was on full display.

• 5) Prigozhin had overestimated his hand.

• Major generals and commanders like Surovikin (theater commander prior to Gerasimov - and a relatively competent one too: ensuring orderly retreat from Kherson, and saving 30k Russian troops in the process) - individuals that Prigozhin liked and praised in public (and whose support he was surely betting on securing) came out quickly against him - calling for unity and loyalty to President.

• Not one major general/commander from any of the branches of the armed forces of Russia joined Prigozhin.

• We also didn’t see any ordinary soldiers switching sides either: in fact, we saw the very opposite - some of the Wagner troops refused to partake in the attempted coup.

• 6) From early on, Prigozhin had hedged his bets to preserve optionality.

• He never openly called for the removal of Putin - preserving a way out (which he later used - more on that further below) for himself and his fighters.

• But perhaps precisely because of this hedging, he failed to inspire many more followers.

• From the very outset, Prigozhin’s announced political objectives (defense of Wagner, removal of Shoygu and Gerasimov) were rather limited in their ambitions.

• And great sacrifices (from followers) require a grand vision and inspiring goals.

• That, Prigozhin did not offer - him hedging his bets displayed uncertainty and lack of unyielding confidence in his own mission: essential ingredients in inspiring more followers (that risk so much by switching sides prematurely, and being trapped in a failing endeavor).

The ‘‘deal” that ended Prigozhin’s March, and the unsustainable status quo: something must give.

• We still don’t know all (or even most of) the details of the deal (brokered by Belarusian President Lukashenko - of all people).

• Apparently as part of the agreement, Prigozhin will now leave to Belarus - making this his base for future operations.

• (side note: there is some excellent reporting on the backstory on negotiations, from a very reputable (one of few remaining) independent Russian media sources Meduza. According to the Kremlin insiders, the actual negotiations were conducted by the likes of Putin’s chief of staff Anton Vaino, Security Council secretary Nikolai Patrushev, and Russia’s ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov. And that Lukashenko was involved because Prigozhin needed extra legitimacy / guarantee for the deal by involving a head of state. Naturally, Lukashenko was all too happy to return to the limelight and recover at least some prestige)

• This doesn’t make sense, and if true (and Prigozhin follows through on this commitment), this would amount to a voluntary self-exile, and it is hard to see Prigozhin not suffering from a consequent reputational blow in the eyes of his key lieutenants, his fighters, and those in the extreme right/ military blog sphere that have been cheering him on.

• But there are a few things that we do already know (according to the Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov) about this deal:

• 1) All criminal charges against Prigozhin will be dropped and he will move to Belarus

• 2) Wagner fighters who didn’t take part in this putsch and stayed on the sidelines, will sign contracts with the MoD

• 3) Those that followed Prigozhin and did take part, will not be charged.

• What we didn’t learn/ still don’t know is if Shoygu and Gerasimov will remain in their posts.

• For now, and if we have to make a reasonable guess, then the answer is most likely yes: although Prigozhin saved his skin, it is hard to consider this a “win” for him.

• After all, he is self-deporting to Belarus, and it is difficult to see how he could convince his fighters to follow him once again against Putin.

• Putin of course knows this: Prigozhin’s leverage - while not totally gone - has indeed weakened considerably.

• So then, why give up Shoygu and Gerasimov - and do something extremely embarrassing just to appease a warlord (now in exile)? Why look even weaker and more pathetic than you already are?

• Implications of this deal & the unsustainable status quo.

• 1) In Russia, you can get imprisoned for up to 15 years for displaying the “no war” sign, but if you challenge the President with your own private army (and destroy 7 helicopters and fighters (here is an aftermath footage of one of these), take over a military command center and senior generals as hostages) you can get all criminal charges against you dropped.

• Let us pause and think what kind of a precedent is Putin setting here?

• What incentives is he creating for future wannabe Prigozhins?

• That as long as you can prepare really well, you too can take a shot at number one in the system, and then use your leverage and threat of further bloodshed and chaos as an escape card?

• What lessons will regional governors and mayors draw here?

• That to ensure their own survival, they too should urgently develop their own private military companies or informal militias?

• 2) Prigozhin’s next moves are unclear.

• Mainly because it is really too early to tell how this will all play out in terms of his reputation and ability to organize and shape further campaigns.

• As mentioned before, many hardcore Wagner supporters and “influencers” on social media are describing this deal in terms highly unfavorable to Prigozhin.

• He is painted as someone who backtracked at a crucial point.

• But then again:

• A) So did Putin.

• Let’s be clear, Putin did in fact chicken out as well.

• Earlier in the day, he described the whole affair as a “stab in the back” by “traitors” and promised to punish these traitors.

• By the end of the day (at which point, he was more like a mayor of St Petersburg than a President of Russia), he chickened out from an actual confrontation, and Prigozhin is alive and well (at least for now, more on that further below);

• B) Prigozhin’s framing of his retreat (to avoid further “bloodshed” amongst Russians) did also resonate quite well.

• This is of course total nonsense: there is little doubt that Prigozhin would have hesitated to kill many more on his way - that is, if there was a viable path towards victory.

• But the hero’s send off that he received in Rostov, is indicative of him securing a realistic chance of political revival - and thus, power.

• 3) Putin’s reputation is in the gutter..

• Both with the formal security forces, nationalists, and the general public.

• He has now definitely proven that he is only in control as long as his opposition is a liberal politician, a journalist, or a soft oligarch with no access to hard power.

• Indeed the “ultrapatriots” like Girkin/Strelkov (who started the war in Donbas in 2015, and is now calling for a total war) have already started to openly attack Putin -essentially, calling him an impotent puppet: saying that Russia now has two Presidents.

• (side note: it would have been amazing to see the real-time facial expressions of a “strongman” Putin fanboys here in the US - the Tucker Carlson and his crew of right-wing delusional fringe)

• 4) Putin needs to make a move - and do so very fast.

• All of this leads us to the final (for now) conclusion: the current status quo & balance of powers is simply untenable.

• Putin must surely know that an actual resolution of this “problem” leads to only one inevitable path: actual “liquidation” of Prigozhin.

• And it is inconceivable that Prigozhin doesn’t also realize this (he can ask Ukraine about the reliability of the Kremlin’s security guarantees (Budapest memorandum 1994)) - and so, it would be surprising not to see him prepare for such eventualities in advance - and perhaps, make another comeback.

Battlefield implications

• We should not draw too many conclusions on how this whole incident will affect Russia’s frontlines operations (at least not this early).

• But we can make some observations:

• 1) If a major Ukrainian army crossed the border into Russia proper, it could have almost reached Moscow within 24 hours.

• We have Wagner to thank for this revelation.

• (side note: naturally the practicalities of this would be almost impossible to pull off. Such an invading force (of substantial size - to not waste thousands of lives in vain) would first need to accumulate near Russia’s border. By then, Russia could relocate its troops to defend its own territory. In addition, Ukraine’s march on Moscow would look radically different. Citizens would surely rise up in the face of an invading force and obstruct their way). But perhaps this is something that Ukrainians will now consider: not to actually invade Russia, but to pull away Russian troops from the second and third layers of defenses in Donbas)

• 2) Manpower/ personnel availability is unlikely to be affected in the short-term.

• This is because a) Wagner had already withdrawn from Bakhmut, and b) Frontline troops were not pulled back from Ukraine to deal with Wagner.

• 3) Manpower issues could become acute in the medium-to-long-term.

• That is, if Wagner’s nearly 30k troops (with 5k battle hardened elite fighters) don’t return to Ukraine, but instead go to Belarus

• And if they do redeploy to Ukraine, it is still hard to see the return of business as usual…

• The tensions with the regular army commanders will be immense.

• A lot will depend on how many Wagner troops switch sides and take on new contracts with Russia’s Ministry of Defense.

• 4) There will likely be significant morale issues within Russia’s military.

• Beyond the mere chaos and mockery of formal Russian command, Prigozhin had also destroyed the official Kremlin rationale for war.

• In a video on June 23, he dismissed the official excuses to do with Ukraine allegedly bombing Donbas in February 2022 (proximate cause), and NATO’s “expansionist” policy (long-term cause), claiming instead that this was all a plot to enrich oligarchs of the Putin regime…

• Good luck maintaining strong intra-army morale with those toxic allegations flying around.

• And good luck recruiting more “volunteers” after this whole episode.

• (side note: and all of these difficulties might then force Putin to call for another mobilization. And it is unclear how the Russian public (seeing the weakness of his regime and Putin’s own shaky grip on power) react on this occasion).

• One thing is clear however, this intra-regime chaos in Russia is good news for Ukraine.

• This will also weaken the argument that Putin is winning the war of attrition and that time is on his side.

• Clearly, the longer the war lasts, the more strain is imposed on his regime.

• Consequently, the pressure to force Ukraine into premature concessions (especially in light of a slow ongoing counteroffensive) will lessen.

• The full implications of this incident will however, continue to unfold over the coming weeks and months - and we shall address all of them as they come.